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Carving Out Policy Autonomy for 
Developing Countries in the World Trade 
Organization: The Experience of Brazil and 
Mexico 
ALVARO SANTOS* 
 
Although liberal trade and development scholars disagree about the merits of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), they both assume that WTO legal 
obligations restrict states’ regulatory autonomy. This Article argues for relaxing 
this shared assumption by showing that, despite the restrictions imposed by 
international economic law obligations, states retain considerable flexibility to 
carve out policy autonomy. The Article makes three distinct contributions. 
First, it analyzes how active WTO members can, through litigation and 
lawyering, influence rule interpretation to advance their interests. Second, the 
Article redefines the concept of “legal capacity” in the WTO context and 
introduces the term “developmental legal capacity,” which describes how states 
can use legal tools and institutions not only as a sword to open new markets but 
also as a shield for heterodox economic policies. Third, the Article offers a 
comparative analysis of two case studies, Brazil and Mexico, and shows that 
they have pursued different trade and litigation strategies. While subject to the 
same WTO obligations, these countries have made different use of their policy 
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space according to their own economic objectives. The Article concludes that, 
despite the apparent rigidity of the WTO, countries following a deliberate 
strategy can expand their regulatory space to advance their own interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As countries around the world responded to the 2008 global financial 
crisis with economic stimulus and rescue packages, a vigorous debate 
developed in the rich North Atlantic countries about the role of the state 
in the market. In the United States, the government bailout of several 
financial institutions, the rescue of the American car manufacturers, and 
the start of several investment and spending projects seemed to inaugurate 
a greater role for the state in the economy. For a brief period of time, it 
seemed as though the strong belief in markets and the aversion to active 
state participation had crumbled and a paradigm shift in economic thought 
had taken place. Although this proved to be a temporary illusion and the 
parameters of the public debate have shifted dramatically since then, the 
crisis initiated a worldwide debate about the virtues and limits of the 
market. This debate had been going on for years in the context of 
developing countries — what was different this time was that a grave 
economic crisis originated in and affected the rich industrialized countries 
directly. This time, the debate and the reform policies that followed would 
have immediate consequences on the economies of the rich countries. 
The global financial crisis also threw the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) into the limelight and reenergized a vigorous debate between two 
main positions, which I call the “liberal trade” and “development” 
positions. Liberal trade scholars defend the WTO as an institution that can 
bring prosperity and increase economic welfare in the world. Development 
scholars, on the other hand, criticize the WTO for curtailing developing 
countries’ policy autonomy and hindering their ability to undertake the 
kind of policies that wealthy countries undertook to become rich. 
Interestingly, although liberal trade and development scholars disagree 
about the merits of the WTO, they both share an assumption that the 
WTO effectively restricts a state’s capacity to regulate in favor of its own 
domestic economic interests; the difference is that the former group 
celebrates this condition and the latter bemoans it. 
In this Article, I examine and challenge the assumptions of the two 
main positions in the debate. Development scholars argue that by 
imposing tight legal restrictions the WTO system hinders poor countries’ 
prospects for economic growth. As I will show, however, many of the 
legal restrictions are open-ended and remain in flux through constant 
interpretation. While there are important limits set by the architecture of 
the WTO and the asymmetry of power between its members, there is 
flexibility within the system to expand developing countries’ regulatory 
autonomy beyond what is currently recognized. By the same token, I 
challenge the liberal trade scholars’ assumption about the WTO as a rule-
based system providing a level playing field and equality of opportunity 
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between members in the WTO dispute settlement system. I show that 
there are important structural asymmetries that disfavor developing 
countries. Thus, while attainable, policy space is expensive and above all, 
requires a deliberate strategy. 
This Article seeks to make three distinct contributions to the literature 
of trade and development. First, it offers a legal-institutional analysis of the 
WTO to shed light on the open-endedness of legal obligations and on how 
active members can influence rule interpretation over time to advance 
their interests through effective litigation and lawyering. The terms of 
WTO legal obligations are still contestable; this Article highlights the 
conditions under which countries can exploit this ambiguity and suggests 
several avenues by which to do so. While scholars have studied countries’ 
rates of participation and success in WTO litigation, I examine this 
participation in a dynamic way, looking at the rules in flux and at favorable 
rule-change over time. I argue that a country’s success in WTO litigation 
should not be measured by the number of cases it has won or lost. Often, 
a country can lose a case but still obtain a favorable interpretation of a rule 
so that it can ultimately modify its domestic measures to suit its domestic 
needs. Thus, what is relevant is how countries — mostly repeat players — 
manage to change rule interpretations to advance their domestic economic 
policies within the confines of the WTO legal regime. 
Second, this Article seeks to broaden the concept of “legal capacity” in 
the WTO law literature by analyzing its importance from a new 
perspective. Scholars use the idea of legal capacity to account for the 
perceived difficulties that developing countries face in participating in the 
WTO dispute settlement system to their advantage. Because of the 
complexity of WTO litigation, developing countries often lack the legal 
skills and resources to effectively advance their interests within the system. 
This Article suggests that the current understanding of legal capacity is too 
limited as it continues to rely on the assumption that its overarching goal is 
to deepen trade liberalization. In contrast, I introduce the concept of 
“developmental legal capacity,” which acknowledges that trade law can be 
both a sword to open markets and a shield for heterodox policies. 
Countries that actively pursue heterodox development policies are also 
more likely to invest in their local legal capacity and to rely on it to 
advance their national policy goals. 
Finally, I offer a comparative analysis of two cases studies, Brazil and 
Mexico, to explore how two developing countries pursue their 
development objectives within the trade legal regime. These countries have 
the two largest economies in Latin America, are active participants in the 
global market, and have the highest participation rates in WTO cases in 
the region. But, while these countries are similar in many ways, their 
participation in the WTO shows two divergent trade and development 
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strategies. Mexico pursues a policy of trade liberalization while Brazil 
focuses more actively on state promotion of domestic industries and 
economic actors within the international trade system. These positions are 
in turn reflected in these countries’ participation in the WTO system and 
the domestic institutions that support it. This comparative analysis shows 
that active participation in the WTO on its own does not guarantee greater 
policy autonomy. A country needs to carve out this space deliberately, 
which requires a great degree of training, coordination, and institutional 
capability. Ultimately, a country will be able to expand its policy autonomy 
only if it links its legal capacity to a deliberate domestic development 
strategy. 
Beyond these contributions, this Article seeks to intervene in the 
literature on the emergence of a New Developmental State, which 
proposes that the neoliberal economic model is making way for an 
alternative paradigm.1 This emergent model presupposes a more active 
role for the state in the market, but differs significantly from the old 
Developmental State and the dirigiste practices of the past. The 
characteristics of this emerging model remain unclear and it currently 
amounts more to a set of policies than to a coherent whole. By analyzing 
Brazil’s experience in the WTO and highlighting the institutions and 
strategy behind its relative success, I suggest that Brazil may very well be, 
along with other emerging countries like China and India, the harbinger of 
a new economic model. By analyzing this case study, I explore what the 
trade policy of such a New Developmental State might look like.  
This Article is divided in four parts. In the first part, I examine the 
debate over the WTO restrictions on countries’ policy autonomy and 
argue that liberal trade and development scholars alike underestimate the 
flexibility of the regime. The second part analyzes the legal restrictions 
introduced by the WTO and the barriers that have arisen when using the 
exceptions. I argue that while the WTO is more restrictive than the 
previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime, there 
is policy space to be gained within the WTO agreements. In the third part, 
I examine the legal and doctrinal space available to countries in the 
interpretation of WTO agreements that are open-ended. I show that active 
participants in the system are influencing rule interpretation and using the 
system’s procedures to their advantage through strategic lawyering and 
litigation. The experience of rich countries and a few middle-income 
countries shows that repeat players can expand their policy space to favor 
their interests. I analyze the type of “developmental legal capacity” and 
domestic institutional capability that is needed to pursue this strategy. 
                                                                    
1. See, e.g., David M. Trubek, The Political Economy of the Rule of Law: The Challenge of the New 
Developmental State, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 28, 30 (2009); F. Charles Sherman, Law and Development 
Today: The New Developmentalism, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1257, 1258–59 (2009). 
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Lastly, in the fourth part I analyze the cases of Mexico and Brazil 
contrasting their divergent strategies of participation in the WTO. The 
analysis shows that developing countries can carve out important space for 
their domestic development objectives. 
I. THE DEBATE ABOUT POLICY AUTONOMY IN THE WTO 
The creation of the WTO in 1995 has been hailed as a phenomenal 
achievement. The organization introduced a new trade regime by 
expanding the GATT and, in effect, inaugurating a new era of 
unprecedented global economic integration. The organization stood as the 
institutional embodiment of an economic model predicated on free 
markets and free trade being key to social and economic prosperity. In the 
1990s, former communist countries and developing countries flocked to 
the organization with great expectations for economic growth. The WTO 
has effectively reduced trade restrictions around the world, integrating 
domestic markets and unleashing production and consumption gains from 
specialization and trade. 
Institutionally, the WTO has become the envy of international 
organizations for its effectiveness and, above all, for its enforcement 
capacity. It is no surprise that scholars and policymakers would like to use 
the WTO as a forum to deal with a variety of challenging global issues, like 
the environment, labor, immigration, and health.2 Nor should it be a 
surprise that many advocates of and players in the WTO resist such 
expansion because they view it as a threat to its efficacy and legitimacy.3 
Finally, the WTO can boast a slim profile in a world of international 
organizations that look unnecessarily large, wasteful, and ineffective by 
comparison. 
The WTO regime is often perceived as having moved the trade system 
from a power-oriented diplomacy toward a rule-oriented diplomacy.4 
Consequently, it is also perceived to be more restrictive than its GATT 
predecessor. In fact, the motivation behind the WTO was to create an 
institution that would encourage countries to decrease their trade barriers 
and that would enforce countries’ commitments. In order to achieve these 
results, it was necessary to curtail domestic government measures that 
would serve as effective equivalents to tariff barriers and hinder trade 
liberalization commitments. To ensure this end, the original trade regime 
has been transformed into a complex legal regime with more effective 
                                                                    
2. See, e.g., Symposium, The Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002). 
3. Id. 
4. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (2006); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND 
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 97 (2d ed. 1997). 
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institutions (most notably a dispute-settlement body) to enforce existing 
international obligations.5 In this Section, I outline the liberal trade and 
development scholars’ debate about the desirability of these restrictions on 
the policy autonomy of developing countries. 
A. Liberal Trade vs. Development Scholars 
Although there is a general consensus that the WTO is more restrictive 
as compared to GATT, there remains disagreement over whether these 
new institutional constraints are desirable. Liberal trade scholars argue that 
the WTO has been a success in terms of increase in global trade and gains 
to global economic welfare.6 They note, however, at least two important 
aspects in which the WTO could be improved. First, liberal trade scholars 
suggest that developed countries fail to truly embrace the goals of the 
WTO when they herald trade liberalization by developing countries, yet 
considerably restrict access to sectors of their own markets, such as the 
agricultural and textile sectors. Considering that many developing 
countries have a comparative advantage in these sectors, liberal trade 
scholars argue that developed countries should reduce their farm subsidies 
and eliminate other trade restrictions in agricultural and textile goods.7 
Second, liberal trade scholars advocate providing aid and greater 
technical assistance to developing countries, so they can fully participate in 
and take advantage of the existing trade regime.8 These proposals stem 
from a conviction that developing countries would benefit from fully 
participating and complying with the WTO system. Instead of granting 
developing countries substantive exceptions to the rules the WTO should 
aid them to become active participants in and take full advantage of the 
system.9 
                                                                    
5. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a key example of the trend towards courts and 
judicialization globally. This phenomenon is salient in international law and international 
organizations, with the proliferation of judicial and quasi-judicial institutions. For a characterization 
of this practice as part of a broader event in global legal consciousness, legal reasoning and legal 
institutions, see Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE 
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (describing a third globalization of legal thought, originating in the United 
States, with judges and adjudication as a centerpiece). 
6. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION 60–67, 261 (2004); MARTIN 
WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 206–12 (2004). It should be noticed that both authors point 
to limitations of the WTO.  
7. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 212–16.  
8. See, e.g., BHAGWATI, supra note 6, at 235–36 (arguing that the World Bank should have a special 
aid program to compensate developing countries when they bear significant losses in income and 
market access as a result of unfavorable rulings in the WTO dispute settlement). 
9. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. The declaration, which 
is the most explicit WTO recognition of developing countries’ concerns, emphasizes the importance 
of technical cooperation and capacity building as “core elements of the development dimension of 
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In contrast, development scholars argue that the WTO does not serve 
well the interests of developing countries. They argue that trade 
liberalization has become the main objective of the WTO at the expense 
of economic development.10 The WTO’s success, they argue, should not 
be measured by the increased volume of global trade, but by its effects on 
member countries’ economic development.11According to this view, the 
WTO regime and those who manage it have mistaken the means (trade 
liberalization) for the goal (development).12 Thus, development scholars 
seek to change the WTO’s focus from asking what it can do to encourage 
countries to open their markets to how countries should use the existing 
trade regime to foster economic growth and improve living standards 
around the globe.13 While they criticize developed countries’ reluctance to 
end their subsidies and open their markets in agriculture and textiles, 
development scholars do not see this liberalization, even if it were to 
happen, as the key to developing countries’ growth.14 
Developing countries signed up to the WTO chasing its promise of 
economic growth and better living standards. Development scholars argue, 
however, that trade liberalization alone has not, and cannot, deliver on this 
promise.15 Today’s industrialized and rapidly-growing developing countries 
achieved economic growth by embracing heterodox strategies that 
combined policies of government support and selective trade 
liberalization.16 Development scholars argue that, if the WTO’s aim is truly 
                                                                                                                                                            
the multilateral trading system” ¶ 38. 
10. See DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 213–36 (2008); DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: 
DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 76–84 (2011); see also HA-JOON 
CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF 
CAPITALISM 65–83 (2007); HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1–12 (2002); NARCÍS SERRA & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE 
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2008); 
RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 61–102 (2006); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, 
FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: HOW TRADE CAN PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT (2005); Robert Wade, What 
Strategies are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The WTO and the Shrinking of Development Space, 10 
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 621, 621–31 (2003). 
11. See, e.g., RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 233–36. 
12. See id. at 227–28. 
13. See id. at 233–36. 
14. See id. at 222–23; Nancy Birdsall et al., How to Help Poor Countries, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 
2005, at 136. 
15. See CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10, at 65–83; CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE 
LADDER, supra note 10, at 1–9; RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 216–
25; RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX, supra note 10, at 159–83. 
16. See CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10, at 40–64; CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE 
LADDER, supra note 10, at 1–9; RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 13–55. 
See generally ALICE AMSDEN, THE RISE OF “THE REST”: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATE-
INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (2001); ROBERTO UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED (2007); 
ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF 
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to promote economic development, then the trade regime should give 
developing countries more policy space to support domestic economic 
activities and promote industrial policies.17 
At its most general level, this is a debate about whether the neoliberal 
development model, with its staunch support for free markets and free 
trade, even in its more moderate form, holds promise for developing 
countries. It would be wrong to characterize this debate simply as one 
between free trade versus protectionism. At the core of this debate there is 
a disagreement about whether trade liberalization is the main engine for 
economic growth and whether it should be the main organizing principle 
of the international trade regime. Consequently, it is also a debate about 
what institutional form the WTO should take, how much space it should 
give member countries to promote their own industries and what form 
this promotion should take.  
This Article does not attempt to adjudicate this debate. But, it is 
important to note that there is a wealth of theoretical and empirical 
critiques challenging the relationship between free trade and economic 
growth which was taken for granted when the WTO was created.18 In 
addition, many countries that pursued orthodox free trade policy as a 
development strategy have not fared well whereas countries that followed 
unorthodox policies have done better.19 Thus, looking at the current state 
of the academic and policy debate it is possible to conclude that the 
relationship is inconclusive at best. These critiques have undermined the 
confidence in the neoliberal model and triggered attention to other 
potential determinants of economic growth such as domestic institutions. 
At the same time, the critiques have ignited a new interest in industrial 
policy now gradually taken seriously by international development 
                                                                                                                                                            
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1992). 
17. See RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 122–52; RODRIK, THE 
GLOBALIZATION PARADOX, supra note 10, at 67–88; Dani Rodrik, How to Save Globalization From Its 
Cheerleaders, J. INT’L TRADE & DIPL. 1, 9–11 (2007); see also CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10, 
at 203–22; STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 10, at 61–102; Wade, supra note 
10, at 621–23, 636–38. 
18. See, e.g., RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 13–55; SERRA & 
STIGLITZ, supra note 10; Francisco Rodríguez & Dani Rodrik, Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A 
Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence, in 15 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 2000 (Ben S. 
Bernanke & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 2001); Francisco Rodríguez, Openness and Growth: What Have We 
Learned? 2 (United Nations Dep’t. of Economic & Social Affairs, DESA Working Paper No. 51, 
2007); see also Barcelona Development Agenda, City of Barcelona, available at 
http://tinyurl.com/7n28gdn (issued by several development scholars after the 2004 Barcelona 
Forum). 
19. See CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10, at 67–78; RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY 
RECIPES, supra note 10, at 35–44; STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 10, at 61–
102; Birdsall et al., supra note 14; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Is there a Post-Washington Consensus Consensus?, in 
THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED, supra note 10, at 43–45. 
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institutions, like the World Bank,20 and generating discussion in developed 
countries.21 
B. Structural vs. Pragmatic Development Scholars 
While development scholars agree that trade liberalization is not a 
development strategy on its own and countries should have regulatory 
space to pursue industrial policies, they disagree as to whether the current 
WTO framework is an impediment and should be reformed. It is possible 
to identify a division between two groups of development scholars, which 
I refer to as “structural development scholars” and “pragmatic 
development scholars.” On one hand, structural development scholars 
argue that the WTO and its web of agreements were implemented 
precisely to prevent countries from undertaking the type of trade and 
industrial policies carried out successfully by the states in East Asia.22 In 
this view, the WTO reflects the economic interests of rich countries and 
undermines the ability of poor countries to create their own industries, 
develop technology, and strengthen their domestic markets.23 The WTO, 
the argument goes, institutionalizes a systematic double standard, whereby 
rich countries lock in their competitive advantage, making it practically 
impossible for poor countries to pursue the kind of strategies they 
undertook to become rich.24 Accordingly, the legal regime inaugurated by 
the WTO has come at the expense of countries’ policy autonomy and their 
development prospects.25 Thus, developing countries should coalesce to 
                                                                    
20. The World Bank’s chief economist has recently advocated for the use of industrial policy. See 
Justin Yifu Lin, New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development 23 (World Bank Policy 
Research, Working Paper No. 5197, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/7rg7krk (recognizing an 
important role for goverments in economic policy, though stating that the government’s role “should 
be limited to the provision of information about the new industries, the coordination of related 
investments across different firms in the same industries, the compensation of information 
externalities for the pioneer firms, and the nurturing of new industries through incubation and 
encouragement of foreign direct investment,” and the provision of infrastructure). 
21. Philippe Aghion et al., Industrial Policy and Competition 2 (Growth and Sustainability Policies for 
Eur., Working Paper No. 17, 2011) (“[W]e argue that the debate on industrial policy should no longer 
be ‘existential’, i.e., about whether sectoral policies should be precluded altogether or not, but rather 
on how such policies should be designed and governed so as to foster growth and welfare.”). See also 
the debate organized by The Economist titled “Industrial Policy: This house believes industrial policy 
always fails,” wherein Dani Rodrik debated Josh Lerner against The Economist’s position and got 
seventy-one percent of the public’s vote, at http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/177. 
22. See, e.g., CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER, supra note 10; Ha-Joon Chang, The Future for 
Trade, CHALLENGE Nov./Dec. 2003, at 6, 11; Wade, supra note 10, at 630–31, 638. 
23. Id. 
24. Robert Wade and Ha-Joon Chang have called this “kicking away the ladder,” following 
German economist Friederich List’s analysis, in the 1840s, about the behavior of nations that had 
industrialized through trade protection but were preaching free trade. See CHANG, KICKING AWAY 
THE LADDER, supra note 10, at 3–5, 127–28; Wade, supra note 10, at 630–32. 
25. See CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER, supra note 10; Wade, supra note 10. From a 
different perspective, the WTO has enabled active state policies, but of the kind needed only by 
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repeal or change the most restrictive rules, such as those prohibiting 
subsidies, restricting investment conditions or imposing stringent 
intellectual property protection.26 
On the other hand, pragmatic development scholars agree the WTO is 
constraining but, as Alice Amsden has remarked, its “bark is worse than 
the bite.”27 These scholars argue that the main obstacle for developing 
countries is one of political vision, still very much under the influence of 
liberal trade tenets, not of law.28 Although the WTO rules may make it 
harder for developing countries to climb it, the ladder has not been kicked 
away. Developing countries can still use several policy mechanisms that 
countries that successfully industrialized under the old GATT regime 
enjoyed.29 Pragmatic development scholars point out that many of the 
mechanisms of protection under GATT can be continued even if under a 
different legal form. For instance, while voluntary export restraints 
(VERs) — a popular form of protection under GATT — are no longer 
allowed, countries could still increase tariffs up to their bound levels to 
protect their industries.30 In addition, countries have at their disposal, and 
are now using, other types of mechanisms to protect their industries, such 
as non-tariff barriers and anti-dumping measures.31 Moreover, countries 
can resort to safeguards in emergency situations to help an industry in 
distress; they can also use exceptions that allow them to increase tariffs to 
address balance of payments problems and to support infant industries.32 
Similarly, although there is a new Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures, it does not seem to be too stringent in practice, enabling 
                                                                                                                                                            
industrialized countries. See Linda Weiss, Global Governance, National Strategies: How Industrialized States 
Make Room to Move Under the WTO, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 723, 729 (2005). 
26. See, e.g., CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER, supra note 10, at 144; Birdsall et al., supra 
note 14, at 144 (“[R]ich countries cannot just amend TRIPS [The WTO’s Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights]; they must abolish it altogether . . . .”); Ha-Joon 
Chang, Trade and Industrial Policy Issues, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, supra note 10, 
at 257, 269–73; Wade, supra note 10, at 624. 
27. See Alice H. Amsden & Takashi Hikino, The Bark Is Worse Than the Bite: New WTO Law and 
Late Industrialization, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., July 2000, at 104, 110; Alice H. Amsden, 
Promoting Industry under WTO Law, in PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY 
SPACE IN THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 
2005); see also Peter Evans, Neoliberalism as a Political Opportunity: Constraint and Innovation in Contemporary 
Development Strategy, in PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST, supra. 
28. Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 105. Rodrik agrees with Amsden on the lack of “vision” 
but argues that “current WTO regulation do preclude many of the strategies that were usefully 
employed by the East Asian countries.” RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, 
at 226. 
29. Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 105. 
30. Id. at 108–09 (stating that many developing countries have legally retained high tariff ceilings, 
even if their prevailing rates are inferior). 
31. Id. at 109. 
32. Id. at 110. 
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developing countries to maintain their local content requirements in 
important sectors.33 
Finally, although export subsidies have been prohibited, and other 
subsidies are subject to action by affected states upon proof of injury, the 
WTO originally allowed a number of permissible subsidies related to 
research and development, regional development, and the environment.34 
Even though these permissible subsidies have officially expired,35 many 
countries continue to use them.36 Additionally, export subsidies remain 
available for least-developed countries, those countries with per capita 
income below $1000.37 Thus, these scholars conclude that beyond export 
subsidies, “there is nothing in WTO law that prevents other countries 
from promoting their nascent industries and subjecting them to 
performance standards.”38 
It is important to underscore that these positions I have outlined are 
ideal-types and are located in a continuum, so that there is certain 
overlap.39 There is, for example, wider consensus about the restrictiveness 
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights.40 Although development scholars may differ in their perception of 
                                                                    
33. Id. at 109; Moreover, WTO law has also been quite lax in its enforcement of sprawling free-
trade agreements, formally only an exception of multilateral non-discriminatory obligations. Amsden, 
supra note 27, at 219; Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 109. 
34. Amsden & Hikino,, supra note 27, at 110. 
35. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 27.2(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]. These non-actionable subsidies were included in Article 8 of the SCM 
Agreement. According to Article 31, however, these provisions were initially valid for five years after 
the entry into force of the WTO agreement in 1995 and, although subject to extension, they have not 
been renewed. An important question is, of course, whether countries would challenge each other on 
these types of subsidies, even if they were now actionable. 
36. Amsden, supra note 27, at 221 (arguing that making research and development subsidies illegal 
“would put the national innovation systems of all developed countries out of business.” Similarly, 
Europe and the United States use regional development subsidies extensively.) 
37. SCM Agreement, supra note 35, at art. 27.5. 
38. Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 108. 
39. Initially, Chang seemed to agree with Amsden on the potential flexibilities of the WTO, 
claiming that the “constraints are not completely overwhelming as many people assume” and that 
important leeway remains for those who want to use it. Chang, supra note 26, at 269. However, in 
later scholarship, Chang seems firmly placed in the position holding that WTO rules overtly restrict 
industrial policies:  
In the name of ‘leveling the playing field’, the Bad Samaritan rich nations have created a 
new international trading system that is rigged in their favour. They are preventing the 
poorer countries from using the tools of trade and industrial policies that they had 
themselves so effectively used in the past in order to promote their own economic 
development — not just tariffs and subsidies, but also regulation of foreign investment and 
‘violation’ of foreign intellectual property rights. 
CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS, supra note 10, at 77–78. Moreover, “many of the exceptions to the rules 
were created in areas where the developed countries needed them.” Id. at 76. 
40. Chang and Wade are harsh critics of TRIPs. So are many other development economists. See 
supra note 26. Amsden estimates that TRIPs importantly limits the strategies of the “late 
industrializers,” although it is unclear how it affects poorer “potential industrializers.” Alisa di Caprio 
& Alice Amsden, Does the New International Trade Regime Leave Room for Industrialization Policies in the 
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how much the WTO restricts developing countries’ space to promote 
selective trade and industrial policies, they share much common ground. 
A common trait between the structural and pragmatic development 
scholars, however, is that both tend to take rules and exceptions at face 
value as if they imposed clear, fixed and stable limits on states’ actions. 
The problem with this approach is that it underestimates the existence of 
“gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities” in the legal materials that leave room for 
legal and institutional change.41 In this Article, I suggest that an evaluation 
of WTO constraints needs to be complemented by an analysis of the 
“rules in flux” and the institutional practices developed in the WTO. 
Whereas development scholars often take what I would call an external 
look at the WTO regime, this Article does an internal legal/institutional 
analysis. Once this perspective of the WTO is adopted, it becomes clear 
that there is more room for policy autonomy than is often apparent. 
Using this approach, this Article’s analysis will adopt the strengths and 
expose the weaknesses of the three positions described above. While the 
Article retains the liberal trade interest in law as an important mechanism 
for economic change and for potentially mutually beneficial transactions, it 
rejects the assumption that given law’s formal neutrality all economic 
outcomes are merely the reflection of each country’s economic merit. 
Similarly, my analysis retains the structural development scholars’ interest 
on the asymmetry of power and resources among different countries, but 
it rejects the notion that law, and more specifically the WTO regime, is 
merely epiphenomenal, mechanically or inexorably mimicking the current 
balance of global power amongst different countries. My analysis attempts 
at once to recognize more agency and freedom of developing countries’ 
governments, often denied by structural development scholars, while 
                                                                                                                                                            
Middle-income Countries?, (ILO, Working Paper No. 22, 2004), available at http://tinyurl.com/89yaamm. 
Criticism of TRIPS goes beyond development scholars. Liberal trade scholars Bhagwati and Wolf 
have also criticized the inclusion of TRIPS in the WTO. Bhagwati has stated that “TRIPS should not 
be in the WTO at all.” BHAGWATI, supra note 6, at 185. According to Bhagwati, the agreement relies 
on no serious economic justification and actually harms developing countries. In his view, TRIPS is 
the result of successful lobbying of software and pharmaceutical companies. These companies have 
“turned it into a royalty-collection agency simply because the WTO can apply trade sanctions.” Id. at 
182; see also WOLF, supra note 6, at 216–17. 
41. For a classic analysis of the indeterminacy of law and legal materials, and the law-making 
work judges do in resolving questions for which there is often no clear or “correct” answer, see 
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE 28–30 (1997) (examining the 
ideological character of adjudication and challenging the distinction between legislation and 
adjudication, which is often a form of denying that the work of judges is ideologically based, 
particularly when stakes are high). For the purposes of my argument, it suffices to show that the 
work of law-making continues after the rules in the agreement have been “settled.” Both litigating 
parties (countries) and judges (panelists and Appellate Body members) will be actors in the ensuing 
change. The direction of the transformation can go in a variety of ways. See JOEL TRACHTMAN, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (2008) (analyzing international dispute 
resolution as a hybrid of adjudicative and legislative authority. Trachtman argues that the 
“indeterminacy, incompleteness, or standard-like nature” of treaty provisions may be regarded as a 
legislative decision and “a form of implicit delegation to dispute resolution.”). 
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pointing out important asymmetries in the operation of the legal regime 
that adversely affect those countries with less power and resources, 
commonly disregarded by liberal trade scholars. Finally, this Article retains 
the pragmatic development scholars’ interest in existing WTO flexibilities 
available for developing countries, but it eschews a formalist and static 
understanding of how the WTO legal system operates. My analysis looks 
more closely at the rules in action and at how strategic actors help to shape 
and transform these rules over time. 
II. THE WTO LIMITS ON COUNTRIES’ POLICY AUTONOMY 
In this Part, I examine a number of key differences between the former 
GATT and the WTO regimes. I analyze both the new restrictions 
introduced by the WTO on subsidies, intellectual property, and investment 
as well as the opt-out clauses incorporated from the old GATT system.42 I 
conclude that, even though there is an important reduction in juridical 
space since the creation of the WTO, there is still more room for 
maneuvering than is currently appreciated.  
A. Restrictions 
The creation of the WTO in 1995 introduced new significant 
restrictions within the international trade regime.43 First, subsidies are now 
subjected to greater scrutiny and many forms of government support to 
domestic industries, such as export subsidies and local content 
requirements, are prohibited.44 These restrictions are more onerous than in 
                                                                    
42. See Chantal Thomas & Joel Trachtman, Editors’ Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN 
THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 1–20 (Chantal Thomas & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009) (analyzing several 
areas in which the WTO may constrain regulatory space for development). In addition to the 
imposition of new substantial obligations, development scholars argue that the variety of exceptions, 
opt-out mechanisms, and special clauses used by countries under the GATT regime have become 
harder to use under the WTO. In their view, the WTO has unduly burdened the ability of developing 
countries to enact policies that proved instrumental in the success of countries like Japan and the 
Asian Tigers in the twentieth century. See Chang, The Future for Trade, supra note 22, at 11; Wade, supra 
note 10, at 630. 
43. Member countries agreed to use tariffs as the main form of trade barrier, gradually eliminating 
quotas and other forms of non-tariff barriers. Simultaneously, they agreed to decrease tariff levels. As 
a result, quantitative protections were largely reduced. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 423 (5th 
ed. 2008). 
44. The new Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) 
considerably increased the reach of disciplines for government action. See SCM Agreement, supra 
note 35. The pre-Uruguay Round GATT regime did not have comprehensive subsidies rules and 
gave countries greater discretion to use them for export promotion and import substitution. U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], Trade and Development Report, 2006: Global Partnership and 
National Policies for Development, at 169–70, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2006, U.N. Sales No. 
E.06.II.D.6 (Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 2006]. The 
WTO subsidies regime applies to subnational governments, government firms, and private 
enterprises carrying out government functions. Id. at 170. The agreement prohibits export subsidies 
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the previous GATT regime where countries regularly used export subsidies 
and local content conditions as part of their industrialization strategy.45 
Second, the WTO has introduced new regulations on intellectual 
property under TRIPS. Most notably, countries are now required to grant 
patent protection to all fields of technology and extend the duration of 
protection to twenty years.46 The current TRIPs regime may be contrasted 
to earlier conditions, under which not only late industrializers but even the 
United States and the European Union developed.47 These countries grew 
while having lax intellectual property laws that enabled domestic producers 
to appropriate technology and reproduce it.48 This process of technology 
transfer helped domestic firms to gradually move up in the value-added 
chain of production and ultimately created a pool of technologically 
advanced domestic producers, which generated spill-over effects in the 
rest of the economy. By establishing more stringent protections on 
copyright, patents and trademarks, the current WTO regime under TRIPS 
has in effect made it harder and costlier to appropriate technology.49  
                                                                                                                                                            
(conditioned on export performance) and local content requirements (conditioned on the use of 
domestically-produced goods). Prohibited subsidies do not even require a demonstration of injury to 
be challenged. Id. The agreement further creates a two-tier classification of subsidies, dividing them 
into specific subsidies and non-specific ones. Id. Specific subsidies are actionable and parties may 
challenge them through multilateral dispute settlement or countervailing duties. Id. The challenging 
party is required to show injury and causal connection to the measure in question. Id. The new 
classification of subsidies as specific makes it hard for countries to use selective policies to target a 
firm or industry. Id. In contrast, non-specific subsidies are not affected by the agreement. Id. These 
subsidies are general and are deemed not to distort the allocation of domestic resources. Id. They 
typically involve resources for the provision of infrastructure that in principle benefit all enterprises. 
Id. 
45. Development scholars have shown how important export subsidies and local content 
requirements were for countries industrializing in the second half of the twentieth century, “late 
industrializers” such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. These countries used export 
subsidies to stimulate domestic production and subject national firms to the discipline of 
international competition. See, e.g., PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES & INDUSTRIAL 
TRANSFORMATION (1995). In addition, the implementation of export performance standards was a 
key mechanism in East Asia’s industrial policy because it limited support to those firms that were 
able to compete internationally, thereby reducing the risks of abuse and rent-seeking. UNCTAD 
Trade and Development Report, 2006, supra note 44, at 171. At the same time, local content 
requirements stimulated the creation of domestic firms that could supply inputs for the products of 
foreign firms. This mechanism established linkages in the domestic market between foreign firms 
dedicated to export and domestic producers, who acquired new technology needed to supply the 
foreign and usually more technologically advanced-firms. See, e.g., CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE 
LADDER, supra note 10; AMSDEN, supra note 16. 
46. UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 2006, supra note 44, at 172. 
47. See B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND 
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790–1920, at 56–57, 260 (“[It is] more 
than a little ironic that today the United States is at the forefront of efforts to compel developing 
countries to forego ‘piracy’ and to recognize foreign [patents].”). 
48. See Nagesh Kumar, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic Development: Experiences of 
Asian Countries, 47 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 209, 214 (2003) (analyzing the role of technology imitation 
in the economic development of Japan and the Asian Tigers). 
49. RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX, supra note 10, at 199. 
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Finally, as to restrictions on foreign investment, the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)50 limits the use of 
government measures that are incompatible with the non-discrimination 
principle of national treatment and prohibits the use of quantitative 
restrictions.51 As a result, performance requirements, which were 
commonly used by the late industrializers to link foreign investors with 
domestic manufacturers, such as local content regulation, export 
performance, and foreign exchange balancing rules are now forbidden in 
the WTO.52 
B. Exceptions 
In addition, there are a number of exceptions and opt-out clauses that 
have survived from the GATT regime. The WTO trade regime 
contemplates safeguards, special and differential treatment rules, and 
balance of payments exceptions that are still in place. However, these 
exceptions have become harder to use.  
                                                                    
50. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter 
TRIMS]. 
51. The main WTO agreements include two principles of non-discrimination; one is known as 
“most-favoured-nation” (MFN), and the other is the principle of national treatment. Under MFN, a 
country is obliged not to discriminate between its various trading partners. Under national treatment, 
a country is obliged to treat imported products in the same fashion as products produced in its own 
territory. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I (MFN), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; GATT, supra, at art. III (national treatment). 
52. Development scholars have shown that many successful countries used these regulatory 
mechanisms to increase domestic value added, generate income, create jobs, and transfer technology. 
See, e.g., CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER, supra note 10. While the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) does not clearly define “trade-related investment measures,” 
it does provide an illustrative list of forbidden regulations in the Annex, including regulations on local 
content and trade balancing requirements. TRIMS, supra note. 50. Already TRIMS commitments 
have successfully been invoked by developed countries in a number of cases against developing 
countries, particularly in the automobile industry. All trade-related investment measures have been 
brought by developed countries against developing countries, with exception of Canada, which has 
also been sued. See, e.g., Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Philippines — 
Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector, WT/DS195/3 (Oct. 13, 2000); India — 
Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146 (Complainant: E.C.) (Oct. 6, 1998), India — 
Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Motor Vehicle Sector, WT/DS175 (Complainant: U.S.) (June 
1, 1999); Indonesia — Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS 64 (Complainant: Japan) 
(Nov. 29, 1996), WTO/DS59 (Complainant: U.S.) (Oct. 8, 1996), WTO/DS55 (Complainant: Japan) 
(Oct. 4, 1996), WTO/DS54 (Complainant: E.C.) (Oct. 3, 1996); Brazil — Measures Affecting Trade and 
Investment in the Automotive Sector, WTO/DS81 (Complainant: E.C.) (May 7, 1997), Brazil — Certain 
Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, WTO/DS65 (Complainant: U.S.) (Jan. 10, 
1997), WTO/DS52 (Complainant: U.S.) (Aug. 9, 1996), Brazil — Certain Automotive Investment 
Measures, WTO/DS51 (Complainant: Japan) (July 30, 1996); Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automotive Industry, WTO/DS142 (Complainant: E.C.) (Aug. 17, 1998), WTO/DS139 (Complainant: 
Japan) (July 3, 1998). Although the most important investment restrictions stem from bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) that many developing countries have entered into, TRIMS seems to have 
further reduced governments’ scope for policy action. See generally DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S 
PROMISE (2008). 
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First, consider safeguards. The WTO reformulated the safeguards 
provision in GATT Article XIX under a new Safeguards Agreement that 
was designed to eliminate the use of “grey-area measures.”53 The goal of 
the Safeguards Agreement is to formalize the requirements for an escape 
clause — temporarily suspending a GATT obligation — while subjecting 
safeguards to greater transparency and stricter conditions. This safeguard 
mechanism, however, has proven to be hard to use. No country invoking a 
safeguards measure has ever been able to pass muster under the WTO 
Appellate Body (AB)’s scrutiny.54 Instead, as a result of this largely 
inflexible interpretation of WTO safeguards requirements, countries have 
resorted to other measures, such as anti-dumping and other “unfair trade” 
laws, that provide similar relief.55 
                                                                    
53. Countries used mechanisms like voluntary export restraints (VERs) or marketing agreements 
to relieve their domestic industries of import pressure. These mechanisms were part of the GATT’s 
“grey-area measures,” which enjoyed an ambiguous legal status; they contravened the GATT’s legal 
commitments, but these mechanisms were largely tolerated and remained generally outside the 
purview of the GATT and its dispute settlement mechanism. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 691. 
Although developed countries frequently resorted to these mechanisms, they were also used by late 
industrializers to promote their domestic industry. Amsden & Hikino, supra note 27, at 108; For an 
analysis of the restraints, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Grey Area Trade Policy and the Rule of Law, 
2 J. WORLD TRADE L. 22, 22–44 (1988). 
54. See Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence 2 (Univ. Chi. Inst. for 
Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 187, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=415800 (arguing 
that the Safeguards agreement does not clarify the meaning of the legal prerequisites under GATT 
Article XIX because it does not offer guidance on concepts such as “increased imports” as a causal 
variable, on alternative factors simultaneously causing injury — “factors other than imports” — or 
on the precise contours of the “serious injury” concept itself). For an analysis of the legal constraints 
and jurisprudence on safeguards, as well as an economic critique, see Alan O. Sykes, THE 
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS: A COMMENTARY (2006). Despite the interpretive problems of 
Article XIX, the elimination of gray-area measures has substantially increased members’ use of the 
Safeguards provision. From 1995 to 2010, 216 safeguards investigations were initiated and reported 
to the WTO Committee on Safeguards, leading to 101 safeguard measures. Safeguard Measures, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://tinyurl.com/7ysxf54 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
55. Anti-dumping duties are high on the list of these measures. Some scholars argue that anti-
dumping has become the functional equivalent of the grey-area measures of the pre-WTO era. See, 
e.g., Chad P. Bown, Why Are Safeguards in the WTO So Unpopular, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 47, 51 (2002). 
In contrast to the Safeguards agreement, the WTO’s anti-dumping procedure offers a more 
“managed trade” or negotiated compromise to trade disputes, similar to the more informal, 
diplomacy-based atmosphere of the old GATT. Id. at 53; Patrick A. Messerlin, Antidumping and 
Safeguards, in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE 159, 159–83 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (discussing the 
impact of antidumping measures on trade law and policy and suggesting reforms in the arena of 
antidumping measures). 
In the context of global economic integration, countries often need to make trade policy 
adjustments and thus need to resort to escape valves. Safeguards would be a more effective way to 
deal with these issues because they provide governments with a formal, institutionalized tool by 
which to address the problems that their domestic constituencies face in an overly competitive 
market resulting from an influx of foreign imports. Safeguards can be viewed as part and parcel, 
rather than anomalies of, liberalizing domestic economies. For a proposal to use safeguards to 
advance explicit development goals, see RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, 
at 230 (“[C]ountries may legitimately wish to restrict trade or suspend existing WTO 
obligations . . . for reasons going beyond competitive threats to their industries . . . . Developmental 
priorities are among such reasons, as are distributional concerns or conflicts with domestic norms or 
social arrangements in the industrial countries.”). Rodrik has proposed to recast the Safeguards 
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Second, the WTO has provided for special and differential treatment 
(SDT) provisions, as encapsulated in the “enabling clause.”56 The SDT 
category is a big umbrella, encompassing a variety of provisions in several 
agreements. These provisions seek to advance developing countries’ 
interests by providing market access, requiring WTO members to protect 
the interests of developing countries, granting flexibility in rules and 
disciplines involving trade measures, allowing longer transitional periods, 
and providing technical assistance.57 SDT provisions recognize that 
developing countries stand on an unequal position vis-à-vis developed 
countries and are aimed at fully incorporating developing countries into 
the trade regime by providing them with several kinds of formal 
advantages. 
Although the WTO recognizes SDT provisions, they are much more 
limited in scope than those allowed under the old GATT regime.58 Under 
GATT, the two most important principles of SDT rules were preferential 
treatment and non-reciprocity.59 Preferential treatment, which is an 
exception to the non-discrimination principle, allowed members to give 
special market access to developing countries. Additionally, under the non-
reciprocity exception, developing countries were allowed to provide less 
than full-reciprocity to other GATT member states.60 These exceptions 
amounted to legal recognition of the unequal footing of developing 
countries and gave them some legal space to pursue their national 
development policies while taking advantage of the trade regime.61 Under 
the WTO regime, in contrast, SDT provisions have been designed more 
narrowly, primarily to increase transition periods and provide technical 
assistance so that developing countries can implement and comply with 
the new WTO obligations.62 
                                                                                                                                                            
agreement into an agreement on “Developmental and Social Safeguards.” Such an agreement would 
expand the scope of the safeguards, recast the current “serious injury” test and even replace it with a 
requirement that the measure be supported by broad domestic support “among all concerned 
parties.” Id. at 230–31. 
56. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries, ¶ 2(a), GATT Doc. L/4093 (Nov. 28, 1979), B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) 203 (1980). 
57. Manickan Supperamaniam, Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in the World 
Trade Organization, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO: POLICY APPROACHES 130 (Gary P. 
Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 2008). Committee on Trade and Development, Note by the 
Secretariat: Special and Differential Treatment for Least-Developed Countries, at 1, WT/COMTD/W/135 
(Oct. 5, 2004). 
58. See Constantine Michalopoulos, Special and Differential Treatment: The Need for a Different 
Approach, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO, supra note 57, at 110. 
59. See  ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 154–83 
(2d ed. 2010). 
60. This means a country was not under the obligation to provide the same concessions it 
acquired from another country. GATT, supra note 51, at art. XVIII bis. 
61. UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, 2006, supra note 44, at 167. 
62. Id.; see also Frank Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 291, 291–93 (2004). There are important criticisms to the special and differential treatment 
(SDT) provisions, both for their limited scope and ineffectiveness. Scholars have pointed out that 
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Finally, the WTO’s approach towards the use of the “balance of 
payments” exception is significantly more limited as compared to the old 
GATT regime. During the GATT regime, countries used the balance of 
payments exception quite often to enact trade restrictions to safeguard 
their external financial position and prevent a decline in monetary 
reserves.63 The WTO regime incorporated a Balance of Payments 
Understanding64 that restricted the use of trade measures to deal with 
balance of payment problems.65 Furthermore, the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB)66 has given great deference to the IMF in the interpretation of 
the meaning of “development policy,”67 which has resulted in the dismissal 
of any trade restrictions, enacted in response to balance of payments 
problems, whenever there are macroeconomic policies that can also 
address these imbalances. This deference thus effectively constrains the 
use of trade restrictions as a tool to balance payments, even when a 
country may prefer it to macroeconomic policies that would have more 
dire social and economic results.68 
As highlighted in the preceding discussion, it is possible to observe a 
reduction in the legal space and domestic policy autonomy that had been 
available to developing countries under GATT in the form of safeguards, 
SDT provisions, and balance of payment exceptions. Notwithstanding 
these new restrictions, however, I argue in the next Part that, developing 
                                                                                                                                                            
technical assistance funds are insufficient and that the WTO Secretariat lacks the necessary capacity 
to provide them. In addition, existing transition periods seem arbitrary and unrealistic given the 
physical and human resources involved in setting up the institutions needed to ensure 
implementation and compliance. Developing countries also complain about the lack of compliance to 
the “best endeavors” rules by developed countries. See, e.g., Mari Pangestu, Special and Differential 
Treatment in the Millennium: Special for Whom and How Different, in THE WORLD ECONOMY: GLOBAL 
TRADE POLICY 2000, at 195 (Peter Lloyd & Chris Milner eds., 2000); Donald McRae, Developing 
Countries and the ‘Future of the WTO,’ 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 603 (2005); Indeed, in the Doha Declaration, 
WTO members agreed to review all SDT provisions to clarify them, strengthen them, and increase 
their effectiveness. Doha Declaration, supra note 9, ¶ 44. 
63. See GATT, supra note 51, at arts. XII–XIV. 
64. Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 208. 
65. Robert Howse, Pursuing Sustainable Development Strategies: The Case of the Balance of 
Payment Rules in the WTO 16 (2005), available at http://tinyurl.com/7d96g4r (last visited on Mar. 
18, 2012) (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law Association). 
66. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is established in the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
in Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement. The DSB is comprised of the WTO General Council sitting 
under a separate chair, and it governs all disputes arising under the WTO agreement. JACKSON ET 
AL., supra note 43, at 267–68. 
67. Howse, supra note 65, at 19. See Appellate Body Report, India — Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R, ¶ 149 (Aug. 23, 1999) (holding 
that the Panel had not delegated “its judicial function to make an objective assessment of the matter” 
despite giving “considerable weight” to the views of the IMF); Panel Report, India — Quantitative 
Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999). 
68. Howse, supra note 65, at 19. 
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countries can exploit existing flexibilities and carve out more space in 
which they can promote domestic economic policy.  
III. COUNTRIES’ ABILITY TO CARVE OUT POLICY AUTONOMY 
Considering the restrictions analyzed in the previous Part, it would be 
tempting to conclude that developing countries would likely benefit from 
changing the WTO rules to make them more compatible with their 
development objectives. The Doha Development round, which embodies 
the most ambitious development agenda in the WTO to date, to some 
extent follows this route by seeking changes in the WTO rules that would 
benefit developing countries. Indeed, there has been considerable scholarly 
attention to negotiations in WTO Ministerial meetings and the emergence 
of developing country coalitions that could successfully change current 
WTO rules to improve the lot of the developing world.69 Given the 
current political impasse that has arisen as a result of competing interests 
between developed and developing countries, however, the likelihood of 
the Round’s success and its implications for the WTO are widely 
debated.70 
In this Part, I focus instead on the opportunities for expanding policy 
autonomy71 that lie in rule change through lawyering and litigation 
strategies to alter the interpretation of existing rules. Whereas the literature 
has paid significant attention to the travails of trade negotiations and the 
opportunities that lie therein,72 the prospects of gaining terrain in dispute 
settlement remain underappreciated. Moreover, while progress in political 
                                                                    
69. See, e.g., Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 483 (2007) (assessing how the WTO institutional structure encourages coalitions of 
developing countries). 
70. See, e.g., HIGH LEVEL TRADE EXPERTS GROUP, The Doha Round: Setting a Deadline, Defining a 
Final Deal: Interim Report — JANUARY 2011 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Peter Sutherland co-chairs, 2011), 
available at www.voxeu.org/reports/doha-round.pdf; Jagdish Bhagwati, An Open Letter to President 
Obama on Doha, AM. INT. (Sept. 6, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/7l2ujev; Dani Rodrik, Don’t Cry for Doha, 
PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 4, 2008), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/rodrik22; 
Dani Rodrik, Let the Doha Round Fail, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Nov. 21, 2005), http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/rodrik13. 
71. For existing scholarship on policy space within the WTO, see generally Bernard Hoekman, 
Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 8 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 405 (2005); MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS & SUSY FRANKEL (EDS.), 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY (2010); Michael Ming 
Du, The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 639 
(2011). For a different perspective, see ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER 
NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011) (arguing that the 
question should not be about whether the WTO can grant more policy autonomy to states — it 
cannot meaningfully do so — but rather what type of governance and values should prevail in the 
trade regime, and how those choices should be subject to debate and deliberation). 
72. See, e.g., Sonia E. Rolland, Redesigning the Negotiation Process at the WTO, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 65 
(2010). 
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branch of the WTO has stagnated, activity in the judicial branch has 
proceeded at a fast pace, making this a crucial area of engagement in the 
trade regime. Although reforms of WTO agreements by member countries 
in Ministerial negotiations are undoubtedly important, these efforts need 
to be complemented by strategic engagement in the WTO litigation 
sphere. 
In the discussion that follows, I first describe the insights that can be 
gleaned about strategic litigation from legal-sociological literature in the 
context of the WTO. I analyze how active WTO members influence rule 
interpretation and use the system’s procedures to their advantage. Second, 
I examine the available legal and doctrinal space under which national 
regulatory measures could still pass muster, given the gaps, conflicts, and 
ambiguities in the text of the WTO agreements. Finally, I explore the 
requisite legal capacity and domestic institutional capability that countries 
seeking to implement institutional change must develop. Although gaining 
policy space in this way has generally been the domain of rich countries, a 
number of developing countries have begun to follow suit. 
A. Opportunities Arising From Strategic Lawyering 
1. In Theory 
Dispute settlement is perhaps the most prominent feature of the WTO 
today and the DSB its most active branch, even when the rate of disputes 
per year has decreased since the first eight years of the system.73 While in 
the initial years rich members, and particularly the United States and the 
European Union, were by far the most active players, developing nation 
participation has increased significantly.74 Scholars have looked at the 
incidence of participation by developed and developing countries and 
pondered what accounts for the lower rates of participation by developing 
countries.75 In addition, there is a burgeoning scholarship examining the 
                                                                    
73. WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 88 (2011), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/6st32nn (showing a precipitous drop in claims filed compared to the late 1990s). 
74. William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
17, 24 (2005) (noting lower developed-country participation but finding that developing countries’ 
use “increased dramatically” from 2000–2005); Joseph Francois et al., Trading Profiles and Developing 
Country Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System (Research Inst. Indus. Econ., Working Paper 
No. 730, 2008), available at http://tinyurl.com/84y33jc (noting increased developing-country 
participation over the last fifteen years while trying to determine objectively whether they are still 
“underrepresented”). 
75. See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719 (2003); Marc L. Busch et 
al., Does Legal Capacity Matter? A Survey of WTO Members, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 559, (2009); Andrew 
Guzman & Beth Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in WTO 
Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 569 (2005); Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for 
Developing Country Adaptation, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 177–98 (2006). See generally Chad Bown, 
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incidence of wins and losses by developed and developing countries. 
Scholars looking at WTO dispute outcomes have found that developing 
countries win or lose just as regularly as do developed countries and have 
concluded therefore that, once developing countries access the dispute 
settlement system, there seems to be no bias against them.76 This 
conclusion, however, underestimates how the difference in parties’ 
capabilities may determine their ability to advance their interests over time 
beyond winning or losing in particular instances.  
My analysis, in contrast, builds on the American socio-legal tradition, 
analyzing dispute settlement as a system where participants often have 
asymmetrical opportunities for gain. A seminal article in this tradition is 
Marc Galanter’s classic “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead,”77 which 
provides a socio-legal analysis of dispute-settlement in the U.S. legal 
system, showing that the formal legal rules and the courts that apply them 
are only part of the story. It is of great importance to understand who the 
parties are, and what their different opportunities to gain are given their 
characteristics.  
This theoretical approach inverts the traditional analysis, which typically 
starts at the rules, proceeds to look at how those rules are applied by the 
respective institutions, and finally looks at their effects on parties. Instead, 
this approach centers on the parties and their different characteristics, 
analyzing how these differences affect the way the system works.78 
According to this analysis, there are two ideal types of parties, situated in a 
continuum: one shotters (OS) who only occasionally resort to court and 
repeat players (RP) who are frequently engaged in similar disputes over an 
extended period of time.79 Whether an actor is a one shotter or a repeat 
player matters greatly for his incentives and his chances to benefit from 
the legal system.  
RPs have many advantages over OSs based on their greater party 
capability.80 This capability is comprised of multiple elements but three 
                                                                                                                                                            
Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes, 27 WORLD ECON. 59 
(2004); Francois et al., supra note 74; Peter Holmes et al., Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: 
Back to the GATT? (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3133, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636553. See text accompanying infra notes 187–194. 
76. See, e.g, Bernard Hoekman et al., Winners and Losers in the Panel Stage of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 42, at 151, 
161. 
77. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). For a review of Galanter’s analysis twenty-five years later in various 
legal domains, see Symposium, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. (1999). 
See also IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert Kritzer & Susan 
Silbey eds., 2003). 
78. Galanter, supra note 77, at 97. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 99–103 (associating party capability with the RP-OS distinction to a greater extent than 
with wealth and organization); Marc Galanter, Afterword: Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
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seem particularly relevant in the WTO context. First, RPs rely on 
experience, expertise, and economies of scale they have built through 
previous participation.81 Second, RPs can play the odds of litigation, 
seeking to maximize gain over a series of cases, even at the risk of 
incurring maximum loss in some cases.82 They play for rules too, 
strategizing about rule-change over time, even if this means trading-off 
tangible gain in a particular case. Finally, they are better able to influence 
the impact of rules that favor them.83 Thus, although there is overlap with 
wealth and level or organization, party capability, as honed in by repeat 
participation, is an independent factor and a crucial one in determining 
RPs success.84 
Using this approach, it is possible to examine the parties’ different legal 
capacity, their capacity to bargain given their alternatives, and their 
knowledge of the judicial apparatus: judges, bailiffs, and the staff that they 
interact with on a routine basis. Similarly, access to lawyers who know the 
system well, the “invisible college of international trade lawyers,”85 matters 
greatly.86 What is striking about Galanter’s analysis is his demonstration 
that despite no bias in the rules or obvious favoritism by judges, the 
institutional practices work to consistently favor the haves over the have-
nots.87 
Galanter’s analysis does not have optimistic implications. But his 
diagnosis can be useful in both understanding the incentives that maintain 
the status quo, and finding where the opportunities for change may lie. A 
number of scholars have begun using a sociological approach in the 
                                                                                                                                                            
347, 360–63 (1975). 
81. Galanter, supra note 77, at 98–99. 
82. Id. at 99. 
83. Id. at 103. 
84. Galanter, supra note 80, at 363. 
85. I borrow this phrase from Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. 
U. L. REV. 217–26 (1977). 
86. Galanter, supra note 77, at 114; Galanter, supra note 80, at 361–62. 
87. Although the traditional discussion of RPs and OSs was not developed in the context of 
international adjudications, this analysis is nevertheless relevant to understanding the WTO DSB as a 
system. There are, of course, obvious differences. In the WTO, the parties are states and the 
domestic processes through which a government decides to pursue litigation is typically more 
complex than that of a firm. Similarly, state RPs are not actors specialized in a particular business 
area, but instead deal with a wide range of subject matters. Finally, enforcement in the system is less 
stringent than in a domestic setting. These differences, however, are not as stark as they may appear. 
First, governments of RPs calculate the benefits of litigation with the interests of their domestic firms 
and economic sector in mind and strategize accordingly. The experience and expertise they have 
gained in past practice remain crucial, as do their ability to reduce costs through economies of scale. 
Although the range of subject matters in which WTO RPs deal is relatively broad, all of the subjects 
involve knowledge and expertise in international trade and the WTO Agreements. Lawyers gain 
expertise in these subspecialties (subsidies, anti-dumping, intellectual property) just as traditional RPs 
(insurers, banks, manufacturers) do in the different subspecialties of their business practice. Finally, 
although the WTO’s enforcement mechanism is subject to the weaknesses that is characteristic of a 
supra-national regime, it has been lauded for its effectiveness and its high rates of compliance. 
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analysis of the international trade regime, which tends to show a 
disadvantage in litigation for those countries that lack resources and do not 
have the knowledge and experience to navigate the complex dispute 
settlement process.88 The recommendations to target these disadvantages 
range from building domestic legal capacity, to financial aid and technical 
assistance, to expanding the WTO legal services department and setting up 
a small claims court.89 
Based on this valuable work, the analysis can be extended to account 
for asymmetries in countries’ overall participation in WTO dispute 
settlement that so far remain unexplored. First, there is RPs ability to 
influence rule change in the long term.90 RPs are likely to play for rules in 
                                                                    
88. In order of appearance in the literature, see, for example, Shaffer, supra note 75, at 177; 
Gregory Shaffer, Three Developing Country Challenges in WTO Dispute Settlement: Some Strategies for 
Adaptation, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 309 
(Dencho Georgiev & Kim Van der Borght eds., 2006); Christina L. Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, 
Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication, 71 J. POLITICS 1033–49 (2009); 
Joseph A. Conti, Learning to Dispute: Repeat Participation, Expertise, and Reputation at the World Trade 
Organization, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 625 (2010); Joseph Conti, Producing Legitimacy at the World Trade 
Organization: the Role of Expertise and Legal Capacity, 8 SOCIOECONOMIC REV. 131 (2010); Sungjoon 
Cho, Beyond Rationality: A Sociological Construction of the World Trade Organization, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 321 
(2012). But see Mary Kopczynski, The Haves Coming Out Behind: Galanter’s Theory Tested on the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/mary_kopczynski/1 (arguing that countries with lower incomes tend to 
prevail more often). This analysis, however, equates repeat players with wealthy players, which loses 
key aspects of the RP ideal type. Furthermore, the study counts a loss if the respondent lost only one 
of multiple claims, regardless of the overall benefit or damage borne by the litigants. Moreover, it is a 
static analysis, not accounting for the dynamic character of litigation where repeat players may lose in 
specific instances but win the overall game. Finally, as the author admits, the “undergods” that come 
out ahead in the analysis are clearly not made up of poor countries, which are still largely absent in 
dispute settlement. The most important lesson of the analysis seems to be that complainants win 
most of the time, regardless of relative wealth.  
89. See, e.g., Brian T. Larson, Meaningful Technical Assistance in the WTO, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1163; 
Gregory Shaffer & Hakan Nordstrom, Access to Justice in the World Trade Organization: The Case for a 
Small Claims Procedure?, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 587–640 (2008). 
90. Galanter, supra note 77, at 103. Conti argues that, in the WTO context, RPs stay on “safe 
ground” and do not play for rule-change. Conti, Learning to Dispute, supra note 88, at 656–57. As I 
hope it will become clear in the following section, the evidence seems to suggest that RPs do 
strategize about rule development over time. But see Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO 
Adjudication: From Empirical Analysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 383 (2009) 
(arguing that rule formation is biased towards liberalization of trade as opposed to repeat players). 
One potential limitation to the capacity of developing countries to intervene in defining this policy 
space through litigation may be the WTO panels’ exercise of self-restraint. See, e.g., Marc L. Busch & 
Krzysztof J. Pelc, The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization, 64 INT’L ORG. 257 
(2010) (concluding that panels were more likely to exercise “judicial economy,” deciding the case on 
narrow grounds when the United States or the European Union were parties to the dispute). Other 
scholars are aware of the high stakes of the existing policy space in WTO rule interpretation but are 
focused on reforms that would actually reduce the involvement of WTO adjudication in deciding 
such cases. See, e.g., Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 
53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 861 (2004) (arguing that although claims of judicial activism are exaggerated, 
Panels and AB should avoid making decisions in cases of legal indeterminacy or when the decisions 
could interfere with the powers of the political organs); Similarly, Krzysztof J. Pelc argues that the 
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litigation and in political fora, and will spend resources in ensuring that 
advantageous rules are enforced.91 RPs are often willing to trade off 
tangible gain for rule gain. In other words, they would accept to lose a case 
but win an important rule change that would benefit them in the future. 
Similarly, a RP might decide to settle a case if it foresees that proceeding 
with litigation might lead to an unfavorable rule change.92 Playing the odds 
of litigation, however, also implies that in some cases a RP might win a 
case, getting tangible gains in that particular instance, but lose a rule. 
Second, the WTO dispute settlement features give rise to another 
important dynamic that I call “adjusting to the rule.” When a RP’s 
domestic measure has been found to be in breach of its WTO obligations, 
it has considerable time and leeway to gradually adjust its measure to the 
contours of the rule as defined by the WTO AB. In the process of 
adjusting its measure the losing party may try not to overconform, testing 
once again the boundaries of the rule. If the winning party is unsatisfied 
and deems that the measure in question is still in breach, it may request an 
implementation panel to decide the issue.93 The implementation panel’s 
decision may then be appealed. The winning party may subsequently look 
for compensation and, failing that, request authorization for retaliation in 
the form of suspension of concessions.94 If the losing party objects to the 
level of suspension of concessions, it can bring the matter to arbitration.95 
As it is apparent, the losing party can thus test the boundaries of the rule 
by slightly modifying its measure and making sure it does not do more 
than is strictly needed. In addition, this structure also buys the losing party 
time to deal with its own domestic process. 
A third strategic possibility for a losing party is not to bring its measure 
into compliance. In this case, it will have to compensate the winning party 
or else accept retaliation. When a losing party deliberately decides to pay 
for its violation, we are in the presence of efficient breach.96 In this 
                                                                                                                                                            
policy space available in the WTO regime might be necessary under some circumstances but as a 
general matter, it repoliticizes issues that should remain juridified. Krzysztof J. Pelc, The Cost of 
Wiggle Room: On the Use of Flexibility in International Trade Agreements (Aug. 7, 2009) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University) (on file with Department of Government, 
Georgetown University). 
91. Galanter, supra note 77, at 100. 
92. Id. at 101. 
93. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 21.5, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal 
Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
94. Id. art. 22. 
95. Id. art 22.6. 
96. While the text of the DSU unequivocally makes full compliance the prefered mode of 
reparation over compensation or retaliation (DSU article 22.1), some scholars have argued that 
incorporating the possibility of efficient breach is a virtue of the WTO system and is one that has 
given WTO members considerable flexibility. See Judith Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT’L L 416 (1996). Other scholars argue that describing the 
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scenario the alternative to compliance is worth more to the losing party 
than compliance itself. Thus, it decides to pay the costs of non-
compliance, which would presumably be outweighed by the benefits it 
derived from the breach. 
In all these instances, RPs can exploit the procedural vulnerabilities of 
the WTO system to “drag their feet” and gain time without having to pay 
for it. In addition, the dispute settlement rules only afford prospective 
relief to the winning party. Thus, compensation is due only from the time 
of expiry of the reasonable period of time for implementation and not 
from the time the measure was enacted. Similarly, each party is responsible 
for its own litigation fees, requiring the losing party to cover only its own 
costs. These rules create incentives for RPs to resort to litigation and 
protract it in order to gain time to maintain their domestic measures. 
The party behavior I have described in the cases of rule change or 
adjustment to the rule ought not to be equated with efficient breach. These 
two options are ways to defend a valuable domestic measure while trying 
to bring it into compliance with WTO obligations. To be sure, when a 
respondent values its domestic measure highly it will try to “win” the case 
before considering paying for non-compliance. But the point is that RPs 
can “win” in multiple ways beyond obtaining favorable relief in a particular 
case. They can win by obtaining a rule change even when losing tangible 
benefits in the case at bar. They can win by “adjusting to the rule” in a 
gradual manner without conforming. And they can win by exploiting the 
procedural vulnerabilities of the system, gaining time to phase out the 
breaching measure while providing a protective cushion to their domestic 
sectors. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that a feature of WTO litigation is that 
an increasing number of disputes are held between RPs. A number of 
developing countries have become active participants in the system and 
they are litigating not only against developed countries, which are RPs, but 
                                                                                                                                                            
WTO in this way does a disservice to the binding character of international obligations and to the 
emphasis on restitution (or withdrawal of the violating measure) as the primary means of compliance. 
See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Misunderstanding on the Nature of Legal 
Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L 60 (1997); see also Judith H. Bello, Book Review, 95 AJIL 984 (2001) 
(reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO, and agreeing with 
Jackson that WTO obligations are legally binding and that a country’s choice of efficient breach does 
not satisfy its legal obligation. However, Bello praises the WTO for “its realistic recognition that it 
cannot enforce specific compliance” and incorporates second-best mechanisms that can restore the 
balance of rights and obligations. For a more elaborate analysis on the character of WTO obligations 
see the following competing positions represented by Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The 
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 179-204 (2002) and John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: 
Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109-125 (2004). Irrespective of one’s 
normative position in this debate, it seems to be the case that WTO members resort to this 
alternative and that the WTO has the institutional and procedural infrastructure to sustain it.). 
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also against other active developing countries. In this scenario of RPs v. 
RPs, “we might expect that there would be heavy expenditure on rule-
development, many appeals, and rapid and elaborate development of the 
doctrinal law.”97 These conditions heighten the importance of active 
participation in dispute settlement and may explain why so many countries 
are participating as third parties, taking a position on issues that concern 
them in order to influence rule change. 
2. In Practice 
The strategies by RPs designed to advance their interests through rule 
change or adjustment to the rule are evident in several famous cases. For 
example, the United States was able to advance domestic environmental 
policies that at first seemed prohibited by the main GATT obligations and 
not covered by the exceptions. The United States was successful at 
expanding the scope of Article XX of GATT98 so that it could ban the 
importation of products originating from countries that did not adopt its 
environmental standards. This is a story of a RP seeking to change a rule 
through lawyering and litigation while gradually adjusting its measures to 
fit the new rule interpretation. Although the United States lost every one 
of its cases, the transformation of the rule, from prohibition to permission, 
has been quite dramatic and it is ultimately a story of a country’s success in 
advancing its domestic policies within the WTO framework. 
The process of rule change and adjustment to the rule began with the 
Tuna-Dolphin cases. In Tuna-Dolphin I,99 Mexico challenged the United 
States’s Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), which placed 
an import ban on tuna and tuna products caught using fishing methods 
that were not comparable to U.S. standards.100 The panel declared the ban 
to be in breach of GATT Article XI and to be outside the scope of the 
exceptions in Article XX, due to its extraterritorial reach. It interpreted 
                                                                    
97. Galanter, supra note 77, at 112–13. 
98. GATT, supra note 51, art. XX. Article XX, which was the central rule at stake in all these 
cases, consists of a general exception to the non-discrimination principles of the main GATT. Of 
particular importance in this story were paragraph (g) of Article XX, and the preamble, also known as 
the chapeau. The Article reads as follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures . . . (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption. 
Id. 
99. Panel Report, United States — Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (circulated Sept. 3, 
1991),30 I.L.M. 1598 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin I]. 
100. Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.7. 
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Article XX(g) as justifying measures that affected only production and 
consumption in the jurisdiction of the country enacting the measure.101 It 
reasoned that a country could not impose import restrictions on a product 
merely because it originated in a country with different environmental 
regulations.102 To accept the extra-territorial interpretation of Article XX 
proposed by the United States, the Panel declared, would jeopardize the 
rights of contracting parties under GATT, subjecting those rights to 
unilateral determination by each country.103 In addition, as a condition of 
entry, the measure established a moving target, subjecting exporters to the 
yearly U.S. incidental dolphin-taking rate, which exporters could not 
predict. As a result, the Panel established that the measure could not be 
“primarily aimed at” conservation, and thus it did not “relate to” the 
conservation of natural resources as required by Article XX(g).104 
In its conclusion, the Panel noted that if the GATT Contracting Parties 
wanted to permit this type of trade restrictive measure, “it would be 
preferable to do so not by interpreting Article XX, but by amending or 
supplementing the provisions of the General Agreement or waiving 
obligations thereunder.”105 This statement illustrates the Panel’s view, and 
that of many Contracting Parties participating in the case as third parties, 
that the text of the Agreement as it stood did not allow for this kind of 
unilateral measures. The Panel thought that they so threatened the rights 
of parties in the Agreement and the multilateral framework that if the 
Contracting Parties wanted to allow this type of unilateral measures, it 
would be best for them to change the rules directly through the 
“legislative” process. What in fact has happened, however, is exactly the 
opposite story. 
This type of measures became acceptable precisely through rule 
interpretation by panels and the AB in litigation. The change took place 
over the course of several cases, in which RPs, primarily the United States, 
advanced interpretations of GATT Article XX(g) that were favorable to 
their own domestic policy interests.106 The trajectory of change has not 
                                                                    
101. Id. ¶¶ 5.30–5.34. In addition, the Panel found the U.S. secondary embargo of tuna and tuna 
products from “intermediary nations” also violated GATT Article XI and was not justifiable under 
Article XX. Id. ¶¶ 5.35–5.37. 
102. Id. ¶ 6.2.  
103. Id. ¶ 5.32. 
104. Id. ¶5.33. 
105. Id. ¶ 6.3. 
106. For example, the United States argued and eventually won acceptance for the extraterritorial 
application of domestic environmental regulations over bycatch of fishing operations in the global 
commons. See id. ¶ 5.32 (rejecting the extraterritorial application of environmental policies out of 
hand); Panel Report, United States — Restrictions on the Import of Tuna, ¶ 5.24, DS29/R (circulated June 
16, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II] (holding the embargo was not “related 
to” conservation because it required coercion against other states); Appellate Body Report, United 
States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 19, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) 
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been swift nor a perfect linear progression from case to case. It has 
required the insistent and strategic advancement of favorable doctrinal 
interpretations and the challenge of unfavorable ones. RP, as the most 
active players in litigation, have had the greater opportunity to influence 
rule changes.  
In Tuna-Dolphin II,107 a panel analyzed a U.S. primary and intermediary 
embargo designed to protect dolphins in non-territorial waters that was 
challenged by the European Economic Community.108 The Panel once 
again found the embargo to be in breach of GATT Article III and XI, but, 
in an important departure from Tuna-Dolphin I, it declared that protecting 
dolphins in non-territorial waters was an acceptable policy encompassed 
by the Article XX exceptions.109 The problem in this case, however, was 
that the means to achieve the policy goals were inappropriate.110 In 
interpreting the language of XX(g), the Panel placed particular importance 
on the words “relating to” and took them to mean “primarily aimed at,” 
holding that both the purpose and the effects of the measure had to be 
primarily aimed at conservation.111 The Panel concluded that the U.S. 
embargoes were in place only to force other nations to comply with U.S. 
conservation policy.112 The Panel then reframed the question as to whether 
measures intended to force other countries to regulate persons in their 
jurisdiction could relate to preservation. It found that in order to preserve 
the spirit of the agreement113 Article XX exceptions should not be 
interpreted broadly; therefore measures enacted to force other countries to 
take domestic action do not “relate to” conservation.114 Although the 
United States lost again, in this second case the rule became more 
capacious. After Tuna-Dolphin II, in principle, a conservation policy with 
extra-territorial effects could fall within the scope of the exceptions in 
Article XX.115  
                                                                                                                                                            
(holding that the “related to” analysis should focus on the purposes of the measure and not the 
differential treatment between nations); Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 122, 
WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22 2001) (holding that unilateral measures penalizing other nations do not 
violate the chapeau of Article XX if the imposing nation has made a good faith effort to negotiate 
multilaterally). 
107. Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 106. 
108. Id. ¶ 1.1. 
109. Id. ¶ 5.20. 
110. Id. ¶ 5.42. 
111. Id. ¶ 5.22. 
112. Id. ¶ 5.24. 
113. Id. ¶ 5.26. 
114. Id. ¶ 5.27. The Panel concluded that measures taken so as to force other countries to change 
their policies, and that were effective only if such changes occurred, could not be primarily aimed 
either at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, or at rendering effective restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption, in the meaning of Article XX (g). Id. 
115. It should be noted that both Tuna-Dolphin panel reports were eventually not adopted.  
580 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 52:551 
Just days after the WTO was established, another important case arose 
and the United States continued to push for expansion of the exception 
under GATT Art. XX(g).116 The Reformulated Gasoline117 case involved a 
U.S. measure that required imported gasoline to meet a special statutory 
baseline (inapplicable to domestic gasoline) with regards to certain 
chemical characteristics.118 The Panel declared that the U.S. measure was 
discriminatory and violated the national treatment rule of Article III:4. 
Moreover, the measure did not fall within the scope of the exception in 
Article XX(g). The panel held that the less favorable baseline 
establishment rules were not “primarily aimed at” the conservation of 
natural resources.119 
On appeal, however, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) made an 
important change to the analysis of Article XX(g) and held that the 
contested measure did fall within its scope.120 In an important 
development, the AB changed the interpretation of the phrase “relating 
to” in Article XX(g) and separated the analysis of the measure’s purpose 
from the measure’s effects. It refused to consider the measure’s 
unfavorable treatment (the effects of the measure) in the analysis of 
whether the measure “relates to” the conservation of natural resources.121 
The AB considered that discriminatory treatment is already implicit in the 
invocation of an exception and it should not prejudge whether the 
measure relates or not to the conservation of natural resources.122 Instead, 
the AB examined whether the measure itself was related to the 
conservation of clean air in the United States and found in the affirmative, 
stating that it could not be regarded as “merely incidentally or 
inadvertently” aimed at such conservation goal.123 
                                                                    
116. Subject to the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism, this and subsequent disputes would 
go through a Panel and also through the newly established Appellate Body procedure. 
117. Appellate Body Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter AB Reformulated Gasoline]; Panel Report, United States —
 Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, (January 29, 1996). 
118. AB Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 117, at 2 (identifying the measure in dispute as the 
Gasoline Rule, a 1994 regulation that the Environmental Protection Agency enacted pursuant to the 
Clean Air Act of 1990). 
119. Id. at 14. 
120. Id. at 14–19. 
121. The Appellate Body declared that one problem with the Panel’s reasoning is that “the Panel 
asked itself whether the ‘less favorable treatment’ of imported gasoline was ‘primarily aimed at’ the 
conservation of natural resources, rather than whether the ‘measure’, i.e. the baseline establishment 
rules, were ‘primarily aimed at’ the conservation of clean air. In our view, the Panel here was in error 
in referring to its legal conclusion on Article III:4 instead of the measure in issue.” Id. at 16. 
122. “The result of this analysis is to turn Article XX on its head. Obviously, there had to be a 
finding that the measure provided ‘less favourable treatment’ under Article III:4 before the Panel 
examined the ‘General Exceptions’ contained in Article XX. That, however, is a conclusion of law. 
The Chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the ‘measures’ which are to be examined under 
Article XX (g), and not the legal finding of ‘less favourable treatment.’” Id. 
123. Id. at 19. 
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The AB moved the analysis of the measure’s effects to the chapeau of 
Article XX. It set an analytical structure by which first it has to be 
determined whether the measure fits within one of Article XX exceptions 
and then whether the application of the measure complies with the 
requirements of the chapeau. The AB concluded, however, that the U.S. 
measure did not meet the requirements. So, once again, the United States 
lost the case on appeal but it achieved an important rule change.124 
In Shrimp-Turtle I,125 at issue was a U.S. statute imposing a ban on the 
importation of shrimp and certain shrimp products harvested with fishing 
technology that resulted in the incidental killing of sea turtles and that was 
not comparable to fishing technology used within the United States.126 The 
Panel concluded that the measures violated Article XI and were not 
covered by Article XX.127 Reversing the order of analysis set out in 
Gasoline, the Panel considered first whether the measure fell within the 
scope of Article XX by analyzing whether it satisfied the conditions of the 
chapeau. The Panel declared that the U.S. measure fell outside the scope 
of Article XX because it went against the objects and purposes of the 
WTO.128 Echoing the reasoning in Tuna-Dolphin I and explicitly referring 
to Tuna-Dolphin II, the Panel determined that a country’s unilateral 
measure, conditioning market access upon the adoption of its own 
domestic standards, would damage the security and predictability of trade 
                                                                    
124. “Although the United States ultimately lost its appeal, it expressed great satisfaction with the Appellate 
Body’s analysis of Article XX(g). Past GATT panels had focused, as had the Gasoline panel, on whether 
the GATT-inconsistent aspect of a measure was ‘primarily aimed at’ conservation. The AB’s decision 
that it was necessary to look at the broader measure — the baseline establishment rules generally — 
and examine whether they were aimed at conservation significantly expanded the scope of Article 
XX(g).” JACKSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 611 (emphasis added). 
125. The dispute concerning the U.S. measures in Shrimp-Turtle would go through all the steps of 
the WTO dispute settlement system and be litigated several times, first in a Panel, Panel Report, 
United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) 
[hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I], then in the Appellate Body, Appellate Body Report, United States —
 Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter 
Shrimp-Turtle II], and finally in an implementation procedure that included a Panel and AB decisions, 
Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle 
III]. For purposes of illustrating the changes in rule interpretation and in adjustment to the rule I call 
these cases Shrimp-Turtle I, II, and III respectively, even though they consist of different phases of the 
same dispute. 
126. The U.S. measure challenged by Malaysia is listed as a supplement to 16 U.S.C.A. § 1537(b) ( 
(West 2008) (referred to as § 609). Congress passed the measure in Section 609 of Public Law 101-
162, which was a 1989 appropriations bill. Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 
Stat. 988, 1037 (1989). Countries could be exempted from the ban if they certified that 1) there was 
no risk to sea turtles from the fishing environment in which shrimp was harvested (aqua-farms or 
“artisanal methods”) or 2) the country adopted regulatory measures comparable to the United States. 
The ban was initially limited geographically to the wider Caribbean/western Atlantic region but was 
later extended to all countries. 
127. Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 125, at ¶¶ 7.12, 7.27. 
128. Id. ¶ 7.49. 
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relations and threaten the whole multilateral system.129 The Panel also 
declared that the U.S. measure was overinclusive, as it did not take into 
account different local and regional conditions. It concluded that the 
United States could better achieve its conservation goals through 
multilateral negotiation of international agreements and not unilateral 
conditions.130 
The United States challenged the Panel decision on all fronts and 
achieved important changes in the interpretation of Article XX in Shrimp-
Turtle II.131 Following Reformulated Gasoline, the AB reversed again the 
method of analysis of Article XX and examined first whether the measure 
fell within one of the enumerated clauses of Article XX and second 
whether the measure complied with the requirements of the chapeau.132 
The AB decided that the measure “relat[ed] to conservation.”133 This time, 
the AB did not use the term “primarily aimed at” and it declared that the 
measure was proportionate in reach and scope to the goal of conservation 
of sea turtles: “the means are, in principle, reasonably related to the 
ends.”134 Ultimately, the United States lost the case on appeal because it 
was found to violate the chapeau of Art. XX,135 but it obtained several 
important wins concerning the criteria for assessing whether a measure of 
this kind was permissible. 
Following Shrimp-Turtle II, the United States revised its measure and 
adopted the 1999 Guidelines, which modified the conditions under which 
Section 609 applied.136 It also made efforts to negotiate a new Agreement 
                                                                    
129. Id. ¶¶ 7.46, 7.51. 
130. Id. ¶ 7.55. 
131. Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 125. 
132. Id. ¶ 118. According to the AB, that order had a clear logic and the Panel was wrong to have 
inverted it. Id. ¶ 119. 
133. Id. ¶ 135-36 
134. Id. ¶ 141. 
135. The AB decided that the language of the chapeau in Article XX had to be interpreted in light 
of the object and purpose of that Article and not of GATT or the WTO Agreement, since the nature 
of the exception implied the breach of a substantive obligation. The purpose of Article XX was thus 
to prevent abuse or misuse of the exception and the analysis of the chapeau involved the application of 
the measure, not its design. The AB then proceeded to apply the elements of the chapeau, namely 
whether there was discrimination and whether such discrimination was arbitrary or unjustifiable 
“between countries where the same conditions prevail.” The AB found that the U.S. ban was 
unjustifiable because it required other WTO members to adopt “essentially the same” regulatory 
standards that existed in the United States to achieve a policy goal, without considering different 
conditions in other Members’ territories. Id. ¶¶ 164–65. The AB also found it to be unjustifiable that 
the United States had engaged some members but not others in negotiations to conclude 
international agreements for the protection of sea turtles before imposing its import ban. Id. ¶ 166. 
The AB found that the U.S. measure was also arbitrary, given its rigidity and inflexibility. Id. ¶ 177. 
Moreover, it found that the certification process lacked a review process and that important due 
process requirements were missing. Id. ¶ 180. 
136. Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating 
to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,949 (July 8, 
1999). The United States also engaged in negotiations with shrimp producing nations in Southeast 
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with countries of the Indian Ocean and the Southeast Asia region.137 In 
Shrimp-Turtle III,138 Malaysia challenged in a compliance panel these U.S. 
rule adjustments as an insufficient implementation of the AB Shrimp-Turtle 
II ruling.139 Malaysia argued that, to avoid arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination under the chapeau, the United States needed to conclude an 
international agreement for the protection of sea turtles.140 The Panel and 
the AB disagreed and found that serious, good faith efforts to negotiate an 
international agreement on the part of the United States were sufficient to 
comply with the chapeau.141 Malaysia also argued that, even if Section 609 
now allowed certification of countries that have “comparable” regulatory 
programs to the United States and not “essentially the same,” it would still 
constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.142 The reason, 
Malaysia argued, was that the measure “conditions access to the United 
States market on compliance with policies and standards ‘unilaterally’ 
prescribed by the United States.”143 The AB disagreed with Malaysia and 
found that, due to the new flexibilities introduced in Section 609 and the 
new procedures in the certification process, the measure was now in 
compliance with the chapeau requirements and therefore valid under 
XX(g).144 
It should be noted that, in adjusting its measure to the new rule 
interpretation in Shrimp-Turtle II, the United States carefully tested the 
boundaries of the rule and managed to obtain a favorable ruling. The 
United States initiated negotiations, but did not conclude any new 
multilateral agreement with the winning countries.145 This ended up being 
a wise course of action for the United States, since, in Shrimp-Turtle III, the 
AB found that a good-faith effort to negotiate was enough.146 
In counting the general wins and losses of the United States in these 
environmental cases the tally is not favorable to the United States, which 
lost all the cases analyzed above except for the very last one. The United 
States lost in the sense that the measure in question was found to violate 
WTO obligations. The United States, however, has been successful in 
transforming and expanding the scope of Article XX(g), so that it is no 
                                                                                                                                                            
Asia pursuant to the Appellate Body decision in Shrimp-Turtle II. See Shrimp-Turtle III, supra note 125, 
at ¶ 131. 
137. Shrimp-Turtle III, supra note 125, at ¶ 115. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. ¶ 1. 
140. Id. ¶ 115. 
141. Id. ¶ 122. 
142. Id. ¶ 145. 
143. Id. ¶ 136. 
144. Id. ¶¶ 153–54. 
145. In fact, the United States negotiated these agreements while the previous measures were still 
in effect. 
146. Shrimp-Turtle III, supra note 125, at ¶¶ 122–23. 
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longer interpreted to prohibit conditioning market access to other 
members upon the adoption of comparable environmental standards of 
those of the United States. In fact, the rule progressed from outright 
prohibition of this trade restriction (only fixable through amendment to 
the Agreement, as the Panel in Tuna-Dolphin recommended) to favorable 
permission. In this way, the United States expanded its policy space 
through strategic wins in rule interpretation and adjustments to the rule.147  
As can be seen in these environmental cases148, there is a progression by 
which an RP can achieve an important transformation of a rule or set of 
rules to accommodate its interests.149 The emphasis of the analysis here is 
on the parties and on how they manage to weave their policy interests 
within the confines of the WTO by expanding the boundaries of the rules. 
The United States did not get discouraged by what looked like a restriction 
in the Agreement or by unfavorable interpretations by Panels or the AB. 
Instead, the United States enacted measures that it deemed important to its 
domestic objectives and then sought to defend them when challenged. It 
carefully adjusted its measures to test the limits of new rule interpretations 
and defended its adjustment whenever it was challenged. Along the way, 
the United States also took advantage of the procedural vulnerabilities of 
                                                                    
147. This does not mean to suggest that these changes were the sole responsibility of the U.S. 
government. There was, of course, enormous pressure from U.S. and international environmental 
groups who advocated for the domestic measure in question. For an analysis of U.S. compliance with 
the Shrimp-Turtle decision, see generally Renata Benedini, Complying with the WTO Shrimp Turtle Decision, 
in RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 419 (Edith Brown Weiss & John H. Jackson eds., 
2008). 
148. For further analysis of these cases, see Steve Charnovitz, The WTO’s Environmental Progress, 
10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 685 (2007); Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: 
A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491(2002). 
149. In his important article about WTO litigation, Conti asserts that RPs do not strategize to 
secure rule-changes in ambiguous or untested areas of WTO law. Conti, Learning to Dispute, supra note 
88, at 656. This assertion, however, relies partly on a distinction between clarifying an obligation and 
creating a new rule that seems hard to sustain. Id. When an adjudicator clarifies the meaning of an 
ambiguous rule, she is, in effect, creating a new rule that chooses a particular interpretation over 
other competing alternatives. Parties in litigation do not expect adjudicators to create new rules from 
a clean slate. Rather, they propose interpretations that would give the rule a new meaning, thus 
creating a new rule to favor their interests. Conti states that “[t]here is little evidence that repeat 
litigants strategize the development of WTO law over a series of disputes.” Id. at 657. Further, he 
claims that because RPs can anticipate the impact of a potential rule change, they tend to carefully 
avoid clarification of obligations. He concludes that “this is a reverse playing-for-the-rules strategy 
based on the avoidance of uncertainty and negative implications of the clarification of obligations.” 
Id. But if RPs are likely to anticipate the impact of a rule, there is no reason they should abstain from 
strategic litigation if the odds favor them. And it is precisely RPs who are best situated to avoid 
uncertainty by continuing to push for particular interpretations overtime. Conti recognizes that third 
parties may join a dispute “for the opportunity to affect the interpretation of an obligation.” Id. This 
behavior, however, may very well be seen as complementary, rather than exceptional, to RPs’ strategy 
as litigants. Legal analysis of rule development, like the saga of environmental cases analyzed above, 
shows that RPs invest in rule-change over time through strategic litigation. 
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the system, by delaying the measure adjustment as much as the procedural 
mechanism allowed. 
Developing countries are learning to use WTO rules and exceptions to 
their advantage, arguing that their domestic measures fall under accepted 
justifications, like protecting the environment, health, and public morals. 
But they are also learning that claiming an exception is not a trump card 
because there is an elaborate and evolving doctrine, largely influenced by 
RPs, as to the applicability of each exception. Thus, governments have to 
learn how to craft their measures in a way that would pass muster under 
the WTO. For that, they need institutional legal capacity, so they can shape 
a measure in a manner that would make it WTO-consistent and can 
defend it through effective lawyering and litigation.150 
B. Rule-Based and Doctrinal Space for Countries’ Policy Preferences 
In this Section, I describe areas of policy autonomy that countries have 
begun to carve out by proposing novel or non-obvious interpretations of 
the agreements’ text in the areas of the environment, labor, and intellectual 
property.151 
1. Environmental Regulations 
As I have shown, the exception in GATT Article XX(g), as now 
interpreted by the AB, may enable a country to enact unilateral 
environmental measures with which exporting countries have to comply in 
order to gain market access, regardless of whether those measures pertain 
solely to the environment within these exporting countries.152 Countries 
have thus gained considerable environmental policy autonomy. As a result, 
a WTO member can erect trade barriers against exporting countries that 
do not comply with its environmental regulatory standards.153 
                                                                    
150. This might be especially important if DSB itself, according to one argument, has started to 
develop a bias of interpretation against countries’ claims of regulatory autonomy. See Colares, supra 
note 90, at 387–88. For an opposite view, see Michael Ming Du, supra note 71. 
151. For an excellent analysis of the tension between the values of liberal trade and 
environmental advocates, see generally Edith B. Weiss & John H. Jackson, The Framework for The 
Environment and Trade, in RECONCILING ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE, supra note 147, at, 1; see also 
Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: 
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith 
Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2000) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the main 
international environmental commitments, the mechanisms to ensure their compliance and the 
challenges to make them effective). 
152. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM 51–52 (2009). 
153. For a detailed discussion of potential areas of interaction between environmental protection 
and WTO rules, see Bradly J. Condon, Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law, 12 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 895 (2009). 
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Countries could potentially use this expansion of Article XX(g) for the 
purposes of promoting domestic climate change regulation. Of course, 
pursuant to the AB’s past interpretations, any protective measure still 
needs to comply with Article XX’s chapeau. In fact, the language of the 
now defunct Boxer Amendment to the Lieberman-Warner Climate 
Security Act of 2008 in the United States might violate the requirements of 
the chapeau.154 Nonetheless, one could imagine climate change legislation 
that would be more carefully designed to pass muster under WTO by 
making sure that the provisions of the measure treat similarly situated 
countries equally. 
2. Labor Standards 
Potential space for national policy autonomy also exists in labor 
standards. For example, a country might be able to enact trade-restrictive 
measures to ensure compliance with internationally-recognized labor 
standards.155 There are plausible interpretations of the non-discrimination 
principle, found in the most favored nation156 and national treatment157 
rules, which might justify trade restrictions on goods produced under 
working conditions that violate fundamental labor rights. 
Ultimately, even if the trade measure is considered to be in breach of 
WTO nondiscriminatory obligations, a state might successfully invoke the 
public morals exception in GATT Article XX(a) to justify trade sanctions 
for violations of core labor standards as human rights.158 The AB first had 
the occasion to rule on the public morals exception in Article XIV (a) of 
the General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS),159 which has similar 
text to the public morals exception in GATT. The Panel defined public 
morals as the “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on 
                                                                    
154. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 152, at 83–87. The authors conclude that although the Act’s 
“provisions on imports seem to have been written with a roadmap of WTO law in mind . . . there 
remain GATT violations that would require defense under Article XX, and an adjudication would 
probably find that the program fails to comply with the chapeau of Article XX. Id. at 88. 
155. Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 148–49 (1999); See ROBERT HOWSE & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 571–74 (2005);  
156. See HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 571 (arguing that under criteria established by 
the AB in Canada-Autos an origin-neutral condition based on compliance with core labor standards in 
the product’s process of production might be consistent with Article I:1 even in regard of like 
products). 
157. Id. at 572 (arguing that based on the “consumer tastes and habits” criteria set out by the AB 
in Asbestos, interpreting Article III:4, a state may validly target imported products whose production 
violates core labor standards for considering them unlike similar domestic products whose production 
complies with such standards). 
158. Howse, supra note 155, at 142–45; HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 572–73. 
159. Panel Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004). 
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behalf of a community or nation.”160 The AB concurred with the Panel’s 
decision, thus giving countries considerable latitude to define the scope of 
its public morals and determine the practices that violate them.161 More 
recently, the AB decided its first case on XX(a), confirming this 
interpretation.162 
But an exception on public morals is not a blank check.163 A state 
enacting such a measure would still need to comply with the requirements 
of the chapeau in Article XX, as interpreted by the AB in the Shrimp-Turtle 
case. In addition, a WTO member would need to show that a measure is 
“necessary” for the protection of public morals.164 
One example of a country’s trade-restrictive measure based on 
violations of labor standards is the current U.S. ban on all trade with 
Burma under the 2003 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act.165 The Act 
was issued subsequent to an International Labour Organization (ILO) 
inquiry into labor rights abuses and an ensuing ILO recommendation to 
which the Burmese military junta failed to respond. Were the Act to be 
challenged in the WTO, it could be upheld as an exception because it 
clearly complies with the requirements under Article XX(a).166 In this case, 
there was a definitive multilateral judgment against the violation of labor 
rights in Burma. Indeed, for the first time, the ILO invoked Article 33 of 
its Constitution, which allows other ILO members to take measures 
against a member to secure compliance.167 
                                                                    
160. Id. ¶¶ 6.4–6.6. 
161. See id. ¶ 3.5; Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 146, at ¶ 296. Robert Howse and Michael Trebilcock argue that 
“based on the panel’s deferential reasoning as to the content of public morals, there is no reason why 
[its content] could not extend to beliefs of the importing country concerning the wrongfulness of 
consuming products produced in a context — either corporate or national — where basic labour 
rights are not respected.” HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 572–73. 
162. Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009). 
163. See Mark Wu, Note, Free Trade and the Protection of Public Morals: An Analysis of the Newly 
Emerging Public Morals Clause Doctrine, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 215 (2008). 
164. This would involve an analysis of whether there is any “reasonably available less trade-
restrictive alternative” or whether the measure has a “close relationship to the given objective.” 
HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 573–74. For the most recent Appellate Body analysis of 
necessity concerning public morals, see Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Affecting Trading 
Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, supra note 162, 
at ¶¶ 234–337 (confirming that “at least one of the alternative measures proposed by the United 
States is an alternative ‘reasonably available’ to China” and declaring that China had “not 
demonstrated that the relevant provisions are ‘necessary’ to protect public morals”). Id. ¶¶ 336–37. 
165. Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §1701 (2003). 
166. Howse and Trebilcock note that “a group of WTO scholars from leading U.S. law schools 
issued a joint statement through the Free Burma Coalition, explaining how, in the case of Burma, 
sanctions could be defended under Article XX of the GATT, especially given the actions already 
taken by the ILO [International Labour Organization].” HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 
568. 
167. Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., International Labour Conference Adopts Resolution 
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3. Intellectual Property 
TRIPS is perhaps the WTO agreement that has received the harshest 
criticism for its stringent standards on patents, trademarks and copyrights. 
Some development scholars have argued that the TRIPS agreement 
represents the clearest case of rich states wanting to subject developing 
countries to their own standards and have called for its repudiation.168 
Criticism of TRIPS has been particularly harsh when it comes to 
protection of pharmaceutical patents because of the obstacles it imposes 
on access to medicines in poor countries.169 
Despite the stringent protections established under TRIPS, legal 
scholars have pointed out flexibilities in the domestic application of the 
TRIPS agreement, particularly when it comes to enabling access to 
medicines to further their health policies.170 For example, states can 
mandate compulsory licensing for certain drugs, which effectively 
supersedes any patent exclusivity in exchange for a royalty.171 Under 
TRIPS Article 31, WTO members can grant a compulsory license as long 
as it is conditioned upon “reasonable compensation to the rights-holder 
and provided the license applies only to the market of the granting WTO 
                                                                                                                                                            
Targeting Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma) (June 14, 2000), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/75tsaqj. 
168. See RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES, supra note 10, at 149; Birdsall et al., supra 
note 14, at 144.  
169. James Love, From TRIPs to RIPs: A Better Trade Framework to Support Innovation in Medical 
Technologies, Paper for the Workshop on Economic Issues Related to Access to HIV/AIDS Care in 
Developing Countries, Agence nationale de recherches sur le sida/Institute d' économie publique (Université de la 
Méditerranée), Marseille, France (May 27, 2003), available at www.cptech.org/slides/trips2rips.doc. 
170. See, e.g., Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential Treatment 
in WTO Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1 
(2005). 
171. See Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at ¶ 4.The Declaration responded to the perceived 
danger that the TRIPS agreement would overly restrict counries’ ability to deal with public health 
emergencies. For an early assessment of both the restrictiveness and the flexibility of TRIPS, see 
Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global 
Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 25 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1069 (1996). For a thorough account of the interpretive issues that have arisen 
in the domain of TRIPS flexibilities, see Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 
874–86 (2007). In 2009 report to the General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
physical and mental health noted that “pressure from developed countries has played a prominent 
role in shaping the implementation of TRIPS flexibilities in developing countries and 
L[east]D[eveloped]C[ountrie]s”. Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Promotion and Protection of all Human 
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 26, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/11/12 (Mar. 31, 2009) (by Anand Grover). The Special Rapporteur ends the report 
with a recommendation that “developing countries and LDCs should seek international assistance in 
building capacity to implement TRIPS flexibilities” and that they should avoid enacting free trade 
agreements or bilateral trade agreements that include more restrictive provisions (“TRIPS- plus”). Id. 
¶¶ 106, 108. 
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member.”172 But the dominant interpretation of the Article, which has 
been effectively advanced by the pharmaceutical industry with the support 
of developed countries’ governments, makes it more difficult for 
developing countries to use compulsory licensing, even to address a health 
crisis.173 Unfortunately, the TRIPs division of the WTO Secretariat seems 
to have enabled and supported this interpretation by emphasizing the 
strictness of TRIPs restrictions and “underemphasizing the flexibilities” of 
the regime.174 
Furthermore, on the question of whether poor countries without 
manufacturing capacity could import generic drugs, there is a plausible 
interpretation that they could do so under Article 30 exception. Although 
Article 31 limits the granting of such a license to the domestic market of 
the WTO member in question, 
[T]here are good reasons to think that the granting of a compulsory 
license could be extended to the market in another WTO member 
country as an Article 30 exception, where that other WTO member 
indicates that were it to possess its own manufacturing capacity, it 
would itself have granted such a license for production of generics 
domestically.175  
This exception is consistent with the normal exploitation of the patent and 
does not undermine the patent holders’ legitimate interests.176 The point is 
that the problem “could be solved within the four corners of TRIPs.”177 
Thus, the key question is not the rigidity of the text but the interpretations 
promoted by powerful industrial groups and developed countries that 
promote a closure not warranted by the text of the agreement.178 
Beyond compulsory licensing, scholars have noted further flexibilities in 
the implementation of the TRIPS agreement. States can exercise discretion 
in several areas, such as by limiting the patentable subject matter, setting a 
high inventive step standard, expanding procedural opportunities to 
challenge patents before and after they are granted, and imposing 
                                                                    
172. HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 155, at 429. 
173. Id. Reflecting on the South African controversy, Howse and Trebilcock conclude that 
“neither the parallel importation foreseen by the South African legislation nor the alternative of 
compulsory licensing itself is prohibited under TRIPs — the problem was not the Agreement but it 
being interpreted unreasonably, in a manner that allowed it to be used to bully developing countries 
with an HIV/AIDS crisis.” Id. at 429–30. 
174. Id. at 429  
175. Id. at 430. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 431. 
178. Howse and Trebilcock conclude that “it is important that the conduct of the WTO 
Secretariat in endorsing these kinds of interpretations be carefully reviewed, especially what it tells 
developing-country governments about the meaning of TRIPs in the context of technical assistance 
and training programs” Id. at 431-32. 
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limitations on injunctive remedies.179 While TRIPS contains many bright-
line obligations, such as a minimum twenty-year duration requirement for 
patents, it also includes many vague standards, such as the “requirement to 
engage in ‘reasonable’ efforts to negotiate with patent holders before 
overriding a patent”.180 Developing countries have a real opportunity to 
interpret these terms in their favor during the implementation and 
administration of their domestic regulation, in compliance with TRIPS.181 
Some developing countries have already begun to do so. 182 In reaction to 
this trend and providing further evidence of the existing flexibilities in 
TRIPS, developed countries such as the United States have tried to 
negotiate stricter terms in bilateral trade agreements.183 
As we have seen, even in TRIPS, RPs in the WTO can exploit available 
legal interpretations to their advantage. One important lesson that emerges 
from this discussion is that often the biggest impediments to national 
policy autonomy lie not on the Agreements themselves, but in dominant 
interpretations of them.184 RPs are able to promote favorable 
interpretations in litigation but also through other means. For instance, 
they can promote advantageous interpretations through technical 
assistance programs.185 A key question is thus what the obstacles that 
developing countries confront in taking advantage of the WTO 
                                                                    
179. Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in 
India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1589 (2009). 
180. Id. at 1588. 
181. See id. at 1589 (“In the process of interpreting the TRIPS Agreement, and in part through 
the intervention of local industry and health advocates, India introduced robust versions of familiar 
flexibilities such as compulsory licensing, but also introduced some less common and even entirely 
new flexibilities.”). 
182. For an overview of the ways in which developing countries have already tried to take 
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities, see ELLEN F.M. ’T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER 61 (2009). 
183. Id. at 69–72. For a thorough account of U.S. efforts to conclude bilateral treaties in the area 
of intellectual property and an analysis of the potentially negative effects on developing countries, see 
Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, J. WORLD INT’L PROP. 791 (2005). The 
provisions sought through bilateral treaties are known as ‘TRIPS-plus,’ and they explicitly go beyond 
what is required by TRIPS. See Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on 
Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399 (2006). 
184. This legal-institutional analysis can be taken further to discuss the question of whether the 
WTO should deal with other pressing global issues, like migration, which are usually thought to lie 
outside the scope of the Organization. In an illuminating analysis, Joel Trachtman examines the 
ambivalent relationship between GATS Mode 4, regulating trade in services provided by natural 
persons from another country, with a host state’s immigration law. JOEL TRACHTMAN, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION: TOWARD THE FOURTH FREEDOM 241–46 
(2009). Trachtman suggests that nothing would bar states from making “cross-concessions” or 
liberalizations in goods for liberalization in migration. Id. at 333. 
185. Kapczynski notes that developing countries face important limitations in exploiting these 
flexibilities, such as lack of resources, a dominant transnational legal culture that fills in the gaps of 
TRIPS ambiguities with interpretations that favor high-protection jurisdictions, and extra-legal 
pressure. Kapczynski, supra note 179, at 1631. 
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agreements are and how they may overcome them. This is the question I 
explore in the next section. 
C. Linking Legal Capacity to a Development Strategy 
Despite the potential flexibilities highlighted in the previous section, 
structural asymmetries within the WTO make it harder for developing 
countries to participate successfully in the WTO dispute resolution system. 
Like any change, the transformation of the international trade regime, 
from a diplomacy-based to a rule-oriented system, with the creation of the 
WTO has created new incentives and privileged certain actors over 
others.186 Although several scholars have noted the reduced participation 
of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement system, as 
compared to developed countries, the explanations for this phenomenon 
vary from legal-institutional capacity187 to trade volume and 
composition188, to economic resources,189 to power differentials.190 How to 
determine with confidence which factor is most relevant is a matter of 
current debate. 191 
Shaffer, for example, points out that developing countries face several 
challenges. They lack expertise in WTO law, financial resources to use the 
system, and they are afraid of pressure or potential reprisals by powerful 
countries.192 These are “constraints of legal knowledge, financial 
endowment, and political power” or “law, money, and politics.”193 
                                                                    
186. See, e.g., Shaffer & Nordstrom, supra note 89, at 590 (“In sum, where the procedures are the 
same while stakes differ, the system is not neutral to size. Notionally equal litigation rules provide 
unequal opportunities for WTO members. Small trading nations are effectively constrained from 
being able to use the legal system to the full extent, constituting, in practice, a form of in-built 
discrimination.”). 
187. See Busch et al., supra note 75, at 576–77 (2009); Conti, Learning to Dispute, supra note 88, at 
625–62; Davis & Bermeo, supra note 88; Guzman & Simmons, supra note 75, at 569 (finding that 
legal capacity is a better explanation than power in countries’ constraints to participate in dispute 
settlement); Shaffer, supra note 75, at 197. 
188. See Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis & Håkan Nordström, Is the Use of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System Biased? (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP2340, 1999) 
(published in THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW/DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Petros C. 
Mavroidis & Alan O. Sykes eds., 2005)). 
189. See Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing 
Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT’L ECON. LAW 861, 865–67 (2005); Shaffer, supra note 
75, at 197; Shaffer & Nordstrom, supra note 89. 
190. See Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties and 
Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 387 (2005) (discussing retaliatory and legal capacity); Pilar 
Zejan & Frank L. Bartels, Be Nice and Get Your Money — An Empirical Analysis of WorldTrade 
Organization Trade Disputes and Aid, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 1021 (2006). 
191. Busch et al., supra note 75; Hoekman et al., supra note 76 (examining developing country 
participation in WTO dispute settlement and concluding that once a panel has been formed, there 
does not seem to be a difference in losses and wins between developing and developed countries). 
192. Shaffer, supra note 75, at 177. 
193. Id. 
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Developing countries face considerable hurdles in accessing the markets of 
other countries. These trade barriers can be significant for the economies 
of developing countries.194 If developing countries could challenge these 
barriers their economies would benefit. They should be able to do so 
through the dispute settlement system, the institutional setting provided by 
the WTO. However, despite the system’s recognition of formal equality 
not all countries can use it effectively. 
In Shaffer’s work, as in many studies about the WTO dispute settlement 
system, there is an optimistic note about how once legally-capable 
countries are able to spot trade barriers, they would be interested in and 
would stand to gain from tearing them down. In this view, investing in 
legal capacity allows countries to become “trade-barrier-spotters,” finding 
barriers they could challenge for their benefit. Moreover, because every 
country has an interest in seeking gains, if everyone has considerable legal 
capacity and is able to participate in the dispute settlement system, the 
trade regime would be kept in check by its participants, who would shoot 
down barriers and prevent other countries from erecting them. This view 
is consistent with the assumption that trade liberalization is embedded in 
the WTO regime, which the dispute settlement is supposed to serve. 
Taking this view to its logical conclusion, some scholars have suggested 
having a public prosecutor.195 Because only a few countries are capable of 
identifying violations of legal obligations, many go unpunished. If 
countries are unable to police their own interests, then a public police 
would keep the regime under closer surveillance. The assumption again is 
that less trade barriers would be good for everyone, and particularly for 
developing countries, which currently are less able to challenge them. This 
understanding of legal capacity takes the assumptions of trade 
liberalization for granted and seeks to redress the asymmetrical conditions 
under which different members participate in the system. It recognizes 
that, despite formal equality, there is real inequality of initial material 
conditions and that such disparities impact the result. The strategy for 
developing countries is one of adapting or “catching-up” with developed 
countries to participate on an equal footing. Here, investing in legal 
capacity is a key lever in leveling the playing field by helping countries to 
become RPs. 
Using an alternative approach, I suggest that we invert the starting 
question. Instead of asking “why aren’t developing countries using the 
system in greater numbers?” or “what stops them from participating in 
it?”, we should ask: Why are developing countries using the system? And 
what are they using it for? Surely one could argue that it is because 
                                                                    
194. Id. 
195. See Bernard Hoekman, Strengthening the Global Trade Architecture for Development: The Post Doha 
Agenda, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 23, 36 (2002). 
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developing countries have enough legal capacity to know their legal 
opportunities, financial resources to embark on litigation, and market 
power to withstand the process. But this just tells us that these countries 
have the means to use the system. In other words, they are using the 
system because they can. In contrast, to go deeper into the reasons 
developing countries have to use the system is to inquire into their 
governments’ economic policy and the domestic interests that stand to 
gain. 
If we pursue this line of inquiry, an alternative picture emerges. A few 
prominent developing countries are using the dispute settlement system to 
defend their economic policies against challenges from other countries. 
They are also increasingly emboldened to challenge measures of rich 
countries that affect the economic interests of their domestic industries. 
They have to pick their fights and strategize, choosing which domestic 
regulation to defend and which domestic sectors to stand by. And they are 
doing this while learning that the rules of the international trade regime are 
open-textured and they can push them to accommodate their interests. 
Thus, adopting a viewpoint that analyzes why developing countries are 
interested in participating in WTO dispute resolution (rather than why 
they cannot participate), the concept of legal capacity not only explains 
how developing countries can participate more often, but it also reveals 
how countries can increase their policy space to achieve a specific 
economic objective. 
I examine legal capacity not as a question of increasing a country’s 
repertoire of legal expertise. To be sure, a proficient knowledge of WTO 
law and its operation would be necessary. But I am interested in legal 
capacity as a tool that can show the contested nature of legal expertise as 
well. One that recognizes that legal expertise is not an objective or neutral 
good, but rather a mode of using knowledge in the pursuit of certain 
policy goals.196 Viewed in this way, legal capacity can help developing 
countries to understand the policy choices behind different interpretations 
of WTO rules. It could help them develop their own interpretations that, 
while consistent with WTO Agreements, take their interests to heart. From 
this perspective, increasing legal capacity is not merely a strategy of 
catching up to developed countries through training and technical 
assistance.197 Rather, it must be a program that educates a country’s public 
                                                                    
196. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY. 
L. REV. 5, 19 (2005); see also Andrew T.F. Lang, Legal Regimes and Regimes of Knowledge: Governing Global 
Services Trade 38 (LSE Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 15/2009, July 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423538 (noting that legal experts are empowered by “the significant role 
in the interpretation of international legal norms”).  
197. Indeed, technical assistance might stand in the way of increasing developmental legal 
capacity to the extent that technical training promotes the idea that there is a fixed meaning to WTO 
restrictions or advances particular interpretations of rules as necessary. 
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officials in identifying the normative and policy choices contained in the 
WTO rules and the various legal strategies available to them. 
To refine this different perspective on legal capacity, I propose a 
distinction between “free-trade legal capacity” and “developmental legal 
capacity.” Free-trade legal capacity refers to a process of equipping 
countries with the appropriate international trade expertise, and litigation 
skills to ensure successful participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
system. The goal of free-trade legal capacity is to enable developing 
countries to gain access to other markets by spotting other countries’ trade 
barriers and benefit from further liberalization. The assumption is that if 
countries manage to effectively enforce their rights in the WTO, their 
economies will stand to gain. In contrast, developmental legal capacity 
refers to a process of building lawyering and litigation skills that countries 
can use to increase their policy space, which in turn allows them to not 
only gain market access, but also to promote and sustain their domestic 
industrial policies. The goal of developmental legal capacity is to promote 
a country’s development goals within the framework of WTO 
Agreements. The assumption is that the WTO Agreements are a 
compromise, which countries continue to influence to advance their 
interests. These two types of legal capacities originate from divergent 
development strategies, which place different value on the objectives of 
development of local lawyering skills and strategic, long-term rule-change.  
This Part has analyzed how RPs enjoy a privileged position from which 
to influence the system in their favor. They use strategic lawyering and 
litigation to pursue their policy objectives by changing rule interpretation 
over time and by adjusting to the rule in the most favorable way possible. 
This Part has explored several domains in which countries can make use of 
rule-based and doctrinal flexibilities to pursue their policy objectives. 
Finally, this Part examined the relative importance of legal capacity in 
enabling a country to pursue its policy goals and argued that the shape of a 
country’s legal capacity may be determined, to an important extent, by its 
domestic economic development strategy. We are now in a position to see 
how these elements combine to delineate a country’s policy autonomy. 
It is possible to conceptualize policy autonomy as the available 
regulatory space that results from the combination of three factors: rule 
and doctrinal flexibility, legal capacity and development strategy.198 Figure 
                                                                    
198. The analysis of policy flexibility in the interpretation of international agreements has a 
domestic correlative, too. John Jackson has noted how a country’s domestic legal infrastructure can 
have serious implications for its policy flexibility. Specifically, whether a country makes treaties 
directly applicable in its domestic legal order, and what hierarchy it gives them in relation to federal 
laws and the constitution, may matter greatly for that country’s ability to interpret, modify, and 
implement its obligations. John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 
86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310 (1992). 
A country whose treaties are directly applicable as domestic law would have no opportunity to 
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1, below, illustrates this interaction. Prompted by its own domestic 
development goals, a country may mobilize its legal capacity to mine the 
rule-based and doctrinal space available in its international obligations. The 
domestic development goals refer here to a country’s domestic policy 
objective (economic, social, environmental, etc.), which motivates a 
country to seek the necessary space to achieve it within its web of 
international legal obligations. A country would develop its legal capacity 
to be able to pursue its policy goals. This legal capacity would then be 
informed by and attuned to the domestic policy goals. Consequently, a 
country would deploy its legal capacity to exploit the rule and doctrinal 
flexibility available in the legal agreements to assert and expand the policy 
autonomy needed to achieve its domestic goals. Conversely, a country with 
legal capacity but no domestic development strategy would end up with 
less policy autonomy, despite potential rule-based and doctrinal flexibility 
and regardless of where it stands on law, money, and power. 
                                                                                                                                                            
interpret the treaty obligations favorably through a statute and would be subject to individuals’ 
private right of action before domestic courts. In contrast, when treaties are not self-executing, 
countries retain more control over the interpretation of the treaty for domestic purposes. This option 
prioritizes the domestic democratic process and recognizes that, if the country departs from its 
international obligation in implementation, it could be held liable and may have to compensate the 
other parties. The attraction of this choice, however, is that the country keeps the option of flexibility 
in interpretation and implementation. Id. at 321–30. When, in addition, a direct applicability country 
gives treaties higher authority than federal laws, the problem of rigidity is compounded. In that case, 
a country has effectively locked in a particular international obligation, and it may not be able to 
change it by enacting a subsequent federal law that alters the obligation. In contrast, when the status 
of the treaty is lower or equal to federal laws, the country preserves greater policy flexibility on the 
domestic impact of the treaty. Id. at 330–34. 
As can be gleaned from this analysis, the choices of direct applicability and status of international 
treaties can have important consequences for a country’s policy autonomy. Nothing demands that a 
country may seek to preserve policy autonomy in all areas. According to Jackson, a country may want 
to lock in particular international obligations, like human rights treaties or market-oriented 
commitments. This would depend on how much trust there is in the domestic institutions and the 
national political process. Id. at 334–37. But these are important choices, and countries with 
functional democratic processes may want to preserve control over the particular domestic 
compromises they have struck between “economic efficiency and legitimate social goals.” Id. at 338. 
Thus, prudent government officials may not want to give away that flexibility. Id. at 340. 
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FIGURE 1: POLICY AUTONOMY 
 
 
IV. THE CASES OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO 
This Part turns to the experiences of Brazil and Mexico to explore how 
they have used their legal capacity in the pursuit of policy space and 
development strategy in the WTO. These two relatively similarly situated 
countries have the two biggest economies in Latin America and both are 
firmly inserted into the global economy.199 Brazil and Mexico also share 
important parallels in their recent economic history. They adopted similar 
economic development models after World War II, embracing policies of 
import-substitution industrialization up until the eighties.200 Subsequently, 
they both initiated structural liberalization reforms, opening up their 
economies to international markets, privatizing state-owned enterprises, 
and deregulating the domestic market.201 
                                                                    
199. Brazil’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2011 was estimated at approximately $2.28 
trillion, while Mexico’s was approximately $1.66 trillion. Brazil ranked eighth in the global economy 
and Mexico twelfth. Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, 
http://tinyurl.com/83euool (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
200. Diana Alarcon & Terry McKinley, Beyond Import Substitution: The Restructuring Projects of Brazil 
and Mexico, 17 LATIN AM. PERSP. 72, 76–77 (1992); see also Werner Baer, Import Substitution and 
Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations, 7 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 95 (1972). 
201. For a detailed account of how Mexico became an “early liberalizer” in Latin America, see generally 
Patrick Cronin, Explaining Free Trade: Mexico, 1985–1988, 45 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 63 (2003). 
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An important difference between these countries is that trade represents 
a greater percentage of Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) than that 
of Brazil’s.202 This seems to suggest that Mexico has relied much more on 
international trade, rather than on its own domestic market, as an engine 
for growth.203 In fact, Mexico is the paradigmatic case of a country that 
made trade liberalization its most important economic development 
strategy. This liberalization strategy dates back to Mexico’s entry into 
GATT in 1986, and was consolidated and expanded by the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Since then successive 
governments have further pursued free-trade agreements. Today, in 
addition to its NAFTA and WTO obligations, Mexico has entered into 
multiple trade agreements with Europe, Japan, and other countries from all 
over the world.204 Brazil, on the other hand, was a founding member of 
GATT, the WTO, and Mercado Común del Sur (Common Southern Market 
or MERCOSUR) and a member of other trade agreements. However, in 
what appears to be a strong contrast to Mexico, Brazil resisted efforts to 
create a NAFTA-type regime through the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas, arguably because it was not convinced that it was favorable to 
its economic interests.205 
In social policy, both countries have made comprehensive efforts to 
reduce poverty through targeted, conditional cash and transfer programs. 
In fact, Brazil’s Bolsa de Familia program, seems to have followed on the 
steps of Mexico’s Oportunidades program.206 In the last decade, both 
countries have reduced their poverty levels, although at a different rate.207 
                                                                    
202. In 2009, exports composed twenty-eight percent of Mexico’s GDP and only eleven percent 
of Brazil’s GDP. See World Development Indicators: Exports of Goods and Services, WORLD BANK, 
http://tinyurl.com/7zn3rqk (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
203. The growth results in the last decade (2001–2009) also differ. While Brazil has grown at an 
average rate of 3.18%, Mexico’s growth rate has been 1.37%. See World Development Indicators: GDP 
Growth, WORLD BANK, http://tinyurl.com/78jyvqw (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
204. See generally Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N., Mexico, in 3 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 215–47 (2005); Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N., Mexico’s 
Trade Policy: Improvisation and Vision, in THE STRATEGIC DYNAMICS OF LATIN AMERICAN TRADE, 
213–31 (Vinod Aggarwal, Ralph H. Espach & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 2004). For a brief overview of 
Mexico’s trade policy, including its participation in NAFTA and a list of regional trade agreements, 
see generally M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40784, MEXICO’S FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS (2010). 
205. See Ricardo A. Markwald, The Political Economy of Foreign Trade: The Brazilian Case, in 
DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL TRADE STRATEGIES 107–10 (Roberto Bouzas ed., 
2006); SHAFFER J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33258, BRAZILIAN TRADE POLICY 
AND THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (2006);  
206. For a comparative appraisal of the two programs, see generally Fábio Veras Soares et al., 
Evaluating the Impact of Brazil’s Bolsa Família: Cash Transfer Programs in Comparative Perspective, 45 LATIN 
AM. RES. REV 173 (2010). See also Sergei Soares, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs in Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico: Impacts upon Inequality, International Poverty Centre United Nations 
Development Programme Working Paper 35 (April 2007), available at http://www.ipc-
undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper35.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
207. In 2001, 35.2% of Brazil’s population lived below the poverty line. By 2010, this number 
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Furthermore, average income has increased in both countries.208 As a 
result, scholars and policy analysts are increasingly talking about an 
important expansion of the middle-class in both countries.209 
This Part uses these two countries to explore what seem to be two 
divergent trajectories by identifying the different industrial policies and 
trade finance mechanisms employed by each country. Despite the 
aforementioned differences, Brazil and Mexico are both bound by the 
same WTO obligations and are thus arguably equally restricted in their 
domestic regulatory space. Moreover, as middle-income countries, they 
both rely on considerable economic and human resources that enable 
them to actively engage in their respective trade regimes. The analysis 
shows, however, that these countries have had different experiences, 
suggesting that the existence of regulatory flexibility, or lack thereof, 
probably has more to do with a country’s own economic strategy and how 
it manages its international agreements to reflect that strategy than is 
currently recognized. 
A. Differences in Trade Promotion and Industrial Policy 
Both Brazil and Mexico are countries that followed policies of import 
substitution industrialization (ISI), starting as early as in the 1930s, reaped 
the benefits of the model during the period from the 1950s to 1970s and 
faced tremendous difficulties in the 1980s.210 During the debt crisis in the 
1980s, however, there was an increasing sense that the ISI model had been 
exhausted. Advocates of free trade and economic liberalization advanced a 
powerful critique of ISI as the source of the economic crisis and offered a 
program of market reform that seemed a compelling, simple solution. This 
program included trade liberalization, market deregulation, and 
privatization of state owned enterprises.211 
                                                                                                                                                            
decreased to 21.4%. By comparison, 53.6% of Mexico’s population lived below the poverty line in 
2000, compared to 47.8% in 2008. Id. 
208. In Brazil, gross national income (GNI) per capita over purchasing power parity (PPP) has 
grown from $8.960 in 2000 to $14.020 in 2009. Mexico’s has grown from $6.830 in 2000 to $10.160 
in 2009. See World Development Indicators: GNI Per Capita, PPP (Current International $), World Bank, 
http://tinyurl.com/82te9ge (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
209. See, e.g., JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA, MAÑANA FOREVER?: MEXICO AND THE MEXICANS 34–
67 (2011); Homi Kharas, The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries 31 (OECD Dev. Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 285, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/3b6wvbp.  
210. For an overview of the period of import substitution policies in each of these countries see 
Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N. & Ricardo Sennes, Brazil y México en la Economía Política Internacional, in 
BRASIL Y MÉXICO: ENCUENTROS Y DESENCUENTROS 204–16 (Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N. et al. eds., 
2005). 
211. For some of the most powerful critiques of ISI, see generally BÉLA BALASSA, THE NEWLY 
INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1981), ANNE O. KRUEGER, POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF POLICY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1993), and DEEPAK LAL, THE 
POVERTY OF ‘DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS’ (1983). For an analysis of the market-oriented reforms 
in Mexico, see JUAN CARLOS MORENO-BRID & JAIME ROS, DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH IN THE 
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Although both Brazil and Mexico embraced this program 
enthusiastically, they proceeded at different speeds and in somewhat 
different directions.212 Brazil preserved and revamped a number of 
development institutions. Moreover, it has reintroduced several industrial 
policies and seems to be reengaging more actively in economic planning. 
Mexico, on the other hand, was quicker in weakening or dismantling its 
development institutions and industrial policies. 
1. Brazil 
During the last decade, Brazil has explicitly embraced industrial policy 
as a strategy to promote development.213 Arbix and Martin identify four 
main components of the emerging development model in Brazil: trade 
promotion, industrial policy and science, technology and innovation 
policy, finance, and social policy.214 This “Inclusionary State Activism 
without Statism”215 model is neither a return to the old developmental 
state nor a simple progression from market fundamentalism. Instead, it 
reflects an active State that operates under a macroeconomic institutional 
framework introduced by the neoliberal economic model but goes beyond 
it, imprinting a new direction.216 
Brazil’s strategy actively seeks new or deeper markets abroad,217 
particularly for its own goods and investment capital.218 This strategy has 
brought a welcome diversification in trading partners and goods. Brazil is 
moving away from dependence on Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries, as its trade with China 
and the global south increases. Its exports are also more diverse, 
encompassing more sectors and degrees of value added. The commodities 
                                                                                                                                                            
MEXICAN ECONOMY, A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 165 (2009) and ENRIQUE DUSSEL PETERS, 
POLARIZING MEXICO: THE IMPACT OF LIBERALIZATION STRATEGY (2000). 
212. See Ortiz Mena & Sennes, supra note 210, at 216. 
213. This is remarkable given that the term industrial policy was considered a dirty word in 
Brazil — as in much of Latin America — ever since the introduction of liberalizing reforms and the 
dismantling of the developmental state by the administration of Collor de Mello in 1989. As a once 
acting Minister of Finance in Brazil put it: “The best industrial policy is no industrial policy.” Glauco 
Arbix & Scott B. Martin, Beyond Developmentalism and Market Fundamentalism in Brazil: Inclusionary State 
Activism without Statism 11 (Mar. 12–13, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/paper_arbix.pdf (on file with the Virginia Journal of 
International Law Association); see also FRANCISCO PANIZZA, CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA: 
DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS (2009); Luiz Carlos 
Bresser-Pereira, Structuralist Macroeconomics and the New Developmentalism 2 (Oct. 19, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law Association).  
214. Arbix & Martin, supra note 213, at 15. 
215. Id. at 7. 
216. Id. at 7. 
217. Id. at 15; see also Gregory Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind 
Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383 (2008).  
218. Arbix & Martin, supra note 213, at 17. 
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sector, for instance, includes now not only simple commodities but also 
value-added commodities such as ethanol.219 
But Brazil’s strategy has also entailed the aggressive defense of domestic 
measures of selective protection used to promote its domestic firms.220 
Starting with the government of Cardoso and strengthened by the Lula 
administration, Brazil has created a host of new institutions and programs 
to advance a national industrial policy.221 In addition, existing institutions 
have been reinforced.222 Finally, a key focus of Brazil’s industrial policy in 
this new era is on innovation and technological development.223 Between 
                                                                    
219. Id. at 15–16 (“[E]ven within a context of openness that policy elites across the last two 
presidencies have not just accepted but actively embraced — in a historic shift for Brazil — the state 
has not taken that simple cue to retreat into a passive ‘laissez faire’ position of accepting Brazil’s 
inherited comparative advantage of current structure of imports and exports and trading partners.”). 
Id. at 16. 
220. “[W]hile the country has perhaps not been as aggressive as some East Asian countries [in 
using selective protection tools] Brasilia has not shied away from a sometimes aggressive defense of 
measures such as the automotive regime of the mid to late 1990s (forcing multinationals to invest 
directly in the country if they wished to receive lower tariffs on imports).” Id. at 16. 
221. These institutions include the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Commerce in 1999, 
the National Agency for Industrial Development (Agencia Brasileira de Desenvolvimiento Industrial — 
ABDI) and the Council for Industrial Development (Conselho de Desenvolvimento Industrial — CNDI) in 
2004. The Lula administration issued two main sets of industrial policies in 2004 and 2008. The first 
one focused on innovation and is managed by ABDI. The second one, called Policy for Productive 
Development (PDP) was developed by the President’s Chief of Staff and emphasized investment for 
capacity-building in several areas. Arbix & Martin, supra note 213, at 17. 
222. Arbix and Martin particularly note the Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (Financing Agency for 
Studies and Projects — FINEP) under the Ministry of Science and Technology, which funds basic 
and applied research for public and private projects. Id. at 18. They also point to institutions that play 
a similar role at the state level. Id.  
223. Id. at 18 (“The goal of industrial policy under Lula has been to redefine the policy’s scope 
and tools, to drive the country into knowledge-intensive sectors, seen as the only way to sustain long-
term growth. In sum, industrial policies of the present are essentially different than past experiences, 
and are innovation-oriented. As there is not too much room left for protectionism, not for any 
autarkic development, state interventions must be very different from what they were during the 
heyday of the developmental state.”). For a critical perspective on Brazil’s industrial policy, see 
generally Mansueto de Almeida, Desafios de Real Politica Industrial Brasileira Do Seculo XXI (IPEA, 
Working Paper 1452, 2009). De Almeida argues that Brazil’s industrial policy still focused too much 
on sectors where Brazil already was competitive (low-medium tech) and where the promotion of 
innovation did not contribute to export growth. Brazil’s most competitive industries in 2008 were 
exactly the same as those in 1996, despite the government’s efforts to promote technology-intensive 
sectors. In addition, De Almeida faults BNDES’s policy of encouraging internationalization and 
mergers and acquisitions as not really compatible with industrial policy, and causing an appreciation 
of the Real, which in turn reinforced the existing structure in Brazil (i.e., benefiting sectors with high 
margins and strong competitiveness, and hindering the emergence of new sectors). He is also critical 
of BNDES’s strategy of aiming to consolidate the leadership position of certain Brazilian companies 
in the global value chain because it does not factor in the necessity that these companies should 
gradually move up within the production chain, to get more value-added, and because such 
concentration makes it harder for small enterprises lower in the production chain to flourish (since 
they essentially face an oligopsony. Mansueto De Almeida, The New Old Industrial Policy, VALOR 
ECONÔMICO, Jul. 17, 2009; available at http://tinyurl.com/6oqxkks (“But the current industrial 
policy in Brazil does not correspond to that written on the official documents, does not impose 
performance requirements on private firms and, in many cases, the policies adopted are against the 
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2000 and 2008, government spending in science, technology and 
innovation increased from $14.3 billion to $43.4 billion. Investment in 
research and development went up from 0.97 % of GDP in 2005 to 1.13% 
of GDP in 2008.224 
2. Mexico 
Industrial policy shifted from occupying a central role in the state’s 
economic policies to a minimal, almost unnoticeable position.225 Since the 
economic liberalization reforms of the 1980s, the Mexican government has 
dismantled most of its former industrial policies, which had been 
supported by subsidies, trade protection, tax incentives, and performance 
requirements.226 A few government programs, however, devised to help 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, as well as credit and capacity-building 
assistance for exporting firms remained. The primary government program 
for the promotion of industry is a tax-free regime for the temporary 
importation of inputs used in export goods.227 
Mexico’s position regarding industrial policies since the liberalization 
reforms can be summed up in three phases.228 In the first phase, from the 
mid-eighties to 1994, the government dismantled most of its existing 
industrial policies.229 Government support shifted from sector-specific 
programs to general programs available to anyone. In the second phase, 
from 1994 to 2000, the government sought to address the increasing 
                                                                                                                                                            
actual definition of what we understand by ‘industrial policy.’”) (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). Another 
assessment of the overall efficacy of the industrial policy shows that no major shift in production 
sectors has occurred, but that industrial performance and exports overall have increased considerably. 
Claudio Robert Amitrano, O modelo de crescimento da economia brasileira no periodo recente: condicionantes, 
caracteristicas e limites, 7 POLITICA ECONOMICA EM FOCO 206, 215 (2005/2006). The strongest 
growth within industry came from extractive industries, capital goods productions, and durable 
consumer goods. Id. at 220. High-tech, despite its fast growth, only made up 9% of the economy and 
does not figure highly in exports either. Id. at 225. This view attributes industrial performance mostly 
to a strong growth of the global economy — resulting in increased exports — and, to a lesser degree, 
to state interventions, including increased available of credit, export promotion, and the incentives 
that form part of the industrial policy. Id. at 224–25. 
224. Arbix & Martin, supra note 213, at 20. Arbix and Martin highlight the National Plan for 
Science, Technology and Innovations Systems, which prioritized funding of innovation in firms. The 
government uses tax incentives and subsidies to support the creation and diffusion of technology in 
established and start-up companies.  
225. Enrique Dussel Peters, Industrial Policy, Regional Trends, and Structural Change in Mexico’s 
Manufacturing Sector, in CONFRONTING DEVELOPMENT: ASSESSING MEXICO’S ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL POLICY CHALLENGES 241, 245–49 (Kevin J. Middlebrook & Eduardo Zepeda eds., 2003). 
226. MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 165. (stating that a number of industries, such as 
the automotive, textile, electronics, footwear, appliances, steel, petrochemical, and canned foodstuff 
industries, initially retained their protections, but they were ultimately phased out); see also Kendra 
Sawyer Leith, Challenges for Implementing Industrial Policy in Mexico 47 (June 2009) (M.C.P. thesis, 
Mass. Inst. Tech.), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/50111. 
227. MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 167. 
228. See id. at 165–67. 
229. Id. at 165–66. 
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erosion of linkages in domestic production chains and limited value-added 
in exports, which resulted from its trade liberalization policies. It 
recognized the need for selective support to help some sectors become 
more competitive in the exports market.230 Although the government 
started a variety of programs, the key policy measure consisted of tax 
exemptions on temporary imports used for export products.231 Seeking to 
increase the competitiveness of domestic firms, other programs focused 
on administrative simplification of government support and on support 
for firms’ marketing strategies. In the third phase, from 2000 to date, the 
government has, if more in rhetoric than in practice, explicitly recognized 
the role of the state in the promotion of economic growth.232 It has 
identified priority industries and offers preferential financial support.233 
Despite this gradual change of position, however, government support 
remains limited and its effects have not been significant.234 
B. Differences in Development Banks and Export Finance 
In both countries, development banks have recently served a crucial 
role as buffers from the full impact of the 2008 financial crisis by injecting 
                                                                    
230. Id. at 166. 
231. After the economic crisis of 1994–1995, the Zedillo administration launched the Program 
for Industrial Policy and Foreign Trade (PROPICE). It is worth noting that “[the program] explicitly 
excluded the notion of going back to trade protectionism or granting financial or tax subsidies to 
promote exports or investment.” Id. at 166. In practice, the program granted tax rebates and 
accelerated the elimination of tariffs for certain imported inputs. Id. Additional programs included 
the Program for Temporary Importation to Produce Export Goods (PITEX) and Highly Exporting 
Firms (ALTEX), which offered exporters a tax-free regime for the temporary importation of inputs. 
Another program, the Mexican System of External Promotion (SIMPEX) sought to advertise 
investment opportunities in Mexico and to help domestic companies market their products for 
export. Id. at 166–67. 
232. In 2000, however, the name of the ministry traditionally in charge of economic promotion 
changed from Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Promotion (SECOFI) to simply Secretariat of 
Economy. The name change probably acknowledges that the function of industrial promotion, which 
used to be at the core of this ministry, is now peripheral. 
233. The Fox administration (2000–2006), explicitly recognized the role of the state in promoting 
international competitiveness and stated the need for sector-specific programs as a development 
strategy. In a departure from previous practice, the government offered financial support in 
preferential conditions to these industries. But the strategy turned out to be much less 
comprehensive than announced. Moreover, due to the programs’ limited funds and delay in their 
implementation, analysts doubt they had any significant impact. MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 
211, at 167. The Calderon administration (2006–2012) has made the improvement of the country’s 
competitiveness the cornerstone of its economic policy. See Eje 2. Economía competitiva y generadora de 
empleos, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo [The National Development Plan], 
http://pnd.calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/economia-competitiva-y-generadora-de-empleos.html (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2012). However, there seems to be no coherent plan except for tariff reductions. The 
country’s industrial policy is in a chaotic situation exactly when the manufacturing sector is in one of 
its worst crises in decades. Enrique Dussel Peters, La manufactura Mexicana, ¿Opciones de Recuperación?, 
ECONOMÍA INFORMA (2009), available at http://dusselpeters.com/40.pdf (on file with the Virginia 
Journal of International Law Association).  
234. MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 167. 
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credit to the economy. Thus, banks in both countries have seen their 
budgets grow, as they are used in a counter-cyclical fashion to minimize 
the effects of the crisis. But beyond this shared objective, the functioning 
of the development banks in both countries shows two different visions of 
how to use public finance to support domestic industries and promote 
exports. 
First, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES)235 has a much larger 
budget than Nafinsa and Bancomext (the two main Mexican development 
banks) combined.236 In 2010, BNDES made three times the aggregate 
disbursements that all the Mexican development banks made. In fact, by 
2009, BNDES was one of the largest development banks in the world, 
with $222 billion in assets,237 lending more funds annually than the World 
Bank.238 BNDES’s lending during the recent economic crisis alone 
accounted for 37% of capital provided in the Brazilian economy and its 
role has become increasingly important.239 BNDES is the primary source 
of credit in the Brazilian economy and operates partly through “second-
tier” banks, creating a partnership with the financial sector that helps 
increase the coverage of BDNES.240 By contrast, as a result of the 
liberalization reforms introduced in the 1980s and 1990s in Mexico, 
development banks were downsized and their purpose transformed.241 The 
                                                                    
235. BNDES: BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, http://tinyurl.com/3tn86vz (last visited Mar. 
18, 2012). 
236. Nafinsa was created in 1933 as the country’s first development bank in charge of financing 
long-term industrial development. See MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 86. NAFIN has been 
touted as one of the most successful development banks. See, e.g., JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L 
DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 286 (3d ed. 2009). Bancomext was created in 
1937 for the promotion of exports. Scholars credit these development banks, and especially Nafinsa, 
for having played a crucial role in enabling Mexico’s industrialization during the period of “stabilizing 
development” in 1940–1970. See MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 86–88.  
Nafinsa established in 1941 a department of promotion and began to make systematic 
studies of industrial development projects. With a predilection for manufacturing, it 
promoted enterprises in practically every sector of the Mexican economy over the course of 
the next several years. The roster of firms aided by loan, guarantee, or purchase of stocks 
and bonds reads like a ‘who’s who’ of Mexican business.  
Calvin Blair, Nacional Financiera, in PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO 193, 213 
(Raymond Vernon ed., 1964). 
237. Luciano Coutinho, The Role of Development Banks for Growth in Emerging Economies, in 
RENCONTRES ÉCONOMIQUES D’AIX-EN-PROVENCE: À LA RECHERCHE DE LA NOUVELLE 
CROISSANCE 263, 264 (Le Cercle des economists ed., 2010). 
238. David M. Trubek, Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of 
Development and Law 25 (U. Wis. Law Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 1075, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349163. 
239. Coutinho, supra note 237, at 266. 
240. Id. at 265. 
241. While before the liberalization period Nafinsa lent directly to firms, after the 1990s reforms 
it became a second-tier bank giving out loans through private intermediaries. BARBARA STALLINGS & 
ROGERIO STUDART, FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT: LATIN AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 219 (2006). The results of privatization and liberalization reforms have not improved 
the availability of credit in the economy and thus finance continues to be a key obstacle for growth. 
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privatization of state-owned firms, many of which were financed by 
Nafinsa, and the dismantling of industrial policy ultimately reduced the 
scope of these banks’ activities. 
Second, BNDES has a much wider range of business objectives, 
ranging from venture capital to microfinance. BNDES is set up to make 
credit available on a “horizontal basis,”242 meaning that firms in almost any 
sector can access funding. However, the government in its Production 
Development Policy (Politica de Desenvolvimento Produtivo) has also identified 
“priority areas” that receive more and better access to funding.243 BNDES 
has thus facilitated growth in Brazil by expanding productivity,244 fostering 
job creation,245 and facilitating the growth of many industries, such as the 
successful Brazilian air-manufacturing industry.246 
By contrast, although Mexico’s Nafinsa has a variety of objectives, it has 
devoted most of its resources to facilitating credit for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). But even in this area, its financing is clearly insufficient 
and not supplemented by robust private bank lending to SMEs.247 
Mexico’s domestic financing to firms represents 28% of its GDP, which 
pales in comparison to Brazil’s 82%.248 Moreover, this scarce pool of 
capital is only available to a small number of very large, elite firms, which 
are often able to find other financing sources themselves in the 
                                                                                                                                                            
MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 248. Moreover, the “downsizing and weakening of 
development banks (NAFINSA and BANCOMEXT) brought about by the reform process made 
bank lending to firms more scarce.” Id. Stallings and Studart note that “[u]ntil Mexico has a deeper 
domestic financial system and provides broader access, long-term growth that encompasses the 
domestic economy as well as exports will be hard to generate.” STALLINGS & STUDART, supra, at 185.  
242. Coutinho, supra note 237. 
243. The priority areas include “investments to expand capacity, enhance productivity in strategic 
sectors, promote exports and increase the value added in the manufacturing sector.” Id. In 2010, 
BNDES disbursed $96.3 billion, of which $45.2 billion (47%) went to industry, $29.8 billion (31%) to 
infrastructure, $15.4 billion (16%) to trade and services, and $5.7 billion (6 %) to farming. Performance 
Report, BNDES, (Dec. 11, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/6nrknaf (last visited Mar. 18, 2012); see also 
Performance: The Evolution of the BNDES’ Disbursements, BNDES, http://tinyurl.com/823s9cu (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
244. See Luiz A. Esteves et al., BNDES, Technological Innovation and Performance of Brazilian Industrial 
Enterprises, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD CONFERENCE ON MICRO EVIDENCE OF INNOVATION 
IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (2009), available at http://tinyurl.com/7dnwwgy (last visited Mar. 18, 
2012). 
245. See Ernani Teixeira Torres Filho & Fernando Pimentel Puga, Empresas Apoiadas Pelo BNDES 
Geram Mais Emprego e Pagam Mais [Firms Supported by BNDES Create More Jobs and Pay More], 17 
BNDES VISÃO DE DESENVOLVIMENTO [Vision of Development] (2006). 
246. See Regis Bonelli & Armando Castelar Pinheiro, New Export Activities in Brazil: Comparative 
Advantage, Policy or Self-Discovery? (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. R-551, 2008), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/6ntl8t8 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
247. Stallings and Studart note that “[u]ntil Mexico has a deeper domestic financial system and 
provides broader access, long-term growth that encompasses the domestic economy as well as 
exports will be hard to generate.” BARBARA STALLINGS & ROGERIO STUDART, FINANCE FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: LATIN AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 185 (2006). 
248. Id. 
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international markets anyway. The majority of domestic firms, therefore, 
have to rely on retained earnings and other sources of funding.249 
Third, BNDES aims to facilitate long-term investment in productive 
activities. According to the government “Growth Acceleration Program,” 
BNDES is expected to play an active role in the expansion of Brazil’s 
infrastructure, focusing on providing loans to the following sectors: energy 
transmission and distribution, gas, and oil production and distribution, 
railways, ports, airports, roadways, water and sanitation, and urban 
transportation.250 By contrast, Mexico’s Nafinsa has increasingly focused 
on short-term lending to finance working capital and address immediate 
liquidity problems.251 It has been relegated to second-tier banking and 
limited to support private banking.252 
Fourth, BNDES is aggressively promoting Brazil’s exports and 
supporting Brazilian companies abroad. BNDES lends to companies 
primarily focused on capital goods, engineering/construction services and 
software.253 In addition, BNDES supports Brazil’s social agenda by 
                                                                    
249. Id. Scholars identify several problems in the finance sector, such as “the high segmentation 
and shallowness of the banking system, the lack of capital markets, and the scarcity of long-term 
finance, particularly for start-up innovative firms.” MORENO-BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 248. 
Moreover, the “downsizing and weakening of development banks (NAFINSA and BANCOMEXT) 
brought about by the reform process made bank lending to firms more scarce.” Id. 
250. BNDES — Fifty Years of Development, BNDES (Sept. 2002), http://tinyurl.com/83ugtmg 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012). BNDES has established guidelines for Micro, Small, and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (MSME), which focus on providing loans to allow scaling and implementation of 
innovative products and processes. BNDES Annual Report 2008, BNDES 70–71 (2008), 
http://tinyurl.com/7p3mw3x (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). In 2010, BNDES expected to distribute 
$1.4 billion for innovation for MSMEs alone, and spent $18 billion supporting small and medium 
sized firms during the twelve months ending in April of 2010. Id. Despite the fact that small and 
medium-sized enterprises are a priority area, they account for a quarter of total loans. Management 
Report-BNDES Group, BNDES (June 30, 2009) http://tinyurl.com/7jztcng (last visited Mar. 18, 
2012). While the number of operations for MSMEs accounted for 93% of all operations, funding 
only accounted for 27% of disbursements. Performance Report, supra note 243. 
251. Nafinsa has been lauded as a successful example of a developing country using solutions 
such as “reverse factoring” to enable the short-term financing of SMEs. For a largely positive 
account of Nafinsa’s program and how it works, see Leora Klapper, The Role of Factoring for Financing 
Small and Medium Enterprises, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 3111, 3124–29 (2006). For a critical assessment 
of this retreat from clear development goals to short-term financing, see Alejandra Salas-Porras, Basis 
of Support and Opposition for the Return of a Developmental State in Mexico, PONTO DE VISTA, Aug. 2009, at 
20. For another very critical assessment by former federal legislator Suárez Dávila, see Roberto 
González Amador, Censura Suárez Dávila que se Desmantele la Banca de Desarrollo [Suárez Dávila Censors 
the Dismantling of Development Banking], LA JORNADA (Jan. 19, 2008), 
http://tinyurl.com/6vg9r7s (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
252. “Nafin has been transformed into a second-tier bank, with special responsibility for SMEs. 
Five other development banks carried out more specific mandates: Bancomext (foreign trade, 
especially export finance, Banobras (infrastructure), Banrural (agriculture), Fina (sugar) and 
Banejercito (banking services for military personnel).” STALLINGS & STUDART, supra note 247, at 
197; see also id. at 219. 
253. This lending accounted for seventy-two percent of total disbursements. BNDES Annual 
Report 2008, supra note 250, at 124. 
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assessing projects based on their environmental impact on the country and 
serving as a microfinance bank to provide credit to poor Brazilians.254  
In contrast, Bancomext’s budget has been reduced and the government 
has informally merged Nafinsa and Bancomext.255 Mexico has also 
gradually been dismantling Bancomext, reassigning functions of the latter 
to a trust for foreign investment called Pro-México.256 In addition, it has 
given the Ministry of the Economy, through the program Pymes, a quasi-
banking role with no clear targets or oversight.257 
At the core, there seems to be a different vision about the role the 
government should play in the economy and how it can create the policy 
tools to advance its agenda through development banking. While banks in 
both countries underwent important transformations after the 
liberalization reforms, BNDES has been given an explicit mission of 
promoting and financing industrial policy in strategic sectors. In contrast, 
Nafinsa and Bancomext have been retooled as supplements of the private 
sector, helping some firms to be able to eventually access private capital.258 
C. Legal Capacity in the Service of Policy Autonomy 
Having analyzed the differences in the two countries’ development 
strategies, this Section describes how these differences are reflected in 
Brazil’s and Mexico’s litigation patterns and dispute settlement 
experiences. Specifically, I examine how the experience of each country is 
underpinned by a different mode of legal capacity. This Article has 
previously argued that policy autonomy is the space that a country can 
create by mobilizing its legal capacity to use the rule and doctrinal 
flexibility of the WTO in the service of a development strategy.259 In the 
                                                                    
254. BNDES — Fifty Years of Development, supra note 250. 
255. Amador, supra note 251. Some analysts perceive the new objectives of the development 
banks to be too narrow and too reliant on a failing market. They advocate a more robust role for 
development banking, focused not on liquidity and working capital but on long-term productive 
investment, prioritizing small and medium enterprises. In addition, they consider that development 
banks should be able to work as direct lenders and obtain funding through issuing bonds. Mexico 
Frente a la Crisis: Hacia un Nuevo Curso de Desarrollo 23–24 (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.nuevocursodedesarrollo.unam.mx/docs/Mexico_frente_a_la_Crisis.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2012).  
256. Amador, supra note 251. 
257. Id.  
258. Critics of BNDES argue that it is expanding too aggressively, crowding out private banking 
in the financial sector. See Brazil’s development bank: Central planning, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2009, available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/13496820 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). On the other hand, 
critics of Nafinsa and Bancomext argue that the development banks are ineffective because they fail 
to realize their potential ability to expand and reinvigorate the banking and financial system in the 
country. The latter critics see the limited role of development banking as a reason for the lack of 
sustained economic growth in Mexico. MORENO BRID & ROS, supra note 211, at 248 Mexico Frente a 
la Crisis: Hacia un Nuevo Curso de Desarrollo, supra note 255, at 7, 23–24. 
259. See supra Figure 1. 
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case of Brazil, the development strategy that animates the country’s legal 
capacity is industrial policy. The following table illustrates the relationship 
between these factors. 
 
FIGURE 2: BRAZIL’S POLICY AUTONOMY 
 
 
In the case of Mexico, the development strategy is one of free trade 
liberalization. Under this paradigm, since WTO obligations already 
encapsulate the development strategy, these elements appear side by side 
in the diagram below. The scope of what the government can or cannot do 
is considered as already delineated by its WTO commitments and thus 
there is no need to look for more space through rule or doctrinal 
flexibilities. The country uses its legal capacity primarily to enforce its 
obligations in the system. 
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FIGURE 3: MEXICO’S POLICY AUTONOMY 
 
 
 
 
 
The dispute-settlement experiences of Brazil and Mexico exhibit a 
pattern that seems consistent with this distinction. While Mexico’s 
development policy has remained largely lodged within the Washington 
Consensus paradigm, Brazil has put in place a growth strategy program 
based on deliberate industrial policies to promote specific economic 
sectors. Each country’s development strategy is reflected in the challenges 
that these two countries have chosen to initiate as complainants and those 
that they have had to defend as respondents. Brazil, on the one hand, has 
forcefully promoted its exports abroad by challenging a variety of trade 
barriers, but it has also used the dispute settlement to defend several of its 
industrial programs that seem to contravene the WTO. Mexico, on the 
other hand, is largely concerned about ensuring market access for its 
exports in other countries and about fending off unfair competition caused 
by foreign imports at home. 
1. Differences in Legal Capacity 
Perhaps due to their different development strategies and priorities, 
these countries exhibit different types of legal capacities. Both countries 
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have competent lawyers who are experts in international trade law. But 
there are also important institutional and strategic differences that reflect 
divergent policies about how to create, foster, and deploy legal capacity. 
a. Brazil 
Brazil has built an institutional legal infrastructure that includes a trade 
team in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, a variety of intra-ministerial trade 
groups, and established coordination mechanisms between the 
government and the private sector and civil society. The Foreign Ministry 
lawyers have been sent for training to Brazil’s permanent mission in the 
WTO and to trade litigation firms in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere. As 
a result, Brazil has created a cadre of lawyers who are able to represent the 
government in the WTO dispute settlement system.260 
Brazil exhibits what can be described as developmental legal capacity, 
geared to advance the country’s industrial policy agenda through the 
government’s promotion of select, targeted sectors. An important aspect 
of Brazil’s legal capacity is making sure that the country’s legal strategies 
accord with the government’s interests, not only for a given case but also 
systemically for the future. So far, Brazil has been able to defend several of 
its industrial policies in the WTO against challenges from countries that 
claimed they were violations of its WTO obligations.261 
b. Mexico 
The experience of Mexico presents a different picture.262 There is a unit 
in charge of international trade in the Ministry of the Economy, which was 
first created to provide legal advice for and participated in the NAFTA 
negotiations. This office is now in charge of international trade 
negotiations and dispute resolution.263 Although several very competent 
lawyers have worked and developed their careers in that office, there is a 
different institutional approach than that of Brazil’s. Over the years, there 
                                                                    
260. Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Developmental Responses to the International Trade Game: 
Examples of Intellectual Property and Export Credit Law Reforms in Brazil 14–15 (2011) (on file with the 
Virginia Journal of International Law Association); Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning, supra note 217, 
at 424, 428–29. It should be noted that the government of Brazil has frequently resorted to hiring 
outside counsel, particularly from the United States, even though it has a trained domestic team of 
lawyers working for the government. 
261. See Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning, supra note 217, at 413–22. 
262. Research for this section was based on semi-structured interviews with current and former 
Mexican government officials.  
263. This unit is called the Office of Legal Counsel for Trade Negotiations. It provides legal 
advise to the Ministry of the Economy in trade and investment negotiations, free trade and 
investment promotion, implementation of existing agreements, and dispute settlement proceeding. 
For an organizational chart of the Ministry of the Economy, see Secretaría de Economía, available at 
http://www.economia.gob.mx/images/ConoceSE/organigramafinal.png (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).  
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has been considerable turnover and limited institutional continuity to take 
advantage of accumulated knowledge and experience.264 There are few 
incentives for people to stay and ascend the career ladder, eventually 
pushing them out and losing valuable human capital. This may reflect a 
problem of design in the civil service career structure.265 
In addition, the Ministry of the Economy has largely relied on outside 
legal counsel — primarily from the United States and Canada — for 
preparation of its cases and for lawyering strategies.266 There seems to be 
no movement towards investing in and training a cadre of Mexican lawyers 
that can do the bulk of the lawyering and litigation.267 Of course, there is 
nothing wrong in working with outside foreign counsel; given the highly 
technical aspects of WTO litigation, it may well be essential, particularly at 
the beginning of a country’s participation in the WTO legal system. But 
developing one’s own legal capacity and moving toward greater autonomy 
might yield considerable advantages, including saving the government 
important resources.268 In addition, it may generate legal capacity spillovers 
                                                                    
264. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in 
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author); Phone interview with former official #6 at 
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (on file with author). Phone Interview 
with official #3 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 31, 2011) 
(on file with author) (stating that while many of the lawyers who negotiated NAFTA remain in office 
in the United States and Canada, “everybody is gone in Mexico”). This is particularly worriesome in 
light of scholars’ account of important accumulated experience is and how legal capacity and 
expertise accrue primarily to individuals. See Conti, Learning to Dispute, supra note 88, at 625.  
265. Phone Interview with official #3 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in 
Washington, D.C. (Jan 31, 2011) (stating that even though a civil service carrer statute exists it is 
badly designed. While the statute establishes conditions of entry, it does not really establish the 
conditions to create a public service career). 
266. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in 
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author). Phone interview with former official #6 at 
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that 
recently, the Office of Legal Counsel has begun to write its briefs in some cases, depending on the 
dispute. Stating also that Mexico had a rule whereby only Mexican lawyers would represent Mexico in 
oral arguments before international panels). Indeed, a small number of lawyers from the United 
States and Canada providing outside legal counsel to the Secretariat since NAFTA seems to be the 
main point of continuity. This small number of foreign legal advisors remained the same until the 
current administration began to expand the pool. Phone Interview with official #3 at the Ministry of 
the Economy [name withheld], in Washington, D.C. (Jan 31, 2011).  
267. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in 
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author). Phone interview with former official #6 at 
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (on file with author).  
268. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] 
(Oct. 6, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that relying to such an extent on outside counsel is not 
only costly, it also may hamper the development of local capacities that could complement or 
eventually substitute outside advice, at least at the strategic level of litigation). “The government 
spends too much money in outside counsel. It would be better to spend that money to gradually 
create a group of first-rate in house lawyers within the government. The result would be a strong 
group of well-paid in-house lawyers.” This would save money, but most importantly, it would build 
capacity in the government. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name 
withheld], in Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that it would be hard to 
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to the private sector, where private law firms and companies would benefit 
from the services of competent domestic lawyers.269 
Moreover, there is a noticeable lack of coordination between the trade 
unit in the Ministry of the Economy and other government Ministries and 
agencies as well as within the Ministry of the Economy itself.270 For 
instance, there is scant coordination between the Ministry of the Economy 
offices in charge of trade promotion and the Ministry of the Economy 
offices responsible for industry promotion.271 There are institutional 
channels for coordination between the Ministry of the Economy and the 
private sector, but this interaction largely depends on the initiative of 
representatives of economic sectors to approach the government. This 
institutional setup generally favors large firms and established industrial 
interests at the expense of medium and small enterprises.272 In addition, 
there is practically no outreach to civil society groups.273 
The apparent lack of coordination suggests that there are no 
overarching, explicit economic policies that the Mexican government is 
interested in advancing. Instead, Mexico adheres to the agendas that are 
assumed to be embedded within its international trade agreements. The 
Office of the Legal Counsel takes the cases as they come; each case is a 
separate problem with no relation between each other or to a deliberate 
agenda.274 Thus, the cases undertaken by Mexico are not systemic, in the 
sense that they are not designed to change the rules of the game or to 
                                                                                                                                                            
entirely do without outside counsel but that the government could use it for a second opinion, 
without heavily relying on them and at a considerably lower cost). 
269. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] 
(Oct. 6, 2011) (stating that there is a dearth of lawyers trained in international trade law in the country 
and there are no Mexican law firms specialized in WTO or NAFTA. This capacity-building could 
have spill-over effects as some lawyers would eventually enter the private sector. This in-house team 
would be a seeder for international trade lawyers in the country); Interview with former official #1 at 
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
270. Antonio Ortiz Mena, The Domestic Determinants of Mexico’s Trade Strategy, in THE DOMESTIC 
DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL TRADE STRATEGIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MERCOSUR 
COUNTRIES, MEXICO, AND CHILE 230–32 (Roberto Bouzas ed., 2006).  
271. Interview with official #4 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in Mexico City, 
Mex. (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author). 
272. Mena, supra note 270, at 239–41. Interview with official #4 at the Ministry of the Economy 
[name withheld], in Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that strong 
industries whose interests the government has agreed to represent have worked in tandem with the 
government during litigation). 
273. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] 
(Oct. 6, 2011). See also Mena, supra note 270, at 229–41. 
274. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] 
(Oct. 6, 2011) (stating that lawyers are a tool but like the external counsel, they do not make policy. 
This is something that has to be set by the deputy minister). “We were never influenced by policy 
decisions. We undertook the disputes as they came.” Id. 
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make the rules more favorable to its interests. Rather, they seek primarily 
to provide immediate relief.275 
2. Differences in Policy Objectives 
The differences in the approaches to legal capacity by Brazil and Mexico 
can be explained in terms of policy, even if an implicit one, rather than at 
the level of State competence or individual expertise or professionalism. 
Each approach seems to track individual positions regarding free trade and 
industrial policy, particularly as to the role of the state in supporting 
domestic infant industries, only this time in legal services. Brazil, on the 
one hand, seems interested in creating its own domestic “industry” in 
international trade law legal services by investing heavily in the training of 
government in-house lawyers. It has also stimulated “technology” or 
expertise transfer (in the form of legal knowledge) from outside foreign 
counsel to Brazilian government lawyers and to the private sector. By 
hiring legal services from Brazilian law firms, it is cultivating a domestic 
market, albeit still small, in the field. And it is deliberately generating 
linkages between government lawyers and other government ministries, as 
well as with the private sector and civil society. 
Mexico’s approach to creating legal capacity, on the other hand, is more 
consistent with its free-trade orientation. It has in place a competent team 
of lawyers who can perform the basic governmental function of legal 
representation and participation in the WTO system. It has additionally 
“imported” legal services, buying those services it considers optimal from 
the international market. Mexico thus seems to have put fewer resources 
into building its own in-house or domestic legal capacity. As a result, the 
state plays no role in generating legal capacity in the domestic private 
sector through the promotion of technology transfers or domestic 
government procurement. Nor does the Mexican government seek to 
establish deliberate linkages with the private sector or civil society. 
In Brazil the prominence of international trade policy has risen and is 
undoubtedly at the forefront of the country’s international and domestic 
agenda. There is considerable discussion about the role of Brazil in the 
WTO and about how it may advance its interests using the system.276 In 
                                                                    
275. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in 
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author) (stating that the cases that Mexico undertakes 
are not systemic and that Mexico’s interpretation of its trade Agreements is rather conservative, 
staying within the limits of what has been tried out). “Mexico is the champion of compliance. Mexico 
is more papist than the Pope.” Id. Phone interview with former official #6 at the Ministry of the 
Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (stating that Mexico does not have a case like Brazil-
Cotton). “Trade lawyering and litigation has never been conceived as a tool for trade policy.” Id. 
276. See, for example, Brazil’s effort to include currency manipulation measures under the WTO. 
Jonathan Wheatley & Joe Leahy, Trade War Looming, Warns Brazil, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, 
http://tinyurl.com/7seafqe (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). Interview with former official #2 at the 
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contrast, in Mexico, trade policy seems to be on the wane. By and large, 
the development discussion in Mexico is about second-generation 
domestic reforms. The international trade obligations are for the most part 
taken for granted and the focus is on what other structural reforms are 
pending. Those reflecting on the experience of the Mexican legal team that 
negotiated NAFTA and was to take charge of international trade in the 
Ministry of the Economy speak of trade as a part of a state policy and 
vision for the country that no longer exists.277 
3. Differences in Litigation Experience 
This Section selects some of the most important cases that Brazil and 
Mexico have participated in, either as a complainant or a respondent.278 
These cases illustrate how different development strategies translate into 
different lawyering objectives. Brazil uses its legal capacity to expand its 
policy space and promote its industrial policies. Mexico uses its legal 
capacity to enforce what it assumes to be its existing international trade 
obligations and defend itself against unfair trade practices. 
As should be clear by the end of this analysis, the litigation experience 
of Brazil and Mexico shows that, when a country has a clear development 
goal and has built the legal capacity to pursue it, a country can create policy 
space and exploit the latent flexibilities in the WTO regime. This flexibility 
for policy autonomy is often invisible and cannot be taken for granted. 
Rather, it results from a country’s deliberate strategy to pursue a 
development goal within the WTO framework, testing its limits, and 
seeking to obtain the most advantage of it. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author). 
(stating that Brazil is an example of a country that stands for itself. The cases of aircraft and 
intellectual property show how Brazil uses the DSB to achieve certain ends, both geopolitical and 
domestic). 
277. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in 
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author). Phone interview with former official #6 at 
the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld] (Oct. 6, 2011) (stating that the centrality of 
international trade in the country’s economic and political agenda has declined and with it, so is the 
power and influence that the Trade Division and the Ministry of the Economy exercises within the 
government). Phone Interview with official #3 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in 
Washington, D.C. (Jan 31, 2011) (stating that “trade policy has stopped being a priority for Mexico”). 
278. Brazil has been involved in twenty-five cases as complainant and fourteen as respondent. 
Mexico has been involved in twenty-one cases as complainant and fourteen as respondent. WORLD 
TRADE ORG., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 88 (2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/6st32nn (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2012).  
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a. As Complainants 
 
i. Brazil 
Brazil has actively promoted its exports in other countries, ensuring 
market access and equal treatment. On this score, Brazil has been fairly 
successful as a complainant. Indeed, Brazil’s record as a complainant, 
particularly against the United States and Europe, has been more effective 
than Mexico’s.279 
One example is the dispute between Brazil and the United States 
concerning cotton. Brazil argued that the U.S. cotton subsidies280 violated 
several WTO agreements, including the Subsidies Agreement, the 
Agricultural Agreement, and GATT.281 The dispute resulted in five 
different opinions from Panels and the Appellate Body and will be 
undoubtedly influential in future cases concerning agriculture, subsidies, 
and countervailing measures. Both the Panel and AB found that several 
U.S. programs were inconsistent with the WTO Agreements, either as 
prohibited subsidies or as actionable subsidies that caused serious 
prejudice to Brazil.282 Furthermore, Brazil obtained permission to cross-
retaliate by suspending concessions not only in goods, but also in services 
and TRIPs. Although the arbitrator accepted neither the total amount of 
damages claimed by Brazil nor the amount of concessions Brazil claimed it 
was entitled to cross-retaliate, the decision represented an important 
victory for Brazil.283 After Brazil received permission to enact 
                                                                    
279. Cf. JORGE A. HUERTA-GOLDMAN, MEXICO IN THE WTO AND NAFTA, LITIGATING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES 122 (2010); Shaffer et al., supra note 217, at 413 (presenting 
Brazil as “the most successful developing-country user of the WTO dispute settlement system” in 
terms of the number of cases and their systemic implications). 
280. The United States started the subsidy program in 1933 with the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act. This act aimed to stabilize the prices for cotton producers through various forms of subsidies 
and government purchases. Despite its modest beginnings in a single act, by the time Brazil 
challenged the use of agricultural subsidies, the U.S. program involved a complex web of regulations. 
See William Gillon, The Panel Report in the U.S.–Brazil Cotton Dispute: WTO Subsidy Rules Confront U.S. 
Agriculture, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 7, 9, 23–28 (2005). Between 1999–2002, the years right before 
Brazil’s complaint, U.S. support for cotton producers in the United States peaked as world prices for 
cotton fell to their lowest level in over a decade. Karen Halverson Cross, International Decisions: United 
States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil: WTO Appellate Body — 
Compliance with Recommendations and Rulings in U.S. — Upland Cotton — Pending Arbitration Over 
Countermeasures by Brazil-Scope of Compliance Proceedings, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 110, 111 (2009). 
281. Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/1 
(Oct. 3, 2002). 
282. Appellate Body Report, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 
3, 2005); Panel Report, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004). 
283. Cross, supra note 280, at 113. Brazil had asked for suspension of concessions equal to 
$4 billion annually. The arbitrator found that Brazil was entitled to countermeasures totaling $147.6 
million for fiscal year 2006 for prohibited subsidies, and an amount based on the calculations going 
into that number for future years. The arbitrator also found that Brazil was entitled to $147.3 million 
annual for actionable subsidies. Id. 
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countermeasures in goods and announced its intention to retaliate in 
services and TRIPs, both parties reached a mutually agreeable solution.284 
The dispute was significant for the WTO system because it was the first 
successful challenge “to highly trade-distorting, actionable, and prohibited 
agricultural subsidies under the WTO.”285 Because such agricultural 
subsidies are a large part of the domestic program of the United States and 
the EU, the dispute can have widespread ramifications. Moreover, this 
case shows that Brazil was willing to use this retaliatory entitlement in 
order to pressure the United States to remove its subsidies and comply 
with its WTO obligations, as well as to use this entitlement in sectors other 
than goods where it could gain additional advantage, such as intellectual 
property protection. Thus Brazil, drew from its experience as a RP and its 
domestic development strategy to create policy space in the domain of 
retaliatory measures. 
ii. Mexico 
Mexico’s primary focus in litigating WTO cases has been to ensure 
market access and equal treatment of its exports in the importing country 
and to fight what it perceives as unfair trade measures by its competitors in 
its home market. As a complainant,286 Mexico has challenged other 
                                                                    
284. Press Release, Office U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., Brazil Agree on Framework Regarding 
WTO Cotton Dispute (June 2010), http://tinyurl.com/7skqhwq (last visited Mar. 18, 2012); Framework 
for a Mutually Agreed Solution to the Cotton Dispute in the World Trade Organization (WT/DS267), BRAZIL-
U.S. BUS. COUNCIL, http://tinyurl.com/89va2t3 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). See also Dispute 
Settlement: Dispute DS267, United States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WORLD TRADE ORG., available 
at http://tinyurl.com/6ufm7qz (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (describing the settlement between the 
United States and Brazil). 
285. Scott Andersen & Meredith A. Taylor, Brazil’s WTO Challenge to U.S. Cotton Subsidies: The 
Road to Effective Disciplines of Agricultural Subsidies, BUS. L. BRIEF 2, 2 (Fall 2009). 
286. As a complainant in the WTO, Mexico has only been successful in winning in litigation 
against United States or European Community (EC) measures when it was a co-complainant of 
either the United States or the EC against the other. In EC-Bananas, for example, Mexico joined the 
United States in a successful challenge against the EC. In U.S.-Offset Act, it joined the EC and other 
WTO members against the United States. Mexico was not able to win on its own against the United 
States before the AB (U.S.-OCTG). HUERTA-GOLDMAN, supra note 279, at 172–73. In fact, Mexico 
has lost the only two cases it has litigated as a sole complainant before the AB, one against the United 
States and the other against Guatemala (Guatemala-Cement I). Id. at 174. Furthermore, until 2010, out 
of sixteen cases in which Mexico had been a complainant, only six had been implemented. Only two 
of seven cases against the United States have been implemented. See Request for Consultations by 
Mexico, United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico, WT/DS281 (Jan. 31, 2003); 
Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States — Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Imports of 
Fresh or Chilled Tomatoes from Mexico, WT/DS49 (July 1, 1996). Both of these cases related to anti-
dumping and were not litigated but rather reached a settlement through negotiation. HUERTA-
GOLDMAN, supra note 279, at 175. One of the most important cases for Mexico against the United 
States was the case concerning sugar. This dispute was initiated by Mexico under NAFTA, and it 
spilled over to the WTO. The case started out by Mexico claiming that the United States was 
violating its NAFTA commitments of market access to Mexican sugar, and it has turned into one of 
the worst headaches for the country. The protracted litigation in the WTO and the Antidumping and 
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countries’ trade measures when they undermine Mexican exports. For 
example, it launched a complaint against the E.C.’s banana import scheme, 
which gave several forms of preference to exporters from African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries over Mexican exporters, among others.287 
Similarly, it complained of U.S. labeling requirements that negatively 
impacted Mexican tuna imports.288 Some of the most prominent disputes 
initiated by Mexico are challenges to anti-dumping duties (AD)289 imposed 
by other countries on Mexican products, such as cement290 and steel.291 In 
fact, in five out of the six cases initiated by Mexico that reached 
implementation, Mexico invoked a violation of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.292 In these cases, Mexico challenged the sufficiency of 
evidence presented in the investigation or the methodology applied in 
determining dumping margins. Mexico has also challenged countervailing 
duties, tariffs and other countries’ measures affecting its exports. In recent 
years, Mexico filed a few complaints that address another country’s 
internal subsidy mechanisms, especially where that country might be a 
competitor in the export market.293 
Mexico’s focus merely on maintaining the current free trade regime is 
clear. Take for example Mexico’s position in the NAFTA Trucking case, 
where Mexico as an RP had an opportunity to expand its policy space, had 
                                                                                                                                                            
Investment chapters of NAFTA all resulted in adverse rulings and hefty compensation claims against 
Mexico. For an overview of the complex sugar dispute, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. 
SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 310–27 (2005); see also Sergio 
Puig de la Parra, The Political-Economy and the Causes of Compliance of Trade and Investment 
Agreements: NAFTA and the Sweeteners Sector (May 2009) (unpublished J.S.D. thesis, Stanford 
Law School) (on file with Robert Crown Law Library, Stanford Law School), available at 
http://tinyurl.com/7qqtxlf (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
287. Request for Consultations by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United 
States, European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/1 
(Feb. 12, 1996). 
288. Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/1 (Oct. 28, 2008). See Request for 
Consultations by Mexico, United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2001). 
289. Among OECD countries, excepting the United States and the EC, Mexico is the most 
frequent user of ADA as complainant (eleven times) and as a respondent (six). HUERTA-GOLDMAN, 
supra note 279, at 170–71. 
290. See Request for Consultations by Mexico, United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement 
from Mexico, WT/DS281/1 (Feb. 11, 2003); Request for Consultations by Mexico, Ecuador — 
Definitive Anti-Dumping Measure on Cement from Mexico, WT/DS191/1 (Mar. 17, 2000); Request for 
Consultations by Mexico, Guatemala — Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from 
Mexico, WT/DS156/1 (Jan. 8, 1999). 
291. See Appellate Body Report, United States — Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from 
Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008). 
292. See HUERTA-GOLDMAN, supra note 279, at 104. 
293. See Request for Consultations by Mexico, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS398/1 (Aug. 26, 2009); Request for Consultations by Mexico, China —
 Grants, Loans and Other Incentives, WT/DS388/1 (Jan. 8, 2009). 
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its development strategy demanded it.294 The Mexican government won a 
case against a U.S. regulation prohibiting Mexican trucks from entering 
U.S. territory, in violation of NAFTA. But Mexico took years to start 
retaliatory measures in the face of United States non-compliance. 
Moreover, in its retaliation measures, the government selected a mix of 
goods by a process that was merely designed to hurt and put pressure on 
the United States to revoke its prohibition; it paid no attention to how it 
could use countermeasures to support specific domestic industries. Indeed, 
Mexican officials forcefully rejected deliberately using these reprisals as a 
way to provide a temporary boost to domestic sectors. In their view, that 
would be an unjustifiable way to “pick winners” and would open the 
floodgates, with every industry demanding that their sector be included in 
the retaliation list.295 
The experiences of Brazil and Mexico illustrate two different attitudes 
towards the use of retaliation. Optimally, the use of a reprisal involves 
attacking the breaching country’s products whose exclusion would ratchet 
up pressure on that country to remove its trade barriers. On its face, the 
availability of a reprisal, which is a legally recognized privilege accorded to 
the winning party to harm the breaching country as a way to compensate 
for the original injury, can help a domestic industry because its foreign 
competitor has been hit with higher tariffs. Although Brazil seems to use 
this retaliation privilege effectively by deliberately targeting the domestic 
industries it can temporarily promote, Mexico seems reluctant to further 
any economic strategy other than hurting the losing country.296 It refuses 
to take advantage of this privilege for fear that such protection may 
engender rent seeking, even though such a tactic might not be deemed 
illegal. 
b. As Respondents 
Perhaps the starkest contrast in the trade policy of Mexico and Brazil is 
visible in the cases they have to deal with as respondents. Brazil has been 
challenged over a wide array of domestic measures designed to implement 
                                                                    
294. Final Report, In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, No. U.S.-Mex-98-2008-01 (Feb. 6, 
2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta20/truckingservices.pdf. 
295. Interview with official at the Ministry of the Economy #4 [name withheld], in Mexico City, 
Mex. (Dec. 15, 2010) (on file with author). 
296. One exception to this position was Mexico’s use of retaliatory tariffs on the case U.S. 
Safeguard Action Taken on Corn Brooms. After winning the case, Mexico used its entitlement to 
retaliate by increasing tariffs on U.S. HFCS (high fructose corn syrup) and thus reduce its 
competitive pressure on the domestic sugar industry. The government decided to “use the bargaining 
chip obtained in the broom case to increase tariffs on fructose.” Puig de la Parra, supra note 286, at 
132 (internal quotes and footnotes omitted). This action shows that this policy space is there and can 
be used at will. In the sugar case, however, this temporary relief was not tied to an overarching 
strategy or industrial policy to make the sector economically viable in the long term.  
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the government’s industrial policies, while Mexico has been targeted 
mostly for its anti-dumping measures. This pattern is consistent with the 
different trade policies in each country. Brazil has not only enacted anti-
dumping measures, but also implemented a series of industrial policies that 
seek to promote its domestic firms at home and abroad. Mexico, on the 
other hand, focuses on using anti-dumping measures or other 
countervailing duties to offset what it perceives as unfair trade measures by 
trade partners. It protects its domestic industries only when it deems that 
they are being harmed unfairly. 
i. Brazil 
Brazil’s trade policy goes beyond seeking market access and protecting 
its domestic industry against unfair competition. Out of fourteen cases as a 
respondent, Brazil has faced a couple of challenges to its anti-dumping 
measures and one to countervailing duties.  
The most prevalent cases challenge Brazil’s measures to support its 
industrial policies. These measures include local content requirements, 
import restrictions schemes, and export promotion programs concerning 
areas such as investment, intellectual property and subsidies.  
Consider first local content requirements, which Brazil has used to 
promote domestic manufacturing by conditioning the extension of certain 
benefits to a foreign exporter who can meet local production or content 
standards.297 The most prominent local requirements case involved the 
U.S. challenge of Brazil’s Industrial Property Law, which established a 
“local working” requirement to grant exclusive patent rights and to 
effectively forced compulsory licensing if the patent was not worked in 
Brazil.298 The United States deemed this requirement to be inconsistent 
with Brazil’s obligations under Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, and Article III of GATT 1994.299 In response, Brazil mounted 
                                                                    
297. Brazil implemented such a program in the automotive sector, which Japan, the United 
States, and the EU challenged in separate cases, citing several nondiscrimination articles, including 
Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994, Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Articles 3 and 27.4 
of the Subsidies Agreement. See Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Brazil — 
Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, supra note 52 (where the complainant was 
the European Communities); Request for Consultations by the United States, Dispute Settlement: 
DS65, Brazil — Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, supra note 52 
(where the complainant was the United States); Request for Consultations by the United States, 
Brazil — Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, WT/DS52/1 (Aug. 9, 
1996) (where the United States was the complainant); Request for Consultations by Japan, Brazil —
 Certain Automotive Investment Measures, supra note 52 (where Japan was the complainant). Eventually, 
Brazil reached an agreeable solution with all complainants and they dropped their cases. For an 
analysis of Brazil’s promotion policies in the auto industry see Mahrukh Doctor, Boosting Investment 
and Growth: The Role of Social Pacts in the Brazilian Automotive Industry, OXFORD DEV. STUD. 105 (2007). 
298. Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil — Measures Affecting Patent Protection, 
WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000). 
299. Article 27 explicitly prohibits discrimination based on place of invention or production. 
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a successful lawyering campaign during the Doha development round, 
which made public health an international priority and made clear that the 
TRIPS agreement had to be interpreted in light of public health concerns. 
Furthermore, Brazil filed a complaint against the United States, alleging 
that the U.S. Patent Code’s local working requirements in Chapter 18 — 
“Patent Rights in Inventions Made with Federal Assistance” — violated 
Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement and Articles III and XI of 
GATT 1994.300 Brazil also argued violation of Article 2 of the TRIMS 
Agreement, which contains a national treatment requirement.301 Through 
the health campaign, and the case against the United States, Brazil was able 
to frame the dispute in its favor and withstand tremendous pressure from 
the U.S. government and the pharmaceutical industry to change its law. 
Eventually, both countries reached an agreement and withdrew their 
respective complaints. 
Consider now import restrictions. Brazil imposed import prohibitions 
on “virtually all used consumer goods, including motor vehicles.”302 The 
most notable type of import restriction was its 2005 ban on retreaded and 
used tires. The EU challenged the ban, which exempted MERCOSUR 
countries, as discriminatory.303 Brazil justified the ban as necessary to 
protect human, animal, and plant life from dangerous tire waste, which 
increased the risk of disease transmission and toxic emissions from tire 
fires.304 Although the Panel agreed with Brazil’s Article XX(b) argument, it 
rejected the import ban on retreaded tires as applied because it was 
unjustifiably discriminatory and thus in breach of Article XX’s chapeau 
provision.305 
                                                                                                                                                            
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 
(1994). Article 28 requires WTO members to protect patent holders against third party use without 
their consent. It prevents “third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, 
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product.” Id. art. 28(1)(a). Article 
III (4) of GATT requires countries to give imported products national treatment, which the local 
working requirement violates. GATT, supra note 51, art. III (4). 
300. Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States — US Patents Code, WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 
2001). 
301. Id. 
302. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review Brazil: Report by the Secretariat, ¶ 14, WT/TPR/S/212 
(Feb. 2, 2009). 
303. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports 
of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/1 (Jun. 23, 2005). 
304. Shaffer et al., supra note 217, at 466. This justification purported to be aligned with GATT 
Article XX(b). 
305. Despite its import ban, Brazil permitted imports of used tires in significant amounts under 
court injunctions blocking the application of the law and also granted an exemption to MERCOSUR 
countries. Id. at 468 n. 350 (citing Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 258(b), WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007)). These exemptions undercut Brazil’s 
stated environmental and health objectives. 
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Despite losing this case, Brazil obtained two important findings. First, 
the AB declared that Brazil’s ban on tires was an appropriate measure and 
would have been upheld if it was applied on a non-discriminatory basis. It 
rejected the EC’s objection that there were other less trade-restrictive 
measures available to achieve Brazil’s objectives. Second, the AB held that 
panels must consider a country’s regulatory capacity when assessing 
whether there are reasonably available alternatives to the measure in 
question.306 This means that a developing country’s cost and technology 
constraints must be taken into account. 
Thus, despite losing this particular dispute, Brazil obtained a valuable 
rule change for future cases. To bring the measure into compliance with 
the AB ruling, Brazil halted the allowance of importation of used tires by 
court injunctions and passed legislation to make the import ban effective 
on “all reusable, recyclable and recycled solid waste that poses a public 
health or environmental risk.”307 As a result, the protection against 
imported retreaded or used tires, which effectively supports the Brazilian 
domestic tire industry, is still in force. 
Brazil has also adopted programs that have been challenged because 
they support certain new industries by incentivizing them to export. The 
most prominent example is PROEX308, whereby Brazil provided export 
financing assistance at significantly reduced interest rates to its airplane 
manufacturer, Embraer. Brazil defended the measure using a variety of 
rather creative arguments and resisted implementing the DSB’s adverse 
finding, instead making minor modifications and repeating previously 
rejected arguments.309 The WTO eventually approved Brazil’s PROEX 
scheme after the interest rate was adjusted to a level permitted under the 
OECD convention, although it was higher than Brazil’s previously 
suggested rates. 
                                                                    
306. Shaffer et al., supra note 217, at 467–68. 
307. Michael Kepp, Brazil’s Chief Justice Overturns Lower Court, Citing Health Risks from Imported Used 
Tires, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1554, 1554 (2007). 
308. In Portuguese: Programa de Financiamento às Exportações. 
309. For a complete list of the cases resolving the dispute, see Panel Report, Brazil — Export 
Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Brazil — 
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999); Panel Report, Brazil — 
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft — Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW 
(May 9, 2000); Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft — Recourse by 
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/AB/RW (Jul. 21, 2000); Arbitration Decision, Brazil — 
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft — Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil Under Article 22.6 of the DSU 
and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000); Panel Report, Brazil — Export 
Financing Programme for Aircraft — Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW2 
(Jul. 26, 2001). 
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ii. Mexico 
The cases in which Mexico acted as a respondent offer a picture of its 
domestic economic policies. Frequently, Mexico responded to perceived 
unfair trade measures by imposing countervailing duties or anti-dumping 
measures that were subsequently challenged by the target country.310 Out 
of fourteen cases in which Mexico has had to defend trade-related 
measures against other WTO members, eight have been anti-dumping 
measures and countervailing duties. In addition, Mexico has been sued for 
other measures it has taken, including customs valuations, import 
restrictions related to technical barriers to trade and sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, domestic taxes, and restrictions on access to 
telecommunications services.311 
Among Mexico’s challenged domestic measures, two stand out as 
unusual because they protected the domestic industry for reasons other 
than for unfair trade practices and the disputes were actually litigated: 1) a 
tax on soft-drinks that used sweeteners other than cane sugar,312 and 2) an 
anticompetitive regulation placed on its telecommunications sector.313 
Although these cases might look like exceptions, they in fact confirm the 
country’s free trade policy described above: neither of these measures were 
implemented to further any industrial policy. 
Take for example the soft drinks tax dispute. The tax regulations at 
stake arose as response to what the Mexican government considered to be 
an unfair U.S. trade practice under NAFTA.314 Unable to pursue its case 
under NAFTA due to the United States’s unwillingness to form a panel, 
the Mexican government passed a series of taxes and bookkeeping 
requirements affecting beverages containing sweeteners other than cane 
sugar, which the United States then proceeded to challenge in the WTO. 
Before the Panel, Mexico conceded that its measures were aimed at 
protecting the sale of domestic cane sugar, which was being displaced by 
imported high fructose corn syrup, but argued that the dispute was part of 
a larger disagreement over bilateral trade in sweeteners under NAFTA.315 
                                                                    
310. For example, Mexico imposed anti-dumping measures on high fructose corn syrup imports 
from the United States that were subsequently challenged by the United States. Panel Report, 
Mexico — Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, ¶ 1.2, 
WT/DS132/R (Jan. 28, 2000). 
311. See Disputes by country/territory, WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://tinyurl.com/eadxf 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (providing a link to the dispute summary of all fourteen cases where 
Mexico has been a respondent). See also HUERTA-GOLDMAN, supra note 279, at 112–14. 
312. See Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, 
WT/DS308/AB/R (March 6, 2006); Panel Report, Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages, ¶ 4.72, WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005). 
313. See Panel Report, Mexico — Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R (April 
2, 2004). 
314. Panel Report, supra note 312, at ¶ 4.72.  
315. Appellate Body Report, supra note 312, at ¶ 2; Panel Report, supra note 312, ¶¶ 4.96, 4.115; 
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Further, Mexico asserted a GATT Article XX(d) defense, justifying the 
taxes as necessary to secure U.S. compliance United States with its 
domestic regulation, of which NAFTA formed part.316 Both the Panel and 
AB rejected these claims and Mexico subsequently repealed the tax. 
This case was only one part of a complex and broader dispute about 
market access for Mexican sugar in the U.S. market and later U.S. fructose 
in the Mexican market.317 The dispute initially included antidumping 
measures by Mexico, which the United States challenged successfully 
before WTO and NAFTA panels.318 As a result of the taxes, three U.S. 
companies sued Mexico for undermining their investment interests under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 and won.319 The saga of this conflict makes clear that 
the sugar industries in both countries are highly protected and that both 
governments have a strong interest in supporting them.320 It also makes 
clear, in the case of Mexico, that it did not have a good legal strategy on 
how to challenge the U.S.’s refusal to adjudicate their disagreement about 
the terms of the U.S.’s market-access commitments for sugar under 
NAFTA. Whilst Mexico started out as the aggrieved party in the conflict, 
complaining that the United States had defected on its promise and was 
refusing to even adjudicate the disagreement according to NAFTA 
proceedings, it ended up as the villain of the story, enacting measures that 
made it vulnerable to challenges in the WTO and made it liable to pay 
$110.8 million in compensation for NAFTA investment panel decisions 
against it.321 None of these measures by Mexico seemed to have been 
                                                                                                                                                            
Puig de la Parra, supra note 286, at 163. 
316. Appellate Body Report, supra note 315, ¶ 13. 
317. For an overview of the sugar conflict, see GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, 
NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 310–27 (2005). See also Puig de la Parra, 
supra note 286, at 163. 
318. Panel Report, Mexico — Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the 
United States, ¶ 8.2, WT/DS132/R (Jan. 28, 2000); Article 21.5 Appellate Body Report, Mexico — 
Anti-Dumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, ¶¶ 135(b)–(c), 
WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). 
319. Cargill Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2 (NAFTA) (Sept. 18, 
2009); Archer Daniels Midland Co. and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05 (Nov. 21, 2007); Corn Products International Inc. v. 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1 (May 20, 2005), 21 ICSID REV. 364 (2006); see also 
Alice Vacek-Aranda, Sugar Wars: Dispute Settlement Under NAFTA and the WTO as Seen Through the Lens 
of the HFCS Case and Its Effects on U.S.–Mexican Relations, 12 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 121, 156 (2006).  
320. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 317, at 310–27. See also Puig de la Parra, supra note 
286, at 163. 
321. See, e.g., Cargill Inc., supra note 319, ¶ 559; Archer Daniels Midland Co. and Tate & Lyle 
Ingredients Americas Inc., supra note 319, ¶ 304; Corn Products International Inc., supra note 319, ¶ 
193 (establishing liability only; damage calculation pending or settled separately). The internal 
tensions between different branches of the Mexican government were at full sight concerning the tax 
measure. While Congress passed the tax, the President invoked special powers to suspend it and the 
Supreme Court finally upheld it. Similarly, a sugar mill challenged the constitutionality of a 
President’s expropriation decree, wich the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional on due process 
grounds. These tensions also revealed that there was not a clear, overarching strategy by the 
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enacted as a component of a coherent, long-term industrial policy but 
rather as immediate palliatives to the economic struggles and the political 
pressures of the sugar industry in the country. 
In the Mexico – Telecommunications case, the United States challenged 
Mexico’s regulations as anti-competitive and discriminatory and charged 
Mexico with tolerating privately-established market-access barriers and 
failing to take regulatory action.322 Mexico defended its regulatory 
measures, but it did not appeal the Panel’s unfavorable decision.323 In 
doing so, the Mexican government used this U.S. challenge as an 
opportunity to economically liberalize one of its own sectors, which had 
been dominated by Telmex, a powerful private monopoly, by inviting 
international competition. This was a decision in the direction of 
liberalization, and in this case, it was very likely desirable. What underlies 
the decision, however, is not the stricture of the international agreement, 
whose interpretation Mexico did not even appeal, but the economic policy 
of the country. Again, this case illustrates the trade policy strategy of 
Mexico. In both cases, however, none of the measures in question seemed 
to be part of a coherent, well thought out industrial policy aimed at 
promoting economic development. 
One potential objection to the analysis of Mexico’s experience in the 
WTO is that this forum is marginal for this country. After all, the main 
trade forum for Mexico is NAFTA, and trade with the United States 
represents 80% of its overall trade.324 While it is true that NAFTA is 
Mexico’s principal trade regime, the features of the country’s legal capacity 
and of trade strategy are practically the same in both fora. There is plenty 
to learn from Mexico’s experience in the world’s prime multilateral trade 
regime. Moreover, the WTO has turned out to be relevant in cases 
involving disputes between NAFTA members. Mexico has litigated 
disputes in the WTO, as complainant and defendant, against the United 
States in disputes that overlap with NAFTA. Thus, even for disputes 
concerning its NAFTA partners, Mexico needs to be able to use effectively 
the WTO. 
A second potential objection would be that Mexico’s policy autonomy 
is reduced by NAFTA’s more stringent legal obligations, particularly its 
                                                                                                                                                            
President and the Ministry of the Economy about how to deal with the problems of the domestic 
sugar industry in the face of U.S. refusal to grant greater market access and competition of U.S. 
fructose in the Mexican market. Puig de la Parra, supra note 286, at 157–65.  
322. See generally Panel Report, Mexico — Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, ¶ 3.1, 
WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004). 
323. See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS204, Mexico — Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://tinyurl.com/778wlwh (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (showing 
no Appellate Body ruling).  
324. Christopher E. Wilson, Working Together: Economic Ties Between the United States and Mexico, 
MEXICO INST., WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS (Nov. 2011), 
http://tinyurl.com/76h5276 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
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investment agreement in Chapter 11. In contrast to the WTO, which gives 
legal standing to States only, NAFTA gives private parties a right of action 
against member States. In addition, while WTO remedies are prospective 
and damages are computed only from the time of final judgment, NAFTA 
remedies are retrospective and require the losing State to compensate from 
the date that the measure was enacted. Under NAFTA, a trade measure 
might have investment ramifications and thus have a chilling effect on the 
potential action of the State to begin with. In this view, what explains the 
difference between Mexico and Brazil is simply that Mexico has more 
stringent international obligations, due to NAFTA, and is thus unable to 
pursue more heterodox economic policies. 
It is possible to speculate that the Mexican government feels less able to 
act because of the potential investment claims against it under NAFTA.325 
But the record shows that when the government has an interest in 
defending a particular industry, even in the most indefensible ways, it does 
so without regard to the potential investment claims. Even if Mexico had 
indeed less room for maneuver, there will be important terrain to be 
gained by using the available space. The main point is that what lies behind 
the government’s underuse of its policy autonomy is not its international 
obligations, even if NAFTA further reduces its space, but its own 
domestic development strategy. 
4. The Brazil Aircraft Case and the Export Subsidies Prohibition 
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, Brazil and Mexico 
pursue considerably different trade policies, development strategies, and 
legal responses in their interactions with other WTO members. For 
developing countries that are interested in achieving greater policy 
autonomy, it demonstrates that building legal capacity to become a RP, like 
Brazil and Mexico, is not on its own enough to take advantage of the 
WTO system. Legal capacity must be accompanied by a development goal 
that could make the RP push for favorable rules. This final Section uses a 
specific case to highlight how Brazil deploys a legal strategy to defend its 
program and the lessons that this type of lawyering can offer to developing 
countries.326 
One of Brazil’s most prominent industrial policy programs involved its 
support to the aircraft manufacturer firm Embraer. Under Brazil’s export 
financing program (PROEX), the government provided interest rate 
                                                                    
325. Interview with former official #1 at the Ministry of the Economy [name withheld], in 
Mexico City, Mex. (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author).  
326. For an analysis of Brazil’s strategy in subsidies and intellectual property, see Michelle Ratton 
Sanchez Badin, Developmental Responses to the International Trade Legal Game: Example of 
Intellectual Property and Export Credit Law Reforms in Brazil 49 (2011) (on file with the Virginia 
Journal of International Law Association).  
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equalization subsidies for Embraer’s sales at the amount of 3.8 percentage 
points of the actual interest rate on any transaction.327 Brazil’s government 
justified this subsidy by arguing that Embraer was at a competitive 
disadvantage in the world’s credit market due to the country’s sovereign 
risk.328 
Canada challenged Brazil’s PROEX program before the WTO, alleging 
that it was an export subsidy and thus violated the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM).329 At issue was the interpretation of 
two important rules. The first was SCM Agreement Article 27.4, which 
accords special and differential treatment to developing countries by 
allowing them to continue prohibited export subsidies for eight years after 
the Agreement entered into force, as long as the subsidies were gradually 
phased out during this period.330 The second rule of concern was item (k) 
on the illustrative list of prohibited subsidies in SCM Agreement Annex I. 
The interpretation of this second rule hinged upon whether the subsidy 
was used to secure a “material advantage” for the subsidy beneficiary or 
not.331 
The Panel agreed with Canada that Brazil had not met the requirements 
of Article 27.4 and therefore could not avail itself of the exception 
available for developing countries.332 In analyzing the text of item (k), the 
                                                                    
327. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 4, 
WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999). 
328. See id. at ¶ 15 (referring to Brazil’s justification of the subsidy program: “PROEX subsidies 
simply compensate for higher interest rates incurred on transactions involving Embraer that result 
from what it terms ‘Brazil risk’. ‘Brazil risk’ occurs because a Brazilian commercial entity cannot 
avoid bearing the additional cost of Brazil sovereign risk when it raises capital or finances a purchase 
or a sale. Brazil sovereign risk results from the perception in the market for debt securities as to the 
likelihood of repayment on schedule.” (citing Panel Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for 
Aircraft, ¶¶ 4.94–4.96, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999)). 
329. What ensued was a prolonged and highly acrimonious dispute; the dispute was up for 
decision six times. It started with the Panel report and the Appellate Body decision, both of which 
found Brazil’s measure to be in violation of the SCM Agreement. Canada then brought the dispute to 
an Article 21.5 implementation panel, which Brazil appealed and lost. Then, the dispute went to an 
Article 22.6 arbitration in charge of deciding whether the suspension of concessions proposed by 
Canada, as retaliation, was equivalent to the damage it had suffered. Finally, Brazil brought a second 
recourse to an Article 21.5 panel, which decided that Brazil’s modified measure was in compliance. 
From the moment that Canada requested formal consultations to the final report, the dispute took 
five years spanning from June 1996 to July 2001. Request for Consultations by Canada, Brazil — 
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/1 (June 21, 1996). 
330. SCM Agreement, supra note 35, art. 27.4. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Export Financing 
Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 126(c), WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999). 
331. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Aircraft, supra note 327, ¶¶ 166–77. 
332. To reach this conclusion, it determined that (1) subsidies consisted of actual expenditures 
and not of budgeted amounts, ¶ 7.74 (2) subsidies were granted when the NTN-1 bonds were issued 
and not when the letter of commitment was issued, ¶ 7.71 and (3) constant and not nominal dollars 
should be used for the calculation. ¶ 7.73 In the panel’s assessment, Brazil had indeed increased the 
level of its subsidies. Thus, it could not enjoy beneficial treatment under Article 27 of SCM 
Agreement, and PROEX was held to be a prohibited form of subsidy under Article 3.1(a). Panel 
Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶¶ 8.1–8.2, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999). 
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Panel concluded that, even if PROEX was a permitted government 
payment, it was still used in a way that secured a material advantage. 
Finding that the PROEX rate was indeed lower than the market rate, the 
panel determined that there was a material advantage. On appeal, although 
Brazil still lost the case, the AB modified the Panel’s interpretation of 
“material advantage.”333 Instead of looking at market rate, the AB used as 
a benchmark the OECD Arrangement, included in Annex 1 of the SCM 
Agreement, although it noted that this was not the only benchmark 
possible.334 
Brazil subsequently adjusted its program, which became PROEX II, in 
order to implement the ruling. PROEX II included as a new benchmark, 
the U.S. Treasury bond interest rate, plus a 0.2% spread.335 Canada 
challenged PROEX II before an Article 21.5 implementation panel, 
arguing that Brazil had not withdrawn its subsidies and that PROEX II 
was still not in compliance with the Subsidies Agreement.336 The Panel 
and, after Brazil’s appeal, the AB agreed on both counts, requiring Brazil 
to withdraw the ongoing subsidies granted under PROEX I and to bring 
PROEX II under compliance.337 
Canada subsequently requested authorization under Article 22 to 
retaliate. Brazil objected to the level of suspensions and referred the matter 
to an Article 22.6 arbitration. The Arbitrator authorized counter measures 
in the amount of 344.2 million Canadian dollars per year.338 Brazil adjusted 
its program one more time but Canada still considered this a continued 
violation of Brazil’s SCM obligations. Thus, Canada requested a second 
Article 21.5 implementation panel, which analyzed whether Brazil’s 
PROEX III program was in compliance. This time, the benchmark Brazil 
used was the OECD Arrangement. The Panel declared that it could no 
longer find Brazil’s PROEX program to be a prohibited subsidy.339 Canada 
decided not to appeal the ruling.340 
                                                                    
333. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Aircraft, supra note 327, ¶¶ 176–77; see Panel Report, 
Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶¶ 7.23, 7.33, 7.37, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999). 
334. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Aircraft, supra note 327, ¶ 181.  
335. Panel Report, Brazil — Aircraft — Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 2.3, 
WT/DS46/RW (May 9, 2000). 
336. Id. ¶ 3.1. 
337. Id. ¶ 7.1; Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft — Recourse 
by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 82, WT/DS46/AB/RW (Jul. 21, 2000). 
338. Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 4.1, 
WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000). 
339. The Panel found that PROEX III allowed Brazil sufficient discretion to discontinue 
subsidies when they conferred an advantage to regional aircraft. Panel Report, Brazil — Export 
Financing Programme for Aircraft — Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶ 5.55, 
WT/DS46/RW2 (July 26, 2001).  
340. See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS46, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., available at http://tinyurl.com/7xhso6a (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (showing 
no further appeals). 
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What Brazil Aircraft made clear is that what initially looks like an 
outright prohibition, such as a measure that provides exports subsidies, 
can be interpreted or adjusted to become less restrictive than as first 
appears. Brazil managed to turn what initially looked like a very explicit 
and somehow inflexible prohibition in the SCM into a more permissive 
rule.341 Brazil, a founding member of the WTO, not only did not gradually 
reduce its subsidies program to take advantage of the Article 27.5 
exception for developing countries in the SCM Agreement, but actually 
doubled it. When Canada challenged the program, it took another five 
years before adjusting its subsidies to a level that was palatable to a WTO 
implementation panel. 
Furthermore, an important part of this story is that soon after Canada 
had challenged Brazil’s PROEX program, Brazil sued Canada in the WTO 
for a variety of measures that Brazil considered export subsidies in favor 
of Bombardier, Canada’s aircraft manufacturer. The panel and AB found 
that some of Canada’s measures were inconsistent with the SCM 
Agreement.342 Brazil sued Canada a second time, challenging a variety of 
Canada’s export credits and loan guarantees.343 While most of the 
challenges were not successful, the panel decided that a Canadian program 
under the Export Development Corporation (ECD), was an export 
subsidy prohibited under the SCM Agreement. This dispute went to an 
Article 22.6 arbitration that granted Brazil the right to retaliate in the 
amount of $247 million.344 
Thus, this story shows that, through strategic litigation and lawyering, a 
state can assert and use its policy space to advance domestic agendas that it 
considers crucial to its economy.345 Brazil experienced tremendous 
pressure throughout the dispute and was required to change its PROEX 
program, but it did so gradually, carefully testing the limits of the 
restriction and moving its measure to a threshold point where it could be 
considered permissible. Of course, this does not mean that WTO subsidy 
                                                                    
341. Cf. Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and 
Cumulative Regulatory Measures, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 153 (2009) (arguing that the Brazil Tyre case 
similarly opens up policy space for developing countries). 
342. See Panel Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R 
(Apr. 14, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999). 
343. Panel Report, Canada — Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, 
WT/DS222/AB/R (Jan. 28, 2002). 
344. Recourse to Article 22.6 Arbitration Report, Canada — Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for 
Regional Aircraft, ¶ 4.1, WT/DS222/ABR (Feb. 17, 2003). 
345. This case, which started only one year after the WTO was created, mobilized the 
government of Brazil and made clear the need to be prepared to litigate and defend its interests in the 
dispute settlement system. It was a “wake-up call” for the government, but also to the private sector 
and civil society groups. Shaffer et al., supra note 217. The case became a matter of Brazilian foreign 
policy and national pride, which propelled trade relations to the center of the political scene in the 
country. 
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rules are free of constraints. After all, Brazil had to change its program and 
had to spend considerable resources in litigating disputes. However, at the 
very least, this case does show that an RP can succeed in defending a 
program it deems important for its domestic economic development and 
in ensuring that it does not overconform to the apparent restriction.346  
Brazil’s lawerying strategy achieved important benefits for its policy of 
supporting Embraer. First, it managed to keep the subsidies for aircraft 
purchase financing, even if at lower levels. Second, it managed to reduce 
the levels of subsidies that Canada accorded to Bombardier, its main 
competitor in the regional jets market, by getting the Panel and AB to 
declare that Canada was itself in breach of the Subsidies Agreement.347 In 
addition, Brazil got permission to retaliate against Canada because it failed 
to bring its subsidies into compliance. The case that Brazil brought against 
Canada demonstrated that export subsidies are important for developed 
countries as well as for developing countries. Finally, Brazil’s lawyering 
strategy got Brazil a ticket into OECD forum that sets the benchmarks for 
export subsidies that are excluded from the SCM Agreement 
prohibitions.348 As a result, Brazil is now an active participant in setting up 
the standards for aircraft finance and can more closely advance its interests 
there. 
D. The Limits of Strategic Litigation 
It should be noted that pursuing a strategy of litigation as means for 
legal, but also social or economic change, carries the risk of legitimating 
the system by achieving gains that are more symbolic than material. 349 
                                                                    
346. This is not to say that Brazil got all it wanted. The panel and AB could have accepted 
Brazil’s argument that its program did not offer a “material advantage” and could not be considered a 
subsidy. There was also no basis to make the OECD benchmark, which is a “safe haven” for OECD 
countries export subsidies, the baseline for calculating “material advantage.” As Robert Howse notes, 
this case uncessarily rejected Brazil’s position that the “marketplace” baseline in paragraph (k) “be 
adjusted to the needs and circumstances of developing countries” because it was not a special and 
differential treamtment provision. This decision is particularly troublesome in view of the SCM’s Art. 
27.2 recognition that “subsidies may play and important role in economic development programmes 
of developing country Members.” Howse, supra note 65, at 21–22. Howse notes that, as a result of 
this case developing countries have put this issue in the Doha Round negotiations. Id. at. 22 
347. See Panel Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R 
(Apr. 14, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999); Panel Report, Canada — Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for 
Regional Aircraft, ¶ 8.3, WT/DS222/R (Jan. 28, 2002). 
348. Ratton Sanchez Badin, supra note 326, at 49. But see Howse, supra note 346, at 21–22 (arguing 
that baseline subsidies set by the OECD are insufficient to balance the difficulty of finding 
competitive access to capital in developing countries). 
349. “Rule-change may make use of the courts more attractive to ‘have-nots’. Apart from 
increasing the possibility of favorable outcomes, it may stimulate organization, rally and encourage 
litigants. It may directly redistribute symbolic rewards to ‘have-nots’ (or their champions). But 
tangible rewards do not always follow symbolic ones. Indeed, provision of symbolic rewards to 
‘have-nots’ (or crucial groups of their supporters) may decrease capacity and drive to secure 
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This may create the impression that the transformation has been 
significant and that no further changes are required in the WTO system. 
The argument of the paper, however, is that a lawyering and litigation 
strategy should be viewed as complementary to diplomatic strategies with 
potential “legislative” and institutional changes in the context of 
Ministerial rounds, as well as with work in the various WTO technical 
committees,350 public campaigns, and whatever other mechanisms 
developing countries can find to advance their interests. The project of 
becoming a RP and increasing legal capacity holds promise only if it is 
inspired by a development strategy. It is the furthering of that strategy that 
can work against conformism with illusory changes. 
A potential objection to the project of carving out policy autonomy 
through litigation is that this is an agenda that only middle-income 
countries can undertake. According to this view, only relatively wealthy 
developing countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, have the economic and 
human resources to devise a strategy like the one I have described. Poorer 
countries have other priorities and do not have the resources or cannot 
invest them in such a gradual reform. 
It might be right that this is a project that only middle-income 
countries, with a sizable economy and significant trade volume, would be 
interested or even capable of taking on. The list of current repeat players 
in the WTO suggests that currently it is primarily these countries that are 
involved in active litigation. Of course, this might change if litigation 
continues to be the main avenue for reform and poor countries enter the 
fold. However, even if this was a strategy out of reach for poor countries, 
there are two important points to consider. First, the asymmetries between 
poor and middle-income countries are also present in the negotiating 
rounds that seek legislative reforms. On this front, it is also middle-income 
countries that generally take the lead, have the resources, and are better 
situated to promote their interests. This raises a serious concern about 
representation of poor countries’ interests in the WTO regime but it is not 
a problem excusive to the litigation strategy. The question is whether 
strategic lawyering and litigation might ultimately have something to 
contribute to the benefit of poor countries. Second, the changes in rule 
interpretation that middle-income countries obtain through litigation 
would be available and potentially beneficial for poor countries too. 
                                                                                                                                                            
redistribution of tangible benefits.” Galanter, supra note 77, at 137. 
350. See, e.g., Andrew Lang & Joanne Scott, The Hidden World of WTO Governance, 20 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 575 (2009) (arguing that although most academic attention on the WTO focuses on the dispute 
settlement mechanism, there are important technical committees that disseminate information, 
facilitate technical assistance, and are influential in creating dominant interpretation of open-ended 
rules). For a qualification of this argument, bringing to the fore the centrality of states in WTO 
committees, see Richard H. Steinberg, The Hidden World of WTO Governance: A Reply to Andrew Lang 
and Joanne Scott, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1063 (2009). 
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Moreover, even if legislative reform were the preferable tack, the terms 
of the new agreements would still need to be interpreted and, again, those 
countries with better institutional capacity to be repeat players and to 
actively pursue their domestic economic interests would benefit the most. 
So, to the extent that their priorities allow, poor countries would do well to 
invest in developmental legal capacity. 
It is important to mention the work of the WTO Advisory Center, 
which provides legal advice and legal counsel to developing countries at 
below market fees. The center has been praised for its professionalism and 
for facilitating access by developing countries to the WTO dispute 
settlement system. The center is a phenomenal resource for poor 
countries. It could be used as a way to jump-start and develop a country’s 
institutional capability. But the center will focus on the specific case at 
hand and it seems unlikely that it will have the long-term interests of the 
country in mind. As useful as it can be, the center cannot be a substitute 
for having a development strategy. A country may use the center as part of 
its strategy but it cannot rely on the center to develop one. 
This Article has adopted a state-centric analysis, looking at how 
countries may use lawyering and litigation strategies in pursuance of policy 
space. The assumption is that policy autonomy can be put in the service of 
a development strategy and that, indeed, the strategy is often the 
motivation to look for space in the first place. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the international position of the state represents its national interest. 
This assumption is subject to limits and future research could complement 
this analysis with an account of how the state articulates its trade policy 
domestically: which sectors, interests, or groups, are benefiting from the 
state’s strategy and based on what justifications? In other words, who wins 
when the state wins? 
Even if one assumes that policy space is desirable, it is not clear that it 
should only be the task of developing countries or that they are always the 
best situated actors to expand the flexibilities in the WTO. As it has been 
noted in the Article, developed countries are already doing this to 
accommodate their interests and the question is how developing countries 
may fend for themselves. However, there is no reason to limit the analysis 
to states. Future research can expand on how other stakeholders of the 
international trade regime, such as NGOs may advance expansion of 
policy space either by acting domestically or by further opening the WTO 
to their participation.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued against the commonly held assumption that 
WTO legal obligations overly restrict countries’ regulatory autonomy. 
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Despite the presence of restrictions, there is still flexibility in the system 
for countries to carve out regulatory space for themselves. That countries 
can expand their policy autonomy shows that governments of developing 
countries have more agency and responsibility than development scholars 
typically admit. At the same time, however, the asymmetry of power and 
resources between countries does affect their experience in the system and 
thus influences the outcomes to a greater extent than liberal trade scholars 
usually acknowledge. 
This Article provided an account of how countries are creating policy 
space in a way that is currently underappreciated in existing academic 
literature. This space relies on the ability of countries, as RPs, to make use 
of textual open-endedness in legal obligations, to seek out favorable rule 
interpretation, and to actively participate in the WTO system through 
strategic lawyering and litigation. To pursue this strategy, countries invest 
in “developmental legal capacity,” through which governments recognize 
the need to make gains in policy autonomy in order to pursue economic 
policy goals that may be in tension with the WTO’s free trade objectives. 
This Article drew on two case studies to examine the availability of 
policy space within WTO obligations and the role of developmental legal 
capacity. It analyzed the trajectories of Brazil and Mexico in the WTO to 
show two different experiences of RPs. The divergent lawyering and 
litigation experiences of Brazil and Mexico reflect different attitudes 
towards the free trade regime inaugurated by the WTO. Mexico seems to 
have considered WTO membership — part of its trade liberalization 
policy — as a strategy for economic growth in itself. Its participation in 
the regime has been mostly to ensure market access for its domestic 
producers abroad and to defend its own market from what it considers 
unfair competition. It has largely abandoned its powers to selectively 
promote specific sectors in which it may create comparative advantages 
with greater growth potential. In contrast, Brazil seems to have combined 
a strategy to promote market access for its exports with domestic measures 
to promote economic sectors it considers valuable. When other countries 
in the WTO have challenged those measures, Brazil has defended them by 
seeking to expand its policy space within the system. In this way, the 
experience of Brazil seems to show that, claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding, states can take an active role in the promotion of their 
domestic industries and their economic future, even under WTO 
constraints. 
The lesson to draw from the experience of Brazil and Mexico is not that 
one trajectory is better than the other. Rather, the lesson is that the 
economic trajectory depends, not only on the international trade regime, 
but also on the domestic economic strategy of each country. Therefore, 
the responsibility of the virtues and vices that one may associate with each 
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of these divergent strategies must be placed largely on the domestic 
government and the economic policies it has decided to follow. 
To say that we should turn our attention to the domestic economic 
policies is not to say, however, that the international legal framework is 
unimportant. Rather, it is to say that despite the international constraints, 
countries can expand their policy space — if they deem it desirable — and 
find room for policies they want to advance. The Article recognizes that 
there are limits to what countries can do. Not all rules are ambiguous and 
subject to favorable interpretation. Not all strategic lawyering will turn to 
an advantage either. Moreover, carving out policy space requires significant 
resources — material, human, political — that not all countries may easily 
muster in order to become RPs. Poorer countries may therefore 
experience greater limits — real or apparent — imposed by the 
international trade regime. However, to show that countries subjected to 
similar international obligations can pursue divergent trade and 
development policies is to make clear that there is policy space and that 
this space can be put to different uses with divergent outcomes. 
This Article has sought to challenge the argument, commonly made by 
developing countries’ governing elites, to wit that their country’s legal 
obligations “tie their hands” and command them to act in a specific way. 
Instead, the Article calls attention to the agency of developing countries’ 
governments. While recognizing that there are important limits set by the 
architecture of the WTO and the asymmetry of power between its 
members, the Article argued that there is flexibility within the system to 
expand developing countries’ regulatory autonomy beyond what is 
currently recognized. Developing countries’ governments should bear 
responsibility — and their citizens should hold them accountable — for 
the kind of developing strategy they pursue, or refrain from pursuing, 
within the international trade regime. 
